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ABSTRACT
Hargesheimer, Richard S., M.A., Fall 1983 History
Democracies and Diplomats: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the American
Foreign Service, 1933-1939 (434 pp.)
..Director:' Jules A. Karl in .
The American peoplgjjong have viewed the professional diplomat 
through jaundiced lenses. To the average American, the diplomat 
is an elitist, an undemocratic striped-pants boy, and a useless 
social ornament when not otherwise engaged in nefarious negotia­
tions and Machiavellian intriques. In part, popular distaste for 
the diplomat stems from the nature of diplomacy itself and its 
age-old reputation as an unsavory business. In larger measure, 
however, the distaste of American democratic opinion for the dip­
lomat derives from the nation's historical experience and its pre­
sumably democratic character. Imbued with an egalitarianism that 
favors the amateur over the expert, Americans predictably distrust 
the diplomatist whose task requires special qualities not often 
found in the ordinary citizen. Although few Americans pay much 
attention to foreign affairs, and fewer still know of the Foreign 
Service or have looked upon a diplomat, the American national 
experience— the way Americans have looked at themselves and 
others— renders popular acceptance of the professional diplomat 
tenuous.
Among modern American political leaders, none has personified ' 
the distaste of democratic opinion for the diplomatist more than 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt. He regarded the career diplomats 
as frivolous dilettantes, out of touch with the pulse of the 
American public. As President, he displayed an almost contempuous 
disregard for the Foreign Service. In selecting chiefs-of-mission—  
ambassadors and ministers— to guide United States interests abroad, 
FDR easily yielded to spoils politics, abundantly displayed his 
penchant for haphazard and ad hoc administrative decision-making, 
and demonstrated a scant regard for the Foreign Service as an in­
strument of United States foreign policy.
Like the majority of his countrymen, FDR seldom considered 
whether a nation-even a rich and powerful one— could long ignore 
the dictates of constructing a sound diplomatic tradition without 
peril to its national interests. For most of its history, the 
United States has relied— in peace as well as in war— upon its 
commercial and technological prowess to secure its interests over­
seas. Whether a good professional diplomatic service is compatible 
with the temper of a democratic society is a question Americans 
have yet to resolve satisfactorily.
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Diplomacy is a profession that requires 
of its votaries a certain amount of 
culture and experience in society.
It is natural therefore that the 
diplomatic service should he recruited 
from that section of society which 
possess these qualifications.
Jules Cambon
We look at the world of diplomacy... 
we find that there are many places 
where a rugged halfback from the 
University of Michigan...can do a better 
gob than any Phi Beta Kappa who ever 
came out of the Ivy League. 2Congressman Leo W. O'Brien
1 DEMOCRACIES AND DIPLOMATS:
EGALITARIANISM AND ELITISM
Writing in The Foreign Affairs Quarterly in 1955, the 
diplomat-scholar George F. Kennan reflected upon "the venerable 
and delicate question of the compatibility of a good profes-
3sional diplomatic arm with the temper of a democratic society."
^The Diplomatist (London: Philip Allen, 1931. Originally 
published in 1926 as Le Diplomate), 69.
2U.S. Congress, House, 86th Cong., 1st sess., July 21,
1959, Congressional Record, CV, 13897. O'Brien served in the 
U.S. House from 1952 to 1969 as a congressman from Albany, New 
York. Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774- 
1971 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), 1482.
3 "Future of Our Professional Diplomacy," 33 (July 1955), 
573. See also Kennan, "Foreign Policy and the Professional 
Diplomat," The Wilson Quarterly, 1 (Winter 1977), 148-157.
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Like others before him, Kennan diagnosed a tension that
4strains relations between diplomats and democracies. While
the art of diplomacy "requires a combination of certain
special qualities" that "are not always to be found...in the
ordinary man," the "egalitarian illusions" of democratic
peoples "tempts them to distrust the expert and to credit 
5the amateur."
Kennan wrote with particular vexation of the "chronic 
distaste" of American democratic opinion for "the image" of 
the professional diplomat. "There is no criticism of" the 
diplomatist "older and more ubiquitous," he stated, "than the 
charge" that he is an elitist, removed from the society he 
represents, who leans to foreign ways and modes of thought, 
and, hence, is unsuitable a=s an agent for the conduct of United
gStates foreign relations. Although career diplomats in most 
democratic countries suffer some popular domestic suspicion, 
the American diplomatist, Kennan asserted, bears "some
7burdens that are unique in intensity if not in nature."
4Countless commentators have observed a lack of harmony 
between professional diplomacy and democracy. Besides Jules 
Cambon and Kennan cited above, two of the more prominent are 
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy In America (2 vols.; N.Y.: 
Schocken Books, 1970. Originally published in 1835), I, 273- 
274; Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1963. Originally published in 1939), 42-54.
~*The material quoted is from Nicolson, Diplomacy, 55, 
and his The Evolution of Diplomacy (N.Y.: Collier Books, 1966. 
Originally published in 1954 as The Evolution of Diplomatic 
Method),124.
^"Future of Diplomacy," 573.
7"Foreign Policy and the Professional Diplomat," 149.
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In few nations has the distaste of public opinion for 
the diplomatist been more pronounced than in the United States. 
Unlike many of their counterparts in foreign lands, American
8diplomats have rarely enjoyed the esteem of their countrymen.
At best, Americans have displayed benign indifference toward
their representatives abroad. At worst, Americans have
9scorned, vilified and ostracized them. When not damned, 
American diplomats have been largely invisible.
Popular distaste for the diplomatist stems, in part, 
from the nature of diplomacy itself.^ Defying precise
oAmerican professional diplomats have been painfully, 
even bitterly, cognizant of the lack of public appreciation 
for their profession. And there may be no better testimony 
to the distaste of American popular opinion for the profes­
sional diplomat than the memoirs of the diplomats themselves.
Even after accounting for a natural human tendancy to resent 
being unappreciated, the memoirs of American diplomats over 
the past fifty years are remarkable for their attention to 
the public's lack of esteem of their profession. A cursory 
glance at the memoirs of foreign diplomats reveals no such 
similar anguish on their part and is, thus, suggestive of the 
uniqueness of the strain between diplomats and democratic 
opinion in the United States. For example, see Henry Serrano 
Villard, Affairs at State (N.Y.: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1965), 15.
9For example, see Gary May, "The 'New China Hands' and 
the Rape of the China Service," a review of The China Hands 
by E. j. Kahn, Jr., Reviews In American History, 4 (March
1976), 120; Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., American Ambassador:
Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United States Diplo­
matic Tradition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966) , vii; Hugh De 
Santis, The Diplomacy of Silence: The American Foreign 
Service, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War, 1933-1947 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 11, 21.
■^Henry W. Wriston dismisses the argument— most notably 
advanced by George Kennan, Jules Cambon, and Harold Nicolson—  
that democracy is more hostile to professionals in diplomacy 
than other types of government. He attributes whatever difficul­
ties exist to the character of diplomacy itself. A university 
president, Wriston chaired a committee under the Secretary of
-4-
definition and associated with Machiavellian intrigue and 
duplicity, diplomacy easily prompts visions of secrecy and 
wickedness.^
Nor is the popular American image of the diplomatist, 
himself, without basis in reality. During the nineteenth 
century, when spoils politics held sway, presidents regularly 
filled the diplomatic and consular corps from the ranks of 
the underserving— unemployed politicians, political hacks, 
and the lazy sons of the rich and powerful. Even after 1924, 
when the United States combined the two corps into a merito­
cratic Foreign Service, men could be found in the Service who 
possessed few other qualifications than Ivy League educations 
and connections in high society.
The roots of the "chronic distaste" of American popular 
opinion for the diplomatist largely arV.se, however, from the
State in 1954 whose purpose was to broaden the base of selec­
tion to the Foreign Service to more faithfully mirror American 
life. His lecture-turned-book is a rebjuttal to Kennan's 
article of 1955 in The Foreign Affairs fQuarterlyf. Wriston, 
Diplomacy in Democracy (N.Y.: Harper?& Brothers, 1956) ,
7-9, 47. -J I
■^Writing about 1945 on a proposed, but never completed, 
book on diplomacy, the American diplomat Hugh Gibson described 
the "general conception of diplomacy...[as] Of an intermediate 
state between this world and another, administered jointly by 
Santa Claus and the devil and functioning by miracles and 
hocus-pocus. It is secret and slimy and no healthy-minded man 
wants anything to do with it. Foreign diplomats are sinister 
and astute; ours are idiotic." Perrin C. Galpin, ed.,
Hugh Gibson, 1883-1954: Extracts From His Letters and Anec­
dotes From His Friends (N.Y. : Belgian American Foundation, 
1955), 27.
-5-
12nation's historical experience and democratic culture.
In the New World, historical circumstance and democratic 
ideology combined to belie the acceptance of professional 
diplomacy. Blessed with geographical security, deeply suspi­
cious of foreign political entanglements, and instilled with 
a sense of its own special world mission, the young American
republic had no desire or reason to cultivate a professional
13diplomatic elite. In advancing its democratic mission, the 
United States relied— for most of its history, in peace as 
well as in war— upon its commercial and technological prowess, 
propelled by a bountiful continent and an egalitarian ethic 
that encouraged private individual initiative. Whenever 
diplomatic problems arose, the United States called forth 
individual leaders, not diplomatic elites, to resolve them 
as circumstances dictated.
Americans early rejected the aristocratic, class values
14associated with European society and diplomacy. Convinced 
that all elites were inherently undemocratic, Americans empha­
sized instead equality, not of status or income, but of
12Published over 144 years ago, the best work on the 
American character remains Toqueville's Democracy In America.
See also David M. Potter, People of Plenty; Economic Abundance 
and the American Character (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1954); Arthur M. Schlesinger, "What then is the American, 
this new man?" in Schlesinger, Paths To The Present (Boston : 
Houghton Mifflin, 1949), 3-23.
13Morrell Heald and Lawrence S. Kaplan, Culture and 
Diplomacy: The American Experience (Westport: Greenwood Press,
1977), 4. See also Potter, People of Plenty, 128.
14Heald and Kaplan, Culture and Diplomacy, 4-5; Potter, 
People of Plenty, 91, 118.
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15opportunity. Ensuing expansion across a continent of
enormous economic wealth blurred the real distinctions that
separated Americans, strengthened the ideal of equality of
opportunity, and gave rise to a passionate egalitarianism
16espoused by political leaders and citizens alike.
Upon the wellspring of American egalitarianism, the 
professional diplomat is marked as a natural target of pop­
ular opprobrium. The ideology of egalitarianism promises to 
each citizen the freedom and the opportunity to reach the 
highest plateaus in society. No one is considered naturally 
superior to anyone else. And what most Americans regard as 
most American— democratic self-government and equality of
opportunity— they also regard as universal models for all 
17men.
''■̂ Potter, People of Plenty, 91-92.
16If American political leaders do not share the 
egalitarian fervor of the citizenry, they court it and pay 
homage to it. Today, the public opinion poll stands as 
the shrine to egalitarianism in the United States, where 
political leaders genuflect to the tabulated chants of 
individual citizens. See Herbert J. Storing, "American 
Statesmanship: Old and New," in Robert A. Goldwin, ed., 
Bureaucrats, Policy Analysts, Statesmen: Who Leads? 
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), 
88-113. Storing offers some brilliant insights into the 
evolution of American egalitarianism and the subsequent 
decline in political statesraanship--from the leadership of 
the Founding Fathers based upon their profound concern 
over the problematic nature of democracy to the leadership 
of modern-day politicians based upon their search for an 
elusive consensus among the electorate.
17Heald and Kaplan, Culture and Diplomacy, 4.
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By contrast/ the diplomatist is an example of what 
egalitarianism is not.*** According to its high priests, sound 
diplomacy requires a sophisticated command of the world that 
not anyone can acquire. And diplomacy acknowledges the exis­
tence of legitimate, conflicting and divergent interests among 
nations. To accept professional diplomacy is to call into 
question the ideology of American egalitarianism.
Bounded by historical experience, American egalitarianism 
renders popular reconciliation with professional diplomacy 
tenuous. Although few Americans habitually pay much attention 
to foreign affairs, and fewer still know of the Foreign Service 
or have looked upon a diplomat, the nature of the American 
experience— the way Americans have looked at themselves and 
others— makes public distaste for the diplomatist predictable, 
if not inevitable. Whether aware of the Foreign Service 
or not, most Americans hold a view of their democratic heri­
tage that contrasts sharply with the portrait of the diploma­
tist periodically painted by popular spokesmen and elected 
officials.
18Twentieth century egalitarianism, with its irresistable 
movement toward the broadest possible base of selection, has 
outpaced efforts to "dearistocratize" the Foreign Service.
- 8 -
I
Americans, more often than not, have cast profiles of 
diplomats in pejorative stereotypes. As unveiled by journal­
ists, elected officials, and other conveyers of public atti­
tudes, American diplomats have appeared as undemocratic and 
unAmerican elitists, as smartly-dressed striped-pants boys 
strutting around with affected European mannerisms, as 
cookie-pushers catering to ladies of high society, and as 
useless social ornaments when not otherwise engaged in nefar­
ious negotiations and Machiavellian intrigues. Alongside 
their more sinister and astute foreign counterparts, American 
diplomats have been portrayed as lazy and inept.
The public's image of diplomats has reflected hues of
suspicion and disparagement. Writing in 1931, the self-styled
savant and columnist Robert S. Allen contended that people in
the United States "who have heard of the State Department at
all" know of it as "a social club whose members are selected
from blue-stocking Bostonians, wield their forks with their
left hands, and are no more representative of American life
19than the Redskins" who first inhabited the land. Allen 
characterized the "typical" Foreign Service officer serving 
abroad as "a young man with glasses who has spent all his 
life since graduation in the rarefied atmosphere of pink 
teas," soiling "his hands at no manual labor more arduous than
^/Robert S. Allen// Washington Merry-Go-Round 
(N.Y.: Horace, Liveright, 1931), 139.
bridge." The Foreign Service, he inveighed, places "a premium
on pink peppermints and protocol" and sympathizes only with
20the point of view "of entrenched wealth."
Others before and since have echoed similar shibboleths. 
Robert Bendiner, a Washington correspondent who began his 
career in the 19 20s on the State Department "beat," wrote that 
the social backgrounds of American professional diplomats
21"tend m  the main to reduce democracy to an abstraction."
Another journalist, Joseph Alsop, commented during the 1940s
that "to most people the State Deparment means...a lot of
Anglophiles in striped pants, who have good manners and have
22married rich wives." From the perspective of the 19 50s, 
court-historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., agreed. He contended 
that "Americans had reasonably regarded" the State Department 
"as a refuge for effete and conventional men who adored coun­
tesses, pushed cookies and wore handkerchiefs in their sleeves.
20 Ibid., 146, 162.
21The Riddle of the State Department (N.Y.: Farrar & 
Rinehart, 1942), 111. See also Bertram D. Hulen, Inside the 
Department of State (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1939), 76-78; Warren 
F. Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy in the United States, 
1779-1939; A Study in Administrative History (Chicago; 
University of Chicago Press, 1961), 225.
22Martin Weil, A Pretty Good Club; The Founding 
Fathers of the U.S. Foreian Service (N.Y.: W. W. Norton,
1978), 11.
23The Vital Center (2d ed.; Boston; Houghton Mifflin, 
1962. Originally published in 1948), 166.
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Public identification of the Foreign Service officer with
the "ugly American" gained wide notoriety upon publication of
24the popular novel by that name in 1958 . In The Ugly American/ 
a pompous, blundering American ambassador destroys United 
States credibility in a hypothetical Southeast Asian country 
when he loses the support of the local masses to the more 
cunning and skillful Communist diplomats. That the American 
ambassador was a politically-appointed amateur envoy, rather 
than a trained professional diplomat, hardly mattered. The 
entire Foreign Service was besmirched.
Elected representatives of the American people long 
have looked askance upon diplomats. Addressing his congres­
sional colleagues in 1859, a representative from Ohio stated 
that he knew "of no area of the public service that is more 
emphatically useless than the diplomatic service— none in the 
world." For American commercial purposes, he expounded, "our 
consuls discharge all the duties that are required. The
diplomatic ministers discharge no duties of a commercial 
25character." Speaking from the same platform several years 
later, a senator from New York was even more defamatory.
"The Diplomatic Service," he exhorted, "is working our ruin
24William Lederer and Eugene Burdick, The Ugly American 
(N.Y.: W. W. Norton, 1958). On the publicity and notoriety 
that the book lent to the Foreign Service, see Congressional 
Record, CV, 13898; Villard, Affairs at State, 6; Nicolson, 
Diplomacy, 139-141.
25Representative Benjamin W. Stanton, January 19, 1859, 
Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 24-25. (The quotation is 
from the Congressional Globe, pt. 1, 35th Cong. 2d sess., 459.)
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by creating a desire for foreign customs and foreign follies.
The disease is imported by our returning diplomats....They
should...be quarantined/'he concluded, "as we quarantine
26foreign rags through fear of cholera."
Congress, generally, has viewed the Foreign Service 
through jaundiced lenses. In describing executive reorgan­
ization of the diplomatic corps in 1937, a writer for The New 
York Times summarized the congressional portrait of American 
diplomats:
Their [the diplomats] difficulty has 
always been to get Congress to accept them 
as anything.better than 'cookie-pushers.1 
The average member of Congress, 
when he gave the matter any thought at 
all, regarded the foreign service [sic] 
men as amiable youths from wealthy fami­
lies, who liked to dally about the world 
with little to do, wearing white spats 
and going to teas. Sometimes...Congress 
thought these boys ought to pay the 
government to let them lead their idyllic 
lives.
I Presidents, especially, have regarded diplomats with 
skepticism. "All Presidents I have known," recalled Dean 
Achqson, who served under or consulted with most presidentsIfrom 1933 to 1968, "have had uneasy doubts about the State 
Department...Foreign Service officers seem to them cynical,
26Senator William E. Robinson, January 10, 1885, Ilchman, 
/Professional Diplomacy, 27. (The quotation is from Congres­
sional Record, XVI, 48th Cong., 2d sess., 613).
27Harold B. Hinton, "Career Diplomats Boosted," July 
18, 1937, sec. 4, 7.. That the Foreign Service has never 
commanded a visible voting constituency accounts, in part, 
for congressional indifference toward diplomats. But it 
does not explain the negative image that many congressmen 
have of diplomats.
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28unimaginative, and negative."
Presidents as diverse as Harry Truman and Richard
Nixon have cast aspersions upon the diplomatic establishment.
To Truman, "protocol and striped-pants" were "a pain in the 
29neck." While acknowledging that a lot "of extremely bright 
people," many "of common sense," worked in the State Depart­
ment, Truman found objectionable those officers whom he
perceived "have had very little association with actual people
30down to the ground." To President Nixon, diplomats were
31simply "those fags."
In an earlier era, President Theodore Roosevelt, too, 
expressed doubts about diplomats. He wrote a friend that 
"there are a large number" of men occupying United States 
missions abroad "who belong to what I call the pink-tea set,
28Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Depart­
ment (N.Y.: W. W. Norton, 1969), 250.
OQThayer, Diplomat (N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 19 59) , 224. 
See also Thomas H. Etzold, The Conduct of American Foreign 
Policy: The Other Side of Diplomacy (N.Y.: New Viewpoints,
1977), 98; Walter Mills, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (N.Y.: 
Viking Press, 1951), 62.
30Truman to Dave H. Morgan, January 28, 1952, Robert 
H. Ferrell, ed., Off The Record: The Private Papers of Harry 
S. Truman, (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1980), 235. President John F. 
Kennedy's assessment of therState Department and the Foreign 
Service was no less charitable. See Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.,
A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 406-44/1
31 .Roger Morris, Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger
and American Foreign Policy (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1977),
145.
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who merely reside in the service instead of working in the
service." Of course, he continued; "most...embassies and
legations are pink-tea places. A few are not, and in these
32we need real men."
II
To some extent, diplomats in nearly every country have 
experienced the charges hurled at American diplomats.
Abstact, often mysterious and foreign to the day-to-day con­
cerns of the indigenous masses, diplomacy has yielded few
33platitudes to its practitioners.
Unlike medicine, law, or any number of trades, diplomacy 
defies precise definition. Diplomacy is variously defined as 
"the management of international relations by negotiation"; 
as "the method by which" relations among, sovereign nations 
"are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys"; and as 
"the business or art of the diplomatist." Diplomacy "is not 
a system of moral philosophy" or the formulation of foreign 
policy, but "the application of intelligence and tact to the
32T. Roosevelt to Richard Harding Davis, January 3,
1905, Elting E. Morrison, ed., The Letters of Theodore 
Roosevelt (8 vols.; Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1951) , IV, 1089-1090.
33For instance, see Kennan, "Foreign Policy and the 
Professional Diplomat," 148-149, and "Future of Diplomacy," 
573-574; Gordon A. Craig, "The British Foreign Office From 
Grey toAustin Chamberlain," in Craig and Felix Gilbert, ed.,
The Diplomats: 1919-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1953), 47; Hugh Gibson, The Road to Foreign Policy 
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, 1944), 42.
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34conduct of official relations" between governments. As an 
arcane business, diplomacy is subject to confusion and misun­
derstanding on part of laymen, if and when they contemplate 
the subject at all.
The nature of diplomacy, itself, is unlikely to render
its practitioner, the diplomatist, a figure of honor and
affection among his countrymen. Serving abroad in foreign
capitals, the diplomatist is separate in time and place from
his native land and,', thus, readily acquires the status of an
outsider. Functioning as a principal source of understanding
between his government and another, he seeks, ideally, to
reconcile and to accommodate conflicting national interests,
not to impose conformity to his nation's standards or to
35achieve victory in any ultimate sense. While representing
his nation's interests, he is sometimes the initiator of
distasteful compromises that appear to be the abandonment of
domestic-political principles. As a messenger, he is "more
likely-to be remembered as the bearer of bad news than good,"
3 6if he is remembered at all.
34The definitions are taken from Nicolson, Diplomacy,
24, 42, 53-54, 87.
35For instance, see Kennan, "Future of Diplomacy," 573- 
574; Cambon, The Diplomatist, 79, 84; Gibson, Road to Foreign 
Policy, 42-43; Arthur Andrew, Defence By Other Means; Diplomacy 
for the Underdog (Ontario; John Degell Ltd., 1970), 56-121.
36Andrew, Defence By Other Means, 102.
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The diplomatist also has suffered from diplomacy's
age-old reputation as an unsavory business. Distrusted as
a matter of course in ancient times, envoys became widely
associated during the Renaissance with the traits of Machia-
37vellian intrigue, duplicity, mendacity, and deceit. Diplomacy,
then, was a more handmaiden for the beginning and ending of
wars than an activity for the maintenance of peaceful relations
among rulers. Diplomats often richly deserved the distrust
and suspicion cast upon them. As a diplomatic theorist of
that period concluded, "It is better to set fire to the house
3 8of one's neighbor than to wait until he sets it to yours."
The European diplomat, nevertheless, acquired consider­
able social status and public recognition over time. Despite 
his Machiavellian public image, the diplomat remained essen­
tial for the management of relations among the European 
39states. The sheer proximity of one nation-state to another 
required diplomacy for the orderly conduct of international
37For instance, see Nicolson, Evolution of Diplomacy,
45; Villard, Affairs at State, 8; Robert H. Ferrell, American 
Diplomacy: A History (3rd ed., N.Y.: W. W. Norton, 1975), 4-5.
That Machiavelli has been misread over the centuries has not 
mattered. For a brilliant analysis of Machiavelli's meaning—  
which would have not consoled American democratic sensibilities 
in any case— see Isaiah Berlin's essay, "The Originality of 
Machiavelli," Henry Hardy, ed., Against The Current: Essays
in the History of Ideas (N.Y.: Penguin Books, 1979), 25-79.
3 8Gaspard de Chatillon, comte de Coligny, advisor to the 
French King Charles IX, 1571, Albert Sorel, Europe Under The 
Old Regime (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1964. The initial chapter of 
an 18 volume work, L 1Europe et la revolution francaise. 
published between 1885-1904), 18.
39Cambon, The Diplomatist, 76-78; De Santis, Diplomacy 
of Silence, 11.
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intercourse. In 1815 at the Congress of Vienna, called to 
reshape the map of Europe in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, 
European statesmen agreed upon and codified standards of 
diplomatic practice. With the Congress of Vienna, diplomacy 
became a recognized, professional branch of public service in 
each European country.^
To be a diplomat in Europe came to carry with it a mark 
of social distinction. In England, for instance, the diplo­
matic service soon ranked with the army, the navy, and the 
church as "a suitable calling for the sons of the aristocracy." 
A similar situation prevailed in France, where "the ambition 
of every family" was "to have at least one member in the
public service and diplomacy was the special preserve of the
41wealthy and titled families."
The social recognition accorded the European diplomat 
largely flowed from the class structure and class conscious­
ness of European society. Under the Old Regime, individual 
sovereigns, ruling by the principle of divine right, and their 
agents conducted diplomacy. Even then— with reason of state 
being the rule and aggrandizement the object of statecraft—  
the "ideal" diplomat was supposed to be "a man of the world,
40Nicolson, Diplomacy, 14.
41Henry K. Norton, "Foreign Office Organization: A 
Comparison of the Organization of the British, French, Ger­
man, and Italian Foreign Offices with that of the Department 
of State of the United States of America," Annals of the 
Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 142, Supplement,
(May 1929), 51-52. See also Barbara Tuchman, The Proud Tower 
(N.Y.: Macmillan, 1966), 14.
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a gentleman above all things, exquisite in his manners" who
42"understands all nuances of speech." Not just any charlatan 
was thought to be capable of conducting the affairs of state.
In theory, if not always in practice, Europeans con­
sidered diplomacy to be a proper calling for the extraordinary 
man. Diplomacy "is a profession"— its European theoreticians
and practitioners have argued— "that requires of those who
43practice it a certain habitude du monde." The upper classes 
were assumed to be the reservoir of men who, by virtue of birth 
and social breeding, could afford to nurture and cultivate the 
cosmopolitanism necessary for the conduct.of diplomacy. That 
the diplomatic service would be filled from the ranks of the 
aristocratic elite was generally accepted and recognized by 
all strata of society.
Such never became the case in America. The,European 
view of diplomacy, whether as idealized!in theory or baster- 
dized in practice, failed to take root in the so ill of the 
New World. Americans came to judge themselves and others from 
a different cultural perspective than that which/characterized 
the Old World.
42Sorel, Europe Under the Old Regime, 11, 13.
43Cambon, The Diplomatist, 69. See also Kennan, 
"Foreign Policy and the Professional Diplomat," 152.
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III
The American people early viewed themselves and the
44outside world through bifocal lenses. At a distance,
Americans saw a world steeped in corruption, imperfection,
petty wars, and class conflict. From close in, Americans saw
themselves entrusted with a universal moral mission never
before tried by man. That mission was to be a model to the
world of democratic, self-government, of the equality of all
45citizens and of individual opportunity.
At the center of the American model and the American
historical experience was an egalitarian ethic formed and
46strengthened by economic abundance. All men were declared
equal in the eyes of the law. No man was assumed to be
47restrained by status to any one station or livelihood.
Despite its patent implausibility, the American creed of
equality asserted the existence of a classless society, where
no one was better than anyone else and where merit was the
48only recognized ground of distinction.
44This section relies heavily on Heald and Kaplan,
Culture and Diplomacy, and Potter, People of Plenty.
45Heald and Kaplan, Culture and Diplomacy, 4,* Potter, 
People of Plenty, 128.
Potter, People of Plenty, 91-110.
47It may be a useful caveat to note today, as John Stuart 
Mill did in penning an appraisal of Tocqueville's Democracy 
In America, I, xii, in 1835, that "in the American democracy, 
the aristocracy of skin, and the aristocracy of sex, retain 
their privileges."
48Potter, People of Plenty, 97.
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The ideal of equality received sustenance from the
seemingly limitless abundance of a fertile land. Abundance
offered the individual the opportunity to make his own place
in society and to emancipate himself from a system of status,
49while the ideal of equality demanded that he try. As the
promise of equality and the reality of abundance diminished
the real social differences and economic disparities that
separated the classes, Americans came to view the existence
of any class distinction or class stratification as doubly
50unfair and discriminatory. Having repudiated a status system, 
Americans refused to recognize a society, even their own, 
where individuals held assigned places.
49Ibid., 91-92.
~^Ibid., 9 7-99, 103-105, 118. Potter argues that the 
boundless American continent enabled Americans to fulfill 
the promise of mobility, by which he means universal oppor­
tunity to move through a socio-economic scale of many levels. 
The promise of mobility is the companion to equality of 
opportunity. Potter goes on to suggest that the quest for 
equality of opportunity has exacted a heavy psychological 
price for the physical comforts it bestows: "By presenting
an unattainable ideal as if it were a reality, the mobility 
drive has created damaging psychological tensions; by elim­
inating class diversity without being able to abolish class 
distinctions, abundance has only made subjective discrimin­
ation more galling, while making objective differentials 
less evident....Whereas the principle of status affirms that 
a minor position may be worthy, the principle of mobility, 
as Americans have construed it, regards such a station both 
as the penalty for and the proof of personal failure....The 
fierceness of the mobility race generates tensions too severe 
for some people to bear, and fear of failure in this race 
generates a sense of insecurity which is highly injurious." 
Although Potter does not contend that a system of status is 
preferable to a system of mobility, he would agree that 
American democracy and the psychoanalyst were made for each 
other.
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The egalitarian ethic gripped Americans early and exer­
cised an immense influence on their attitudes. Imbued with a 
conviction that their nascent nation enjoyed a special destiny 
in world history, Americans consciously rejected the models 
and mores of the Old World. Americans identified diplomacy, 
as practiced by European nations, with the advancement of 
special class interests at the expense of the masses, with 
shifting alliances and the immoral balance of power politics,
with unnecessary wars, and with restrictive commercial rela-
51tions among nations. For the United States to fulfill 
its special destiny— as a model of human equality— Americans 
believed their nation must be divorced from any political 
connection with the Old World. To join other nations in the 
management of international relations based upon the tradi­
tional techniques of statecraft could only pollute the American 
democratic mission.
America's early geographical isolation from the Old World
nurtured the nation's sense of ideological uniqueness.
Bounded by weak neighbors to the north and south, and "nothing
but fish to the east and west" the United States suffered few
challenges to its national purposes during the nineteenth 
53century. In addition, no great war engulfed Europe from 
1815 to 1914, while an increasingly friendly Great Britain
51Heald and Kaplan, Culture and Diplomacy, 4-5.
52Ibid., 4-7.
53Ferrell, American Diplomacy, 9.
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54guarded the world's seas. Largely unhampered by foreign 
threats to their national security, Americans freely pursued 
their "manifest destiny" of continental expansion across a 
land of seemingly boundless abundance.
Geographical security and a creed of ideological 
purity provided poor soil for the cultivation of a profes­
sional diplomatic tradition. Americans regarded foreign policy 
more as an intrusion upon the domestic life of the nation 
than an area requiring sustained attention. Following the 
signing of the Treaty of Ghent in 1914, the United States 
rarely ventured abroad in the nineteenth century cloaked in 
the vestments of traditional diplomacy. Isolated ideologi­
cally and geographically from the entangling intrigues of the 
Old World, the United States largely eschewed active involve­
ment in international politics.
Diplomacy was a marginal occupation, at best, in nine­
teenth century America. Betraying a minimal interest in 
foreign political machinations, the United States neglected 
to construct an institutional capacity for the conduct of 
foreign policy. The appurtenances of the foreign affairs 
apparatus— the State Department and its offspring, the Diplo­
matic and Consular Services— functioned largely independently 
of one another and exhibited all the symptoms of atrophy.^ 
Always the neglected stepchild during the nineteenth century,
55Heald and Kaplan, Culture and Diplomacy, 6,
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the State Department, symbolically enough, occupied a former 
orphan asylum for several years following the American Civil
Commerce and moralistic zeal were the principle instru­
ments through which the United States approached foreign 
relations. With government encouragement, commercial enter­
prises opened foreign ports to American products and exerted 
efforts to break barriers to free trade, while missionaries 
and other humanitarian groups journeyed abroad to proselytize 
the heathen. In the American mind, the interests of the 
United States, in particular, and of humanity, in general, were 
synonomous; business entrepreneurs and missionaries, not
diplomats, were the appropriate agents for securing these 
57interests. God and the policy of the Open Door, not dxplomacy/ 
characterized United States involvement abroad.
IV
The creation of a professional Foreign Service in 1924 
bespoke no abrupt departure in the American approach to world
56Ferrell, American Diplomacy, 16.
57While disclaiming originality, Potter suggests that 
Americans were correct in supposing that they "had a revolu­
tionary message to offer" the world but were mistaken in their 
concept of what that message was. It was not "democracy 
revolutionizing the world," but "abundance revolutionizing 
the world " — a message that was not preached or scarcely under­
stood by Americans. "It was not our ideal of democracy but 
our export of goods and gadgets...which opened new vistas." 
People of Plenty, 134-135.
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58affairs. Unification of the diplomatic and consular corps 
into a single Service emanated more from a desire to protect 
and promote commercial interests abroad than from a conscious 
effort to construct an agency for the conduct of diplomacy. 
Concurrently, the adoption of merit principles for admission 
to the new Service aimed more at democratizing America's 
overseas representation than in producing a special group of 
trained diplomatic experts.
During the nineteenth century spoils politics had 
dictated the appointment of nearly all diplomatic and consular 
agents and had given the separate services a poor public 
image. Spoils politics was abhorrent to the egalitarian 
sensibilities of Americans who recoiled at anything resemb­
ling a process of selection based upon criteria other than
59merit and equality of opportunity. Spoils politics became 
even more abhorrent as Americans, principally businessmen 
and progressives, began to awaken, at the end of the nine­
teenth century, to the need for competent representation 
abroad to fulfill the dream of democratic-capitalism.
Particularly odious to American egalitarian sentiments 
were the diplomats. While men of lowly stature, however in­
competent, could be found toiling in the consular offices
58The development of the Foreign Service is sketched 
more fully in Chapter 2, infra.
59Cambon, The Diplomatist, 69-76; Kennan, "Foreign Policy 
and the Professional Diplomat," 152; Potter, People of Plenty , 
91-92, 97-99, 101, 103, 105, 118.
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abroad, only men of wealth could afford to accept a diplo­
matic appointment to a European capital. And these amateur 
diplomats quickly adopted, or so it appeared, the aristo­
cratic airs of the Old World elite.
Spoils politics, especially as it applied to the
Diplomatic Service, contradicted the ideal of equality of
6 0individual opportunity. In the public mind, the adoption 
of merit criteria for selection to the new Foreign Service 
in 1924 did not reflect a preference for the expert over the 
amateur. Instead, it mirrored a belief that all men— regard­
less of wealth, family ties, or political connections--should 
have the opportunity to compete equally for admission based 
upon merit considerations alone. Americans found the spoils 
system repugnant not because it granted access to amateurs, 
but because it failed to provide equal access to all amateurs.
jI To open a career xn the Foreign Service to a 
crossJ-secticn of competent, pragmatic citizens would enhance the 
expojrt of both American products and the liberal-democratic 
experience. The new career-oriented citizen-diplomat would 
represent the United States to the world, and he would ensure 
that commercial and cultural expansion continued apace. He 
would also be a beacon of peaceful prosperity, since he would 
■ share with the masses in other countries a profound aversion
6 0By virtue of their lowly status and function of pro­
viding direct, tangible assistance to Americans, the consuls, 
as compared to the diplomats, appeared to be more democratic.
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to war. Only a few Americans, mostly among the diplomats 
themselves, believed that the creation of the Foreign Service 
would spur the development of a professional cadre of expert 
diplomatists accepted and appreciated by the public.
The early career diplomats who helped create and shape;'
the Foreign Service shared many of the liberal-democratic
61beliefs of their countrymen. They advertised their contri­
butions to the expansion of American trade; they held a 
liberal-capitalist world view; and they espoused the belief 
that trade relations should be conducted apart from interna­
tional as well as domestic politics. Far from being apolo­
gists for European power politics, they subscribed to the
ideals of peace, prosperity, and harmony through free enter-
6 2prise and the rule of law. No less than their fellow 
Americans, they desired to avoid dangerous political entangle­
ments in international disputes. Finally, they detested spoils 
politics; they wanted to rescue American diplomacy from the
rich socialites and political amateurs who dominated the old
6 3Diplomatic Service.
The career diplomats diverged, however, from the senti­
ments of the general public in at least one important
61De Santis, Diplomacy of Silence, 11-26. 
62Ibid., 12, 16, 17, 19.
63Ibid., 12.
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64 ' .respect. In the eyes of the diplomats, the Foreign Service
should attract and recruit the "best” individuals in American 
society. The ideal diplomat should be representative, not 
of the mainstream, but of the "best" in the country. Writing 
in 1922, Hugh Gibson, one of the first American career diplo­
mats, elaborated:
We have no aristocracy in the United 
States and don't want it. But we have a 
lot of homes with 'tradition.1 Some of 
them are simple homes— no butlers or 
footmen— but where the boys 'go to col­
lege'— the bills are paid— Sunday 
observed, good books read, and where a 
standard obtains in respect to private 
life and publicggolicies....These are the 
people we want.
The early careerists believed that diplomacy was a 
proper calling for the traditionally prominent. Many of the 
early career diplomats were, themselves, descendants of old- 
line, Anglo-Saxon families with genteel traditions. Imbued 
with noblesse oblige, they thought that the members of their
64Many early career diplomats also did not share the 
view of their countrymen that American democracy should be 
held up as a model for the world to emulate. They regarded 
the American brand of democratic egalitarianism as comparable 
— in its arrogance— bo the most virulent strain of elitism. 
Hugh Gibson wrote: "If it is our aim to get the world organ­
ized on the model of the United States, there is one course—  
and only one— that holds out hope. If, as a preliminary, we 
put our own house in order, develop a faultless and smoothly 
working government, find a solution to labor and unemployment 
problems, straighten out the tangled and tragic problems of 
Negroes and sharecroppers and Okies and slums— if we do all 
these things...,other nations may come to us...to show them 
how they can do as much for themselves." Road to Foreign 
Policy, 160.
6 5Galpin, Hugh Gibson, 97. See also Heinrichs,
American Ambassador, 97.
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class had an obligation to serve their country by conducting
its affairs abroad, and to do so with wisdom, honesty, and
public spirit. "I can think of no task," Gibson stated,
"which would appeal" to a young gentleman "more than to use
his strength and wits to look after the interests of his
6 6country in such a direct fashion" as diplomacy.
The career diplomats also believed that sound diplomacy 
required qualities that were more apt to be found in men of 
tradition than in a random assemblage of society. Borrowed 
from the precepts of diplomatic practice laid down by European 
diplomatists, these qualities or virtues included: "Truthful­
ness" in taking scrupulous care to avoid the suggestion of 
the false or the suppression of the true; "precision" in not
merely intellectual accuracy, but in moral accuracy as well;
/"calmness" in the sense of even-temperedness'and exceptional
patience; "modesty" in the sense of avoiding the dangers of
vanity; and "loyalty" to one's government in telling his
sovereign what he ought to know, not simply what he would
like to hear. That the ideal diplomatist should also possess
"intelligence, knowledge, discernment, prudence, hospitality,
6 7charm, industry, courage, and even tact" was assumed. Taken 
together, these qualities distinguished the professional 
diplomatist from the amateur.
^Galpin, Hugh Gibson, 97.
6 7These qualities are taken from Nicolson, Diplomacy, 
55-67, who catalogues and elaborates upon the attributes of 
the ideal diplomat that have evolved over time. See also 
Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 25, 232, 262.
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To the senior careerists in the Foreign Service not
just anyone could master the qualities required of the pro-
6 8fessional diplomat. Nor could the experience neccesary to 
their acquisition be obtained within the boundaries of the 
United States alone. "Diplomacy is primarily a matter of 
understanding and experience," one of the careerists noted.
"It distinctly is not a matter of learning. You cannot teach 
diplomacy." While "you can teach many things it is useful
69for a diplomat to know," it "does not make a diplomatist."
In addition to the "natural" qualifications the would-be 
diplomat should possess, diplomacy required of its practi­
tioner a long apprenticeship in the world abroad.^
Under the guidance of the senior diplomats, the Foreign 
Service, while opening its doors to a broader socio-economic 
cross-section of applicants than its spoils-ridden nine­
teenth-century predecessor, retained an exclusive character that 
separated it from the American mainstream. In addition to 
learning the practice of diplomacy through training and
6 8Within the Foreign Service, a debate ensued over 
whether the profession would be marked by "generalists," who 
stressed intuition and sound judgement, or by "experts," who 
relied more upon objective analysis. Whether expert or 
generalist, however, the careerists agreed that certain 
qualities did distinguish the professional from the amateur.
De Santis, Diplomacy of Silence, 15; Nicolson, Diplomacy, 55; 
Kennan, "Foreign Policy and the Professional Diplomat," 152.
69Hugh Gibson, March 2, 1938, extracts from a manual 
on diplomacy, Galpin, Hugh Gibson, 26.
70Thayer, Diplomat, 248.
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experience, younger officers were advised to follow correct
diplomatic style, and to emulate the standards of established
European practitioners. In order to deal effectively with
their sophisticated foreign counterparts, they were expected
to present a proper and courteous appearance, maintain a
proper command of language, and observe the varieties of
71diplomatic etiquette. To the initiated, the statesmanlike
demeanor of the ideal diplomat reflected the inward virtues
of suspended judgement, skeptical tolerance, and passionless
72detachment necessary for the sound conduct of diplomacy.
In short,the young diplomatist was expected to possess and 
cultivate a sense of the world that almost naturally separated 
him, in appearance at least, from the bulk of his countrymen 
who remained at home."^
V
The American public never embraced the Foreign Service. 
For most of its history, the United States had scant need, 
little use, and no desire to employ traditional techniques 
of statecraft abroad. The United States "preferred to play
74its role as a culture, not as a power, in the world arena."
' 7 1' De Santis, Diplomacy of Silence, 20.
72Nicolson, Diplomacy, 62; Villard, Affairs at State, 7.
73Kennan, "Future of Diplomacy," 574.
74Franklin Ninkovich, "Ideology, the Open Door, and For­
eign Policy," Diplomatic History, 6 (Spring 1982), 190. The 
quotation is from Akira Iriye, "Culture and Power: Interna­
tional Relations as Intercultural Relations," Diplomatic 
History, 3 (Spring 1979), 120.
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To most Americans, diplomacy remained, at best, "a disagree-
75able necessity." To the extent that career diplomats were 
to be regarded as more than useless social ornaments, they 
were expected to emulate their consular brethren in assisting 
American commercial enterprises abroad.
Filtered through the prism of the American democratic
experience, the diplomatic officer reflected an image that
was offensive to the egalitarian temper. Where the career
officer saw virtue in the demeanor of the diplomatist, "the
average American" saw "an immaculately dressed being..., a
coldly severe and superior manner," a snobbish and conceited 
77elitist. Where the diplomats saw in the Foreign Service a
professional organization dedicated to the public interest,
78the public saw a refuge for the privileged. By his example,
75 kHeinrichs, American Ambassador, vn. \'  ..... . . . . . .. , ■ ' \ I
76 .Nicolson notes that, while U.S. diplomats are expected 
to assist private American commercial interests, during the 
nineteenth century "a British diplomatist would have felt 
sullied were he to engage in pushing the material require-! 
ments of his nationals." Diplomacy, 89. Rhetoric to:the 
contrary, many early American career diplomats ffelt similarly. 
See Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 103. I j
77 ' - ■’General Joseph W. Stilwell noted this popular charac­
terization of the diplomat, which he did not share1, in his 
diary on December 7, 1943, while attending the Cairo Confer­
ence. Theodore H. White, ed., The Stilwell Papers (N.Y.: W. 
Sloan Associates, 1948), 256.
78Referring to diplomatic services in all Western demo­
cracies in the 1930s, Nicolson noted that, while statesmen 
must be able to call upon the services of a thoroughly exper­
ienced staff, the "staff must also be democratized and must 
cease to be generally, although to some extent inaccurately, 
regarded as the preserve of the upper bourgeoise." Diplomacy, 
53.
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the career diplomat suggested that some individuals were more
"naturally" suitable for some occupations, a notion that was
reprehensible to the egalitarian passions of the American 
79people. By popular egalitarian standards, the diplomatist 
was undemocratic and, hence, unrepresentative of American 
society.
Indictment of the diplomatist as undemocratic and
unAmerican has found consistent expression in the
Congress. In June 1957, for example, ten members of
the United States House of Representatives— five Republicans
and five Democrats— introduced a resolution urging the
State Department to vigorously pursue the recruitment of
8 0candidates throughout the American heartland. According to
its author, Representative Leo W. O'Brien of Albany, New
York, the purpose of the resolution was "to provide a massive
transfusion of Main Street into the arteries of the U.S.
..81Foreign Service.
Several congressmen engaged in a colloquy on the House 
floor to elaborate on the reasons for the resolution. "We 
are now in an era of business-suit diplomacy," Representative
79Kennan, "Foreign Policy and the Professional Diplomat," 
152. See also Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making 
in Defense and Foreign Affairs (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1971), 45.
8 0U.S. Congress, House 85th Cong., 1st sess., April 8, 
1957, Congressional Record, CIII, 5301.
81O'Brien made this statement during a floor speech two 
years after introducing the resolution. July 21, 1959, 
Congressional Record, CV, 13897.
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O'Brien began, but unfortunately our diplomats "are still 
operating" on the "theory that if you can dangle a teacup 
in the propper manner...you have an edge on the fellow who 
mishandles" it. Occasionally, he continued, "we get some 
excellent people. I have in mind...John Peurifoy....His 
first job had a civil-service rating of laborer." In the 
present Foreign Service, O'Brien went on, "we have too many 
people...speaking the language of a special class of society 
and not the language of a cross-section of the American
i ..8 2people.
Others echoed him. Representative Ed Edmondson of
Oklahoma pleaded that "if we are going to reach the hearts
and minds of other people throughout the world " we must
recruit the most representative examples of the American
8 3people "as members of the diplomatic corps." Still other 
congressmen asserted that the resolution would drop "the 
silken curtain" that separates American youth from careers 
in the Foreign Service; would provide the "means for the 
Federal Government to do as good a job as business... in 
providing... good will ambassadors for the United States " ; 
would accord our "youth an equal opportunity" to become
\
diplomats; and would bring "about a new state of democracy"
8 2Ibid., 13898 and 13900, wherein O'Brien states: "You 
know, they say in this country, and it is an old saying, that 
every mother can look in the cradle and see a future Presi­
dent....! think all of us will agree that if the same mother 
looks in the same cradle seeking a future ambassador, she 
would have to be using trifocals."
83Ibid., 13901.
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in the diplomatic service.**4
Congresses of past and present eras expressed similar 
8 5concerns. Fearing that American agents would become contam­
inated and corrupted by European values, the Continental
Congress ruled that diplomats should remain abroad no more
8 6than three consecutive years. Two hundred years later, in 
1976, Congress enacted legislation creating the "Assignment 
America" program. Under the program, Foreign Service offi­
cers would receive year-long assignments "working with 
American state and local governments and schools in an 
effort to give" the diplomats "a better feel for the country 
they represent." One of the first states to receive a 
diplomat was Georgia, where officials in the governor's 
office believed that a career officer "would be helpful" in
84Representatives O'Brien, John J. Rhodes of Arizona, 
and Barratt O'Hara of Illinois, respectively. Ibid., 13899, 
13900, 13901.
8 5Nearly every congressional effort to reorganize the 
Foreign Service has included provisions aimed at "reAmerican- 
izing" the diplomats. For instance, the Foreign Service Act 
of 1946 required every officer to spend at least 3 years 
of his first 15 in the United States. Harold Stein, "The 
Foreign Service Act of 1946," in Stein, ed., Public Adminis­
tration and Policy Development (N.Y. : Harcourt, Brace, 1952), 
661-737. See also Wriston, Diplomacy in a Democracy, 38; Zara 
S. Steiner, The State Department and the Foreign Service: The 
Wriston Report— Four Years Later (Princeton: Princeton Univer­
sity, Center of International Studies, 1958), 20-21.
O aDonald P. Warwick, A Theory of Public Bureaucracy: 
Politics, Personalities, and Organization in the State Depart­
ment (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 13. Like 
similar provisions advanced in more recent times, the rule of 
the Continental Congress proved impossible to enforce because 
of personnel shortages, exigencies of war, and other reasons.
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aiding "Georgia businessmen in preparing for missions abroad
8 7to attract foreign trade and investment."
VI
The popular stereotype of the diplomatist ha£. endured
with great resilience. Today, critics inside and outside
government characterize the typical career officer as dull,
routinized and antiquated, possessing an air of superiority
and self-importance, and engaging in undisclosed bureaucratic
8 8chores until the next round of evening parties begins.
Contemporary criticisms of the diplomatic establishment reflect,
in part, a modern malaise generally with the societal drift
toward large, impersonal and seemingly unresponsive bureau-
8 9cratic organizations. Although modern criticisms of the 
diplomatist center more upon institutional debilities than 
upon individual appearances and attributes, the tension that 
permeates, and occasionally disrupts, the compatibility of 
professional diplomacy with democracy in the United States
87Independent Record [Helena, Montana], March 11, 1976,
24. The story is from an Associated Press report.
88For example, see John K. Galbraith, Ambassador1s 
Journal; A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years (Boston; 
Houghton Mifflin, 1969) , 211-212; Etzold, Conduct of Policy,
115, who quotes Galbraith's testimony before a congressional 
committee in June 1972.
8 9Ferrell, American Diplomacy, 16-21. Many career diplo­
mats, themselves, bemoan the unwieldly size, apparent inertia 
and inflexibility of the modern foreign affairs machinery, as 
well as the fragmentation of responsibility for the conduct of 
foreign relations that has accompanied the proliferation of 
agencies dealing with foreign policy since World War II.
-35-
lays deeply embedded in the nation's culture.
Among modern United States political leaders, none
embraced the popular image of the diplomatist more fully than
President Franklin D. Roosevelt. By birth, background and
temperment, Roosevelt was as aristocratic as any career 
90diplomat. He regarded the career diplomats, nonetheless, 
as frivolous dilettantes, out of touch with the pulse of the 
American public. As President, he displayed almost contemp- 
tuos indifference toward the Foreign Service.
Endowed with an abundance of self-confidence— reflected
in his ever-present, engaging smile— and conscious of his own
superiority, FDR espoused the egalitarian ideals of his
countrymen as only a man assured of his own place and status 
91could. He taught the people that his rhetoric was their
90FDR's background, is well known. That neither presidents 
nor congressmen, themselves, have reflected, in the aggregate, 
anything approaching a cross-section of the American citizenry 
does not seem to have affected their views on egalitarianism 
and diplomats. Like the Foreign Service officers they some­
times ridicule, elected officials come to their positions from 
a narrow socio-economic base of the populace. See William J. 
Keefe and Morris S. Ogul, The American Legislative Process; 
Congress and the States (4th ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1977), 123-127.
91In an excellent essay on FDR, Theodore A. Wilson and 
Richard D. McKinzie write: "The screens...Roosevelt erected 
around his motives have proved remarkably durable....Obviously, 
in common with his generation and class, he held convictions 
about the nature of American society..., however, these be­
liefs did not comprise a rigid, all-encompassing definition of 
the limits within which he functioned." "The Masks of Power: 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Conduct of American Diplomacy," 
in Frank J. Merli and Wilson, eds., Makers of.American Diplo­
macy: From Benjamin Franklin to Henry Kissinger (N.Y.: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1974), 462.
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opinion and that their opinion was the foundation of his pol-
92icies. Like his fellow Americans, he judged others by the 
egalitarian standards he viewed as the hallmark of the public 
will, and he found the seemingly unconcealed aloofness of the 
diplomats wanting.
Roosevelt also enjoyed a heightened sense of his own
diplomatic abilities and a belief in American exceptionalism as
embodied in her economic abundance. If he could only meet
face-to-face with this or that foreign leader, he often stated,
93he could resolve whatever differences separated them. If he
could place but one American book in the hands of every Russian,
he reportedly asserted, "his choice would be a Sears, Roebuck 
' 94catalogue."
Bounded by the dictates of his own character and the 
assumptions of the American experience, FDR found little of 
value in professional diplomacy. Whether he would have to 
contend with a professional diplomatic corps, however, remained
9 2Potter states that FDR did more to give men a sense of 
status than any President since Lincoln. He then quotes Justice 
William 0. Douglas on FDR: "He was in a very special sense the 
people's President because he made them feel that with him in 
the White House they shared the Presidency." People of Plenty, 105.
93For example, see Richard S. Harrison, "A Presidential 
Demarche: Franklin D. Roosevelt's Personal Diplomacy and Great 
Britain, 1937-1938," Diplomatic History, 5 (Summer 1981), 249.
94Potter, People of Plenty, 80. Also see pp. 120-121, 
wherein Potter states that one of FDR's "most irritating and 
successful qualities was his habit of assuming that benefits 
could be granted without costs being felt— an assumption rooted 
in his faith in the potentialities of the American economy."
-37-
problematic well into the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Only very slowly and hesitatingly did the United States 
even consider developing a professional diplomatic capability.
Nation* must fitly upon the 
quality oh their diplomacy 
to act a* a catalyst ion. the 
dliicn.cnt {actors that consti­
tute their power....thereho re 
It Is of the utmost Importance 
that the good quality oh the 
diplomatic service be constant. 
And constant quality Is best 
assured by dependence upon 
tradition and Institutions 
rather than upon the sporadic 
appearance oh outstanding 
Individuals.
Hans J . Morgenthau-*-
The diplomatic service Is not 
what It should be, principally 
hor the reason that It does 
not attract to It the best 
young men oh the country.... 
there does not appear to be 
suhflelent career to justlhy 
a man oh ambition to enter It.
William Phillips2
2 THE BIRTH OF THE AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE:
BUILDING PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMACY AMID PUBLIC DISTRUST
The United States Foreign Service evolved along a slow 
and meandering path.^ Befitting a nation ideologically and 
geographically isolated from the outside world, the United
^Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and
Peace (2d ed.; N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954) , 131.
To Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, May 8,
1922, Warren F. Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy in the 
United States, 1779-19 39: A Study in Administrative 
History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 162.
3There are several solid treatments of the development 
of the Foreign Service, most of which build upon Ilchman's 
fine treatment cited above. The best are: Thomas H. Etzold,
-38-
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States devoted little attention to its foreign affairs 
machinery during the nineteenth century. Infested with an 
assortment of political appointees and temporary adventurers, 
the foreign affairs apparatus lacked stability, tradition, 
and any semblance of institutional coherence. Toward the 
end of the nineteenth century, the expansion of American 
world interests illuminated serious deficiencies in the 
patronage-ridden Diplomatic and Consular Services and kindled 
a movement to overhaul the structure of United States 
representation abroad. During the next three decades, 
reformers of various hues worked to construct a permanent, 
career foreign service immune from partisan political 
influence.
Public distrust and suspicion of diplomacy and diplo­
mats lurked prominently in the shadows o\f the forelign 
service reform movement. The primary impetus of the reform
The Conduct of American Foreign Policy: ) The Othep Side of 
Diplomacy (N.Y.: New Viewpoints, 1977) ; Waldo H. Hifeinrichs, 
Jr., "Bureaucracy and Professionalism in the Development of 
American Career Diplomacy," in John Braeman, et./al., eds., 
Twentieth-Century American Foreign Policy (Columbus: Ohio
State University Press, 1971), 119-206; Heinrichs, American 
Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the
United States Diplomatic Tradition (Boston: Little, Brown,
1966); Robert D. Schulzinger, The Making of the Diplomatic Mind: The Training/"Outlook and Style of United
States Foreign Service Officers, 1908-19 31 (Middletown: 
Wesleyan University Press, 19 75); Richard Hume Werking, The 
Master Architects: Building the United States Foreign
Service, 1890-1913 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky,
1977) .
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movement derived from concerns to promote American commercial 
opportunities abroad, not from concerns to improve the 
conduct of United States foreign policy. Economic wealth, 
not diplomacy, served as the catalyst for the application 
of American power. In the American mind, however hazy, 
diplomats were useless and irrelevant; the use of diplomacy 
forebode only ill results for the country.
Except for diplomats and State Department officials,
few reformers believed that a modern, efficient diplomatic
4service was necessary or even particularly useful. The 
success of the reform movement in creating a foreign service 
capable of employing professional, diplomatic methods 
occurred incidentally to the larger purpose of improving 
the climate for American businesses overseas. The success 
of the reform movement did not portend public and political 
acceptance of the traditional practice of diplomacy.
The reform movement, nevertheless, proved beneficial 
to the building of a professional diplomatic capability.
In the years between 1924 and 19 33, the Foreign Service 
began to develop into a stable, coherent and capable 
organization. If and when American statesmen chose to
4Werkmg, Master Architects, 239-240.
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engage in diplomacy, some able career diplomatists were
5available to assist them.
I
The United States foreign affairs establishment of 
the late nineteenth century functioned in a state of serene 
disarray. Largely unaltered since the administration 
of George Washington, the foreign affairs apparatus consisted 
of three disjointed entities. The largest branch, the 
Consular Service, whose agents served in major foreign 
cities, especially seaports, performed primarily administra­
tive tasks, issuing visas and passports and assisting 
Americans engaged in international commerce. Operating 
in a more amorphous realm, members of the Diplomatic 
Service resided in the capitals of foreign nations, 
reporting on foreign political developments and representing 
the United States in its dealings with the highest levels 
of foreign governments. The third branch, the State 
Department, theoretically directed the activities of the
^Robert H. Ferrell states: "One has only to make a
list of a few of the leading diplomatic representatives of 
the United States during the Depression to observe the 
general level of excellence." American Diplomacy in the 
Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933
(M.Y.: W.W. Norton, 1970. Originally published in
1957), 281.
6The Consular Service had undergone a few minor adjust­
ments as the result of congressional action. See Werking, 
Master Architects, 1-7.
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other two. In reality, each branch operated independently 
of the others.
The foreign affairs apparatus lacked any semblance of 
a stable, unified institution. Although most State Depart­
ment employees enjoyed the protection of civil service
regulations, patronage riddled the separate Consular and
7Diplomatic Services. Capricious shifts in American 
political winds regularly propelled new consular agents 
and diplomatic envoys into foreign posts. In his first 
year in office, President William McKinley, for example, 
replaced 238 of the 272 consuls appointed by his Democratic 
predecessor.®
Appointments were made to particular posts, not to a 
service. Even when good men received appointments, as 
occasionally they did, no incentive existed for them to
gperform in a more than a routine fashion. None of the 
requisite scaffolding existed for erecting a capable,
7Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 120.
8Katharine Crane, Mr. Carr of State: Forty-Seven Years
in the State Department (N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1960), 
55-56; Werking, Master Architects, 9-10.
9Werking, Master Architects, 9-11. See also Heinrichs, 
"Bureaucracy," 127.
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permanent organization for the conduct of foreign relations—  
no provisions for selection or promotion by merit, no 
uniform salary plan, no training program, no retirement 
program.
The foreign services suffered from benign neglect.
Graft and corruption characterized the normal course of 
business in United States consular offices. Consuls 
profited, sometimes handsomely, from the unofficial fees 
they extracted for a variety of services, fees that often 
far exceeded their niggardly, official salaries. Not until 
1896, more than a century after its inception, was the 
Consular Service's overseas operation subjected to an 
inspection by the Consular Bureau in Washington, D.C.^ 
Diplomatic envoys, who of necessity were men of private 
means and who occupied positions less accessible to petty 
graft than their consular brethern, also found little 
consolation in their work. With little in the way of 
"affairs of state" to distract them, they reveled in the 
elegant and regal atmosphere of nineteenth-century
diplomatic society, and engaged in a myriad of leisurely
<4. 11 pursuits.
■^Werking, Master Architects, 3-5.
•^Ibid., 121; Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 24-26; Ilchnan, 
Professional Diplomacy, 15, 76.
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Americans.had earlier relegated diplomatic business
to a position of low priority. Although the world's great
powers had begun to view the United States as another
world power by the late 1880s, the United States had not
1 7yet begun to think of itself as one. As of 1893, the 
United States had no ambassadors, forty ministers of
legation, and less than eighty State Department employees
13who managed foreign affairs. International relations, 
Congressman Henry Cabot Lodge reflected in 1889, occupy 
"but a slight place in American politics and excite only 
languid interest."14
II
The idea that the United States should develop a 
professional arm for the performance of consular and diplo-
12Ernest R. May, Imperial Democracy; The Emergence of 
America as a Great Power (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 19 73. First 
published in 1961), 5-6. Historians long have debated 
when the United States became a world power. For example, 
see Thomas A. Bailey, "America's Emergence as a World 
Power: The Myth and the Verity," Pacific Historical Review,
30 (February 1961), 1-16; Raymond A. Esthus, "Isolationism 
and World Power," Diplomatic History, 2 (Spring 1978), 117- 
132.
13Crane, Mr. Carr, 21; Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 121.
14Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 23. See 
also May, Imperial Democracy, 11.
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matic functions germinated under the pressure of expanding
American world interests near the close of the nineteenth
century. Seldom isolationist in the realm of international
commerce, American overseas trade and investments burgeoned
in the 1880s and 1890s. By 1899 the United States held
sway as the world's leading industrial nation, exporting
more than it imported, while American corporations increased
15their capital investments overseas at a phenomenal rate. 
Combined with the Spanish-American War, the acquisition of 
colonial possessions, and a generally renascent American 
assertiveness, this expansionist fervor brought into sharp 
relief the inadequacies of United States representation 
abroad.
The presence of a large number of unfit, rum-soaked,
tobacco-chewing consuls— uncovered during the inspection
of 1896— threatened to inhibit the expansion of American
16commercial interests overseas. Similarly, the "constant
15See Warren I. Cohen, America's Response to China: An Interpretive History or sino-American Relations
(N.Y.: John Wiley & Sons, 1971), 46; Walter LaFeber, The New 
Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 196 3), 8-10; J. Carroll
Moody, "The Transformation of the American Economy, 1877- 
1900," in William H. Cartwright and Richard L. Watson, Jr., 
eds., The Reinterpretation of American History and Culture 
(Washington, D.C.; National Council for the Social Studies, 
1973), 401-424; Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 131.
i6Werking, Master Architects, 3-4, 14.
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succession of temporary amateurs," who paraded as diplomatic 
secretaries and ministers, placed the United States at a 
disadvantage when dealing with the professional diplomats 
of foreign nations.^ At a time when the United States 
was emerging as a world economic power, the pathetic state 
of United States representation abroad only seemed to 
diminish American prestige.
The need for reform of the foreign services soon
became widely recognized. Businessmen, progressives, civic
reformers, and government officials— including consuls and
diplomats— criticized "the system," especially the practice
of rewarding "broken down politicians," "failures in
American life," and sons of wealthy political patriarchs
18with consulates and diplomatic missions. The systematic 
use off patronage, the reformers reasoned, posed the greatest 
obstacle to the recruitment and retention of competent 
officers. "The system" discouraged good men from even 
entertaining the idea of foreign service. The solution,
- Ithe Reformers postulated, lay in the creation of a career
17Ibid., 15. The phrase is quoted from Harold Nicolsoq, 
Diplomacy (London: Oxford University Press, 196 3. Originally
published in 1939), 120.
18Werking, Master Architects, 4-12. See also Jerry 
Israel, "A Diplomatic Machine: Scientific Management in the
Department of State, 1906-1924," in Israel, ed., Building 
the Organizational Society: Essays on Associational Activi­
ties in Modern America ( N. Y.: Free Press, 1972), 183-196.
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service in which recruitment, tenure, and promotion would
19rest upon merit, not politics.
Reform of the Consular Service commanded the greatest 
attention. Unlike the diplomatic corps, the Consular 
Service enjoyed a natural and powerful constituency— the 
American business community. Much of the pressure to 
remodel United States representation abroad stemmed from 
business concern for trade expansion. Businesses required 
timely and accurate information on commercial opportunities 
to protect and promote their overseas interests. Because 
of the tangible services the Consular Service rendered, 
businessmen and reformers, alike, recognized the concrete 
benefits that would accrue from a revitalized consular corps.?®
Consular Service reform also conformed well with the 
main currents in American Society. The rapid industrializa­
tion of the American economy at the end of the nineteenth 
and the beginning of the twentieth centuries fostered a 
fundamental restructuring of society along bureaucratic 
lines. "Organization," "businesslike efficiency," "specialir
^Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 86-90;
Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 128.
20Crane, Mr. Carr, 98, 104, 176-179; Heinrichs, "Bureau­
cracy," 154-155, 159, 164, 171; Ilchman, Professional Diplo­
macy, 77-86; Werking, Master Architects, 20-48.
zation," and "scientific management," the man-like-machine
concept of the industrial workplace, were the shibboleths
of the day. The Consular Service— with its emphasis on the
performance of routine administrative tasks and clearly
delineated functions— was a natural target for reform along
21the bureaucratic pattern of organization.
Reform of the Consular Service also enjoyed popular
support. The layman, nurtured on the ethics of the dominant
business culture, easily comprehended the work of the Consular
Service. Consuls engaged in visibly productive tasks.
Consuls, much more than diplomats, dealt with Americans
residing and traveling abroad, assisting them with visas
and various other conveniences. Although many people
questioned the fitness of consular agents, few could
22question their usefulness.
Reform of the Diplomatic Service engendered much less 
enthusiasm. Consistent with the ideological and geographical 
isolation of the United States, most Americans understood 
little about the responsibilities of diplomats and cared 
even less. To most Americans, diplomacy was an abstract and
21Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 122-123; Israel, "Diplomatic 
Machine," 185-187.
22Schulzmger, Diplomatic Mind, 5; Werking, Master Archi­
tects , 121-125; Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 128-131.
-49-
rays ter ious business that yielded few, if any, tangible
results. The functions of diplomats mystified even intelli-
2 2gent, well-read citizens. The art of negotiation— the 
primary and distinguishing feature of diplomacy— seemingly 
had not been needed to insure United States security and 
well-being. Technological genius and military prowess, 
not skill at the negotiating table, appeared to have been
24more than adequate to secure the interests of the nation.
Diplomatic reform also faced a deeply entrenched public
antipathy towards diplomacy and diplomats. Americans not
only found the nature of diplomacy difficult to comprehend;
many "associated diplomacy with monarchy, aristocracy,
25intrigue, duplicity, and war." That most American diplo­
mats, like their European counterparts, were b o m  into 
society's upper classes and appeared to regale in the
"fantastical grandeur of diplomatic society," only reinforced
2 6popular distaBte and suspicion toward diplomacy. The 
elitist class origins of American diplomats clashed with the
20Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 124; Werking, Master Archi­
tects , 37, 122. See also Murat W. Williams, "Life in the 
Diplomatic Service, 1939-1962," American Oxonian (July 1962), 171.
24Werking, Master Architects, 14.
25Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 139.
26Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 24-26.
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democratic eqalitarian ethic; the serene elegance of their
working environment clashed with the American work ethic.
By comparison, consuls came from predominantly middle-
class backgrounds and worked under conditions of uninspired 
27drudgery. Consequently, consuls suffered little of the 
public opprobrium encountered by diplomats. When Americans 
thought about diplomats at all, they usually thought about 
the parasites of society; they questioned their fitness and 
their usefulness.
Reform of the Diplomatic Service appeared to offer no
positive benefit. American diplomats performed no visibly
productive tasks; they engaged primarily in the monitoring
of political relations among nations. The American public
and their elected representatives revealed little enthusiasm
for exercising power through the vehicle of diplomacy.
Debate over the efficacy of United States foreign policy
2 8was confined largely to diplomats and academics.
Commerce, not diplomacy, typified American involvement 
abroad. Better to leave the Diplomatic Service alone than 
to beget an organization that might involve the United 
States in foreign machinations.
^"^Werking, Master Architects, 14, 121.
2®Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 22-23.
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Reform of the Diplomatic Service, nevertheless, had
its advocates. Among the most prominent were the diplomats
themselves, particularly the young men who entered the
Diplomatic Service in the early 1900s. They included such
future career diplomats as Hugh Gibson, Joseph C. Grew, and
William Phillips. Like many of their colleagues, these
men joined the diplomatic corps for reasons that held only
a peripheral relationship to diplomacy— to travel, to acquire
29educations, to avoid careers in more mundane occupations. 
Unlike many of their colleagues, particularly the chiefs-of- 
mission under whom they served, they were not strictly 
political patronage appointees. They served initially as 
diplomatic secretaries and clerks, and many received no 
compensation from the government. They came from well-to-do, 
old-stock, Anglo-Saxon American families. Born to privilege, 
they possessed a sense of noblesse oblige, a belief that 
they were the guardians of American traditions in public 
life. Unlike many political appointees who entered the 
Diplomatic Service during that era, these men "vowed to 
improve the prestige and effectiveness of their Service."30
? QIlchman, Professional Diplomacy, 14, 76; Schulzinger, 
Diplomatic Mind, 2-4, 15-16, 2 0; Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 24-Zb. In their memoirs, many diplomats admit, as Hugh 
Wilson did, that "ease and a measure of education had 
encouraged us to believe that life should have a wider scope 
than business alone could offer." Education of a Diplomat 
(N.Y.: Longmans, Green and Co., 1938), 4.
30Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 4.
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In search of support the diplomatic reformers adopted
the arguments of the proponents of consular reform.
Confronted with a poor public image, the diplomats contended
that they, no less than consuls, did and could assist
American business interests abroad. Only occasionally
did the diplomats attempt to explain publicly the subtleties
of diplomatic practice, of the need for a "certain type of
expert" capable of engaging in the complicated business of
31international relations.
Perhaps they could not or dared not. The United States 
lacked a tradition favorable to public acceptance of the 
tenets of professional diplomacy. Moreover, diplomacy 
belied precise definition; unlike law or medicine, diplo­
matic practice required no specialized or technically\ A32 ' jisophisticated intellectual training. And many pf the
career diplomats who entered the diplomatic corps in the 
early 1900s believed that the public was too unsophisticated
to appreciate the une certaine habitude du monde bf the
33 •' Idiplomatist. /
31Ibid., 5, 125, 133-134, 140.
J Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 124.
■^Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 6-11; Werking, Master 
Architects, 122.
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The diplomats proposed, instead, to "hitchhike" on
34the consular reform movement. They focused their arguments
for diplomatic reform on the need to place "the entire
diplomatic system on a business basis," on the assistance
35that diplomats did and could provide to trade expansion.
The diplomats found allies in the Consular Service
and in the State Department. The diplomats wanted the
career status and benefits they saw the reformers advocating
for the consuls. Elite, wealthy, and privileged men, the
diplomats lacked only legislative protection to insure
that "their" kind remained responsible for American foreign
policy. The consuls, on the other hand, "coveted the easy
social grace of the diplomats" and the status accorded
36them m  foreign lands.
Consuls and diplomats each wanted something the other 
possessed. Both wanted secure job tenure and public recog­
nition as professionals. State Department officials, in 
turn, wanted to achieve some administrative coordination 
and control over the disjointed and isolated foreign
34Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 141.
^Israel, "Diplomatic Machine," 186.
Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 131. See also Etzold, 
Conduct of Policy, 2 7; Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 5.
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services. All of them sought the creation of a permanent 
career service as a means to attain their goals. All of 
them courted business interests and progressive reform- 
minded groups for support.̂
III
Early attempts to reform the foreign services achieved
only mixed success. Reformers directed their efforts
toward the enactment of legislation that would accomplish
for the foreign services what the Pendleton Act of 1883
38accomplished for the Federal Civil Service. In 1906 the
Consular Service underwent a substantial reorganization as
the result of the passage of the Lodge Act by Congress.
The Lodge Act provided the cornerstones for a modern
consular corps, but left untouched the patronage system of 
39appointment. In the ensuing years, the work of Wilbur J. 
Carr, the chief of the Consular Bureau and "the architect 
of the modem Foreign Service," in conjunction with the 
support of the executive and legislative branches and the 
business community, established firm precedent for admini-
^Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 132.
3 8The Pendleton Act introduced merit principles into 
federal employment, in part, in reaction to the scandals of 
the Grant administration.
39Crane, Mr. Carr, 77-86; Ilchman, Professional Diplo­
macy , 56-64; Werking, Master Architects, 89-103.
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stering the Consular Service on the basis of merit
. . , 40principles.
Efforts to reform the Diplomatic Service lagged behind.
A series of executive orders promulgated in 1905 by
Theodore Roosevelt and in 1909 by William Howard Taft
established the principle of qualification for diplomatic
service based upon examination and granted civil service
41status to diplomats below the rank of minister. The
appointment of ambassadors and ministers— the most valued
positions in the Diplomatic Service— were exempt, left to
the vagaries of politics. These executive orders, moreover,
served primarily as expressions of worthy intention: They
neither bound succeeding administrations nor forecast the
42end.of political considerations for appointment.
Career-oriented diplomats possessed no assurance that 
merit and experience would be rewarded. When Woodrow 
Wilson became President in 1912, he dismissed 37 of the 41 
veteran chiefs-of-mission who had served under Taft. Of 
the first 51 individuals appointed by Wilson to head diplo-
40Werking, Master Architects, 89-120, 219-238.
41These executive orders affected the Consular Service 
similarly. Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 89, 116-118.
^ Tb'id., 118-119; Werking, Master Architects, 59.
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matic missions, only four possessed any prior diplomatic 
43experience. At the onset of World War I, the entire 
course of foreign service reform, particularly diplomatic 
reform, hinged precariously upon presidential design.
Reform of the foreign affairs machinery commanded wide
support after World War I. Prior to the war, from 1906 to
1915, the United States— then recovered from the convulsions
resulting from the Depression of 1893 and experiencing a
deacceleration in trade expansion— retreated to domestic
concerns. During the war, the demands and responsibilities
44placed upon the foreign services increased dramatically.
With the war's end, these activities showed no signs of 
diminishing.
The United States emerged from the war as the world's 
predominant economic power. The war saw the role of the 
United States in the world economy shift from that of a
43Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 31; Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 
138. For a thorough evaluation of Wilson's amateur chiefs- 
of-mission, see Martin V. Melosi, "Amateur Diplomats During 
the Administrations of Woodrow Wilson: An Evaluation"
(unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Montana, 1971).
44Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 132, 172-173; 
Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 50^ 59; William Barnes and 
John Heath Morgan, The Foreign Service of the United States: 
Origins, Development and Functions (Washington, DC.: Histori­
cal Office, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, 
1961), 188-189, 195-196, 203.
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A Kdebtor to that of a creditor nation. J Whether the United 
States wanted to exercise political power commensurate with 
its economic status— and it was not so inclined— it had 
acquired a preponderant influence in world affairs. Under 
these circumstances, Americans demonstrated a heightened 
interest in foreign service reform.
Proponents of reform now lobbied vigorously for a
sweeping reorganization of the foreign services. The
campaign for amalgamation of the separate services, for
increased salaries, for tenure, and, in short, for all of
4 6the features of a career system gained wide currency. °
At no point in American history was the time more propitious 
for a revamping of the foreign affairs apparatus.
Diplomats and consuls capitalized upon nearly every 
opportunity to encourage reform sentiment. They had much 
to gain. They were, in a sense, their own best constituency. 
In the years following World War I, they courted interest- 
group support, enlisted chief spokesmen— principally Wilbur 
Carr, Hugh Gibson, and Secretary of State Charles Evans
45For the first time, American nationals had more 
capital invested in foreign lands and received more income 
from those investments than foreigners had investments in, 
and income from, the United States. Barnes and Morgan, 
Foreign Service, 203.
46Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 31; Ilchman, Professional 
Diplomacy, 4.
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Hughes— to plead their case before congressional committees,
and, in the classical fashion of bureaucratic operatives,
47they ingratiated themselves with powerful legislators.
In 1919 one congressman, John Jacob Rogers of Massachusetts,
began to introduce bills annually to improve the foreign
service, bills drafted largely by Carr and his consular 
48associates. The pressures for reform had become almost 
irresistible.
In 1924 Congress responded to the demands for reform
by passing the Rogers Act. Named for its chief sponsor,
John Jacob Rogers, who is often called "the father of the
modern American Foreign Service," the Rogers Act was the
"most notable legislation ever to affect the organization
49of American foreign relations." The Rogers Act combined 
the Consular and Diplomatic Services into a single, unified 
Foreign Service, established competitive entrance examinations, 
provided for appointment and promotion on the basis of 
merit, and legislated numerous other provisions designed
4 7Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 65, 69, 81, 115; Werking, 
Master Architects, 234; Etzold, Conduct of Diplomacy, 31-33.
^Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 154-155, 159, 164, 171; 
Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 152, 157, 173-174, 179, 211; 
Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 212-213; Crane, Mr. Carr, 
257-258.
4 9Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 35. Others share Etzold's 
view of the Rogers Act. See Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 
184; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 205.
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50to create an attractive career in foreign affairs. The 
concept of career diplomacy/ spawned in the last years of 
the nineteenth century, had become a reality. The founda­
tion for constructing an institutionalized capacity for 
the conduct of foreign relations had been laid.
IV
The success of the foreign service reform movement, 
however, signaled no abrupt departure in the American 
attitude toward diplomacy. Legislative approbation of 
professional status for diplomats and consuls, under the 
rubric. "Foreign Service officer," was not synonomous with 
public acceptance of traditional diplomacy as represented 
by the Old Diplomatic Service. On the contrary, there 
remained among'^the public and Congress a deep suspicion 
of diplomacy and diplomats.
«At the same time that World War I sparked a revival in
iIforeign servide reform, the war and its aftermath resurrectedf. I
old prejudices against traditional diplomacy. Many demo­
cratic peoples blamed the European diplomat— the archetype 
of the professional diplomatist, the prototype American 
diplomats/liked to pattern themselves after— for his 
failure to prevent the outbreak of the World War. The
Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 157-177; Barnes and 
Morgan, Foreign Service, 188-210; Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 
157-158; Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 35.
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existence of secret treaties negotiated prior to and
during the war, Woodrow Wilson's idealism and call for
"open covenants of peace openly arrived at," and the
machinations that enveloped the Versailles Conference—
all prominently displayed in the press— reinforced and
exacerbated popular aversion to traditional diplomacy.
More than ever before, ordinary citizens, convinced that
they shared with the masses in all countries a detestation
of war, believed that the harbingers of war— the professional
diplomats, who "represented" an elite minority and who
"controlled" foreign policy-— must be brought under demo-
51cratic control.
The World War marked the democratic politicization of
diplomacy, a "transition from the old diplomacy to the 
c onew." The "old" methods of diplomacy, characterized by 
confidential negotiations among professional diplomats who 
stood above domestic political battles and partisan 
ideologies, became anathema in democratic countries. Elected
51 NLcolson, Diplomacy, 113. See also Gordon A. Craig, 
"The Professional Diplomat and His Problems, 1919-1939," in 
Lawrence E. Glefand, ed., Essays on the History of American 
Foreign Relations (N.Y.; Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), 
311-32 0; Paul Gordon, Lauren, Diplomats and Bureaucrats;
The First Institutional Responses to Twentieth Century 
Diplomacy in France and Germary (Stanford: Hoover Institu-
tion Press, 1976), 222-227.
52Nicolson, Diplomacy, 99, 113.
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chief s-of “State began to conduct negotiations themselves.^3 
Encouraged by their citizen constituencies, political 
leaders employed euphemisms such as "democratic diplomacy" 
and "diplomacy in the public view" to describe the transition 
from the "dark ages" of diplomacy to the new, sunshine 
diplomacy.^
That the professional diplomatist had functioned
largely as an instrument and not as a creator of policy
mattered little. Nor did it matter that Wilson, Lloyd
George, and Georges Clemenceau had negotiated an "open
covenant," the Treaty of Versailles, in strict secrecy.
Diplomats everywhere had incurred the public's wrath.
Elected leaders and citizens now believed "that it was
possible" and necessary "to apply to the conduct of external
affairs, the ideas and practices which, in the conduct of
internal affairs, had for generations been regarded as the
55essentials of liberal democracy."
The democratization of diplomacy found expression in 
the post-World War American foreign service reform movement.
5^Lauren, Diplomats and Bureaucrats, 227.
Ibid., 226-227; Craig, "Diplomats and Problems," 
313-315; Nicolson, Diplomacy, 43.
55Nicolson, Diplomacy, 113. See also Lauren, Diplo­
mats and Bureaucrats, 226.
With the World War, broad masses of the American people 
became more attentive to foreign affairs. They saw that 
the Diplomatic Service had been the almost exclusive 
"preserve of the young and older rich with their interlocking 
connections of birth, education, and f r i e n d s h i p . M e r i t  
and competence appeared to count for little alongside 
proper breeding, wealth, and social manners. Increasingly, 
reformers demanded that the recruitment base of the Diplo­
matic Service be broadened, that the barriers to entry be 
eliminated, that the Service be "democratized." The consi­
derations that "actuated" the reformers, according to one 
observer, was "the danger inherent in recruiting a service
from a social elite," the danger "that the demands of the
57majority on foreign policy might be ignored." The
solution proposed by the reformers was to provide sufficient
salaries to permit the "people's representatives" to enter 
58the Service.
The Rogers Act addressed directly the issue of "democra-
C  C Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 32. See also Schulzinger, 
Diplomatic Mind, 10; Charles W. Thayer, Diplomat (N.Y.r 
Harper & Brothers, 1959), 72.
57Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 141.
58Ibid. The pre-war executive orders eliminated 
neither political patronage in appointments nor elitism in 
the ranks of the corps. Barnes and Morgan state: "With the
small salaries creating what was, in effect, a property 
qualification for the Diplomatic Service, the merit system 
was far from being effectively applied." Foreign Service, 
210-212.
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tization." In providing for decent, though not generous, 
salary increases for Foreign Service officers, and in man­
dating that entry into the Service be at the lowest level 
and that appointment and promotion be based upon merit, the 
act attempted to remove many formal barriers to recruitment^ 
In amalgamating the Diplomatic and Consular Services, the 
act looked ahead to the day when diplomats and consuls 
would be interchangeable, when diplomats would embrace 
the egalitarian and democratic vestments of the consular 
agents.
American diplomats approached the enactment and
implementation of the Rogers Act with caution and ambiguity 
Hoping to acquire some of the public esteem enjoyed by
consuls, the diplomats had worked hard to convince the
public of their usefulness and to dispel the notion that
diplomats were unnecessary ornaments. Time and again the
59Prior to the Rogers Act, diplomatic salaries— exclud­
ing chiefs-of-missions— ranged from a low of $1,500 to a 
high of $4,000, while the highest-paid consuls received 
$8,000. After the Rogers Act, the salaries for Foreign 
Service officers— all consuls and diplomats— were the same, 
ranging from $3,000 to $9,000, depending upon class and 
grade in the Service. Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 67, 73, 
76.
6 0The act had been drafted by Carr and the consuls who 
were better organized administratively and who had more 
friends in Congress than the diplomats. See Etzold, Conduct 
of Policy, 24-25; Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 9; Werking, 
Master Architects, 161-162, 170.
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diplomats had invoked the argument that "not only did a
diplomat try to secure equal treatment for his nation’s
commerce, but among the principal reasons for political
overtures and policies was the desire to maintain conditions
61suitable for commercial intercourse." The diplomats, 
however, also wanted to maintain the privileged status 
of their elite fraternity.
A strong sense of elitist esprit de corps had developed 
within the diplomatic corps since the end of the nineteenth 
century. From the outset of their careers, the younger 
diplomats shared upper-class origins and "best family" 
traditions. Most possessed independent wealth— a prerequisite 
to entrance into the Diplomatic Service since the government 
offered little or no compensation.
Faced with an indifferent, if not hostile, public,
the diplomats found solace and comfort among their own
kind. They would have in any case. The world, as one of
them remarked, was their home town: They could not travel
abroad without meeting someone they knew and were glad to 
62see. With no formal process available for appointment 
and promotion, an informal old-boy network evolved among 
61Werking, Master Architects, 223-224.
62 .Willard F. Beaulac, Career Ambassador (N.Y.: Macmillan/ 
1951), 201.
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the diplomats based upon family, education, and social 
63connections.
Increasingly, too, the diplomats had become jealous
of their privileges and protective of their status, which
many of them equated with the best possible management of
64United States foreign relations. The Diplomatic Service 
was "like a club," one member confided to his diary in 
1919. "The outsider was regarded with a faint air of 
suspicion, but a member, even a junior, was treated with 
absolute trust. " ̂
Many diplomats, moreover, regarded consuls as unfit 
material for admission to the club. Although sincere in
their commercial fervor, the diplomats never believed that
\the "lowly" consuls, who "traded" in the menial tasks of \ 
the business world, were capable of performing political
6 3 *Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 26. See also Martin Weill,
A Pretty Good Club; The Founding Fathers of the U.S. Foxelgi
Service (N.Y.: W.W. Norton, 1978), 15-16, 27, 52 ,passim; Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 85; Henry Serrano
Villard, Affairs at State fcj.Y.: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1965) ,
152.
64Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 27.
6 5Nancy Harvison Hooker, ed., The Moffat Papers: Selec­
tions from the Diplomatic Journals of Jay Pierrepont Moffat, 
1919-1943 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), 9.
See also Weil, Pretty Good Club, 23; Perrin C. Galpin, ed., 
Hugh Gibson, 1883-19 54: Extracts From His Letters and Anec­
dotes From His Friends (N.Y.: Belgium American Foundation, 
1956), 97.
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6 6work in a unified Foreign Service. The diplomats had
supported amalgamation of the two services for reasons of
self-interest: The consuls enjoyed much better relations
with Congress than the diplomats did, and the consuls
wanted amalgamation as part of the legislative package
6 7to reform the foreign services. While the diplomats 
cooperated in securing passage of the Rogers Act, many of 
them reserved for the consuls the same kind of scorn that 
members of the upper class reserve for the working class.
The diplomats, thus, viewed the Rogers Act with mixed 
sentiments. The act accorded them the professional status 
and career stability they had labored so assiduously to 
achieve. But the act did not bring with it public and 
political support for the sound, traditional practice of 
diplomacy. Nor did the act mollify public suspicion of 
diplomacy or raise the level of public esteem of diplomats. 
Finally, amalgamation— desired by consuls who resented the 
pretensions of the diplomats, while coveting their social 
graces and diplomatic positions— threatened to disrupt, if 
not destroy, the diplomats', elite fraternity.
6 6Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 9, 115; Werking, 
Master Architects, 223-224.
67Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 33.
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V
The amalgamation of the Consular and Diplomatic
Services proved to be the most difficult issue encountered
6 8by the nascent Foreign Service. Amalgamation meant that
consular and diplomatic positions would be interchangeable,
that consuls and diplomats would share equally the work of
the consular and diplomatic branches. With the passage of
the Rogers Act, Wilbur Carr and the consuls believed that
interchangeability would be the rule. The career diplomats
69intended it to be the exception.
The diplomats proved the better bureaucratic politicians 
until at least 1927. Many of the career diplomats "grand­
fathered" into the Foreign Service from the old diplomatic
corps were socialites: A considerable number were expert
70diplomatists as well. Although they lacked experience 
in personnel administration, they were seasoned in the 
realm of international politics and negotiations. They
6 8Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 115; Ilchman, Profes­
sional Diplomacy, 165, 188.
69Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 149-152, 165;
Crane, Mr. Carr, 259-260; Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind,
75 .
70Thayer, Diplomat, 2 72; Etzold, Conduct of Policy,
26; Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Depression, 2 81.
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translated their considerable skills into the theater of
internal bureaucratic politics. The diplomats— lead by
Joseph C. Grew, Hugh Gibson, Hugh Wilson, and William
Phillips--gained control of the Foreign Service Personnel
Board at its inception in 1924, and made it an instrument
that served the interests of the diplomatic elite. For
four years, the diplomats enclosed in the old-boy network
received a vastly disproportionate share of the choice posts
71and promotions.
The bureaucratic omniscience of the diplomats did not
last, however. In 1927, with evidence in hand, the consuls
enlisted the aid of their friends in Congress to rectify
the situation. A minor scandal erupted. Although the
diplomats were absolved of most of the charges leveled
against them, they were also stripped of their authority on
72the Personnel Board.
Four years later, in 19 31, Congress enacted the Moses- 
Linthicum Act. The result, in part, of lobbying by the 
consuls for fairer treatment, the act improved several 
aspects of Foreign Service operations, building upon the 
structure of the Rogers Act. The act also limited the
71 , , .Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 77-78, 115-123; Crane, 
Mr. Carr, 281-282.
72Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 122; Heinrichs, American. 
Ambassador, 123; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 173-196.
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power of the diplomats to employ favoritism. The act
prohibited the promotion to chief-of-mission of Foreign
Service officers on the Personnel Board for three years
73following the end of their service on the board. Other
provisions insured that new recruits would be members of a
74fused Foreign Service. By 19 33 over 40 percent of the
75officers held dual commissions.
VI
The labor pains suffered by the embryonic Foreign 
Service over amalgamation faded in comparison to the 
improvements wrought by the Rogers Act. Elevated to the 
status of a career and profession, the Foreign Service 
began to attract a steady supply of competent applicants.
In 1925, 172 candidates gathered to complete the first 
entrance examination administered under the Rogers Act.
Two years earlier, only 36 applicants took the exam, 11 of 
whom passed, necessitating that the State Department accept 
and appoint to diplomatic vacancies nearly anyone who met
73Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 136; Barnes and Morgan, 
Foreign Service, 215-216; 235-236.
74Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 123.
75Robert P. Skinner, "Ten Years Under the Rogers Act," 
American Foreign Service Journal, 11 (July 1934), 341.
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the minimum qualifications.
Business opportunities during the roaring 1920s kept
some qualified individuals from applying. However, fully
282 persons received Foreign Service commissions from 1925
to 19 31. Among those embarking upon diplomatic careers
during this period were such able diplomatists as George F.
Kennan, Charles "Chip" Bohlen, John Patton Davies, Jr.,
David K.E. Bruce, Loy Henderson, Henry S. Villard, and
77Robert D. Murphy.
The Service also attracted candidates from broader
social and economic backgrounds. Because of the Rogers
Act's provisions for salary raises, pension pay, and
representation allowances, the Service was no longer closed
7 8to all of those without substantial private means.
Whereas, in 192 3 32 percent of the members of the Diplo-
^Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 35. Forty-one persons in 
1921 and 37 in 1922 took the entrance exam to the Diplomatic 
Service. See also Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 173; Ilchman, 
Professional Diplomacy, 152, 186, 202-203; Barnes and Morgan, 
Foreign Service, 213, 225; Villard, Affairs at State, 57-58.
77Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 194 ftn. 3.
7 8Nevertheless, some degree of private wealth was still 
very helpful, and no Foreign Service officer could afford to 
take an embassy in Western Europe on his salary alone. Hugh 
Gibson wrote in his diary in 1929: "Diplomacy is the one
thing that interests me....But failing an assured financial 
future I can't see what there is to justify a decision to 
stay on indefinitely in diplomacy. What a pest that money 
has such importance!" Galpin, Hugh Gibson, 42-4 3.
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matic Service had attended Harvard, in 1936 less than 6
percent of all recruits came from Harvard. Over 50 percent
. . 79had matriculated at public universities.
The Service, thus, took great strides in becoming
"democratized." Two exceptions were blacks and women, few
80of whom applied and few of whom received appointments.
Reflecting the prejudices of the larger American society,
the Foreign Service remained an "aristocracy of skin" and
81an 'aristocracy of sex. "
The Service succeeded, too, in dismissing a number of
incompetents. The Rogers Act provided for the weeding out
of inferior men. Soon after the passage of the act, the
Personnel Board began to comply with this provision. As
Joseph C. Grew, a member of the board, wrote to William
Phillips in the summer of 1924:
A good many dead boughs have been separated 
from the Service through age, retirement and 
the abolition of the unassigned list, while 
other men have been given to understand 
that their cases will be further dealt with
79Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 108; Ilchman, Profes­
sional Diplomacy, 225-226.
80Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 108-109.
81The phrases are John Stuart Mill's in his intro­
duction to Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 
(2 vols.; N.Y.: Schocken Books, 1961. Originally published 
in 1835), I, xii.
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R2in the near future.
By 19 34, eighty-nine officers— or 15 percent of those who
were in the Service in 1924— had been retired for age,
83disability, or incompetence.
More significantly, with the Rogers Act the era had 
passed when a change in presidential administration fore­
cast the wholesale replacement of foreign service personnel. 
Merit principles, experience, and bureaucratic politics—  
not party politics— ruled the placement of officers below 
the rank of minister. The appointment of chiefs-of-mission—  
ministers and ambassadors— remained the prerogative of the 
President and, thus, a prisoner of the spoils system.
However, in 1924, President Calvin Coolidge, via an execu­
tive order, instructed the Foreign Service Personnel Board 
to include among its responsibilities the task of recommend­
ing for promotion to chief-of-mission those Foreign Service
84officers who had demonstrated special ability. All 
administrations since have followed a similar practice, 
although the practical results have varied from administra-
82Walter Johnson, ed., Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic
Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945 (2 vols.. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1952), I, 626. See also Ilchman, Professional 
Diplomacy, 209.
8 3Skinner, "Ten Years Under," 342.
84Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 212-213;
Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 210.
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tion to administration.
The appointment of chiefs-of-mission from the ranks of 
the Foreign Service soared under the Republican administra­
tions of the 1920s. From a low of 8 percent under 
Woodrow Wilson in 1916, the percentage of career chiefs- 
of-mission climbed to 2 8 percent under Warren G. Harding 
and to 41 percent under Coolidge. By 1932, under Herbert
Hoover, professional diplomats held nearly 50 percent of
85the top diplomatic posts abroad.
To acquire a share of the top posts abroad was as
important to career development as was the Rogers Act. The
mark of professional distinction for a diplomat lay in
8 6heading an embassy or legation. The actions of Republican
presidents and their secretaries of state during the 1920s
in promoting career officers as chiefs-of-mission reflected
a growing recognition of the merits of professional diplo-
8 7mats over amateurs. These actions also established a 
precedent for future administrations to match.
85"Career vs. Non-Career Appointments, 1906-1940," 
American Foreign Service Journal, 17 (December 1940), 679.
86Henry K. Norton, "Foreign Office Organization: A
Comparison of the British, French, German and Italian 
Foreign Offices with that of the Department of State of the 
United States of America," Annals of the Academy of Political 
and Social Sciences, 142, Supplement (May 1929), 23, 39-41. 
See also Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 125.
87Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 213, 223-224, 264.
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VII
Few people connected to the foreign affairs community
doubted that the United States had passed a milestone in
the development of a Foreign Service capable of assisting
8 8American statesmen in the conduct of foreign relations.
A strong sense of esprit de corps permeated the Foreign
Service, marked by the high morale of officers who now
felt that they belonged to an important, established
professional organization,. By the 19 30s it was "no longer
regarded as a reward to be assigned to the Diplomatic
branch, nor a punishment to be assigned to the Consular 
89branch." The schism between the diplomats and consuls
had largely healed, the distinctions and animosities that
remained now confined to "the unreachable area of personal 
90relations."
In some ways things had not changed or improved. 
Entering the 1930s, the State Department-— a synonym for
88For example, see George F. Kennan, "The Future of Our Professional Diplomacy, " T h e  F o r e i g n  Affairs Quarterly, 33 (July 
1955), 566; G. Howland Shaw, "The American Foreign Service," 
ibid., 14 (January 1936), 328; Skinner, "Ten Years Under," 
341-343.
8 9Skinner, "Ten Years Under," 342. Skinner, himself a 
consul in the old Consular Service, went on to suggest that 
"the time is not far distant when an officer who is profi­
cient in only one branch of the Service cannot hope to 
reach the highest ranks."
90Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 183.
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the foreign affairs establishment— was still "small,
placid," and "comfortably adjusted to the lethargic diplo-
91macy" of they1920s. Endowed with economic abundance and 
technological superiority, the United States maintained 
a traditionally nonassertive, if not inactive, foreign 
policy.
The activities of the Foreign Service officer reflected
the relative serenity of American foreign relations. One
of the best of the early American diplomats, Lewis Einstein,
wrote in contemplating retirement in 1930:
After more than eight years passed at Prague,
I was somewhat tired of the monotony of diplo­
matic life. Such glamour as it ever possessed 
for me had long ago worn off, and though I liked 
the work, when work there was, I was bored by 
diplomatic entertainment and the continuous obli­
gation of attending tedious banquets and talking 
to tedious people.92
David F. Drummond, "Cordell Hull (1933-1944)," in 
Norman A. Graebner, ed., An Uncertain Tradition: American
Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century (N.Y.: McGraw- 
Hill, 1961), 188. Beaulac, a career diplomat 
serving in Haiti in 1927, recalls: "Life had been gay and
easy. I had swam, played golf, and driven about the/country, 
usually in the company of other Americans. My work,; while: 
never arduous, had been instructive." C a re e r Amb ass ado r, 105 /
92A Diplomat Looks Back (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1968),207.
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The genteel and slow-moving world of American diplomacy
93remained unaltered from that of an earlier era.
Nor had the American public significantly altered its
view of diplomats. More than before, perhaps, diplomats
invoked in the public mind visions of boys with white spats,
94tea drinkers, and cookie pushers. The results of the 
Rogers Act in eradicating social elitism from the ranks 
of diplomats had not conformed with public expectations. 
Being a diplomat in the United States, imbued as its 
citizens were with the egalitarian ethic, carried no 
special distinction. Being a businesman did. By contrast, 
being a diplomat in Europe, where class distinctions were 
more pronounced, had always been considered a suitable 
calling for the sons of the aristocracy. Only in the 1920s
9 3Beaulac again recalls: "The State Department was all
too backward in coming forward and insisting that its needs 
be met.... I recall that at one of my posts I received an 
instruction in which the Department noted, gravely, that 
during the preceding quarter my expenditures for toilet 
paper had averaged 20 percent higher than for an earlier 
quarter. I was asked to submit an explanation. I was 
forced to reply, equally gravely, that the temporary in­
crease in expenditure for this item was owing to the circum­
stances that the officer in charge had had recurrent attacks 
of diarrhea during the period under review..*.of course, this 
was a reflection of the period in which we lived." Career 
Ambassador, 107-108.
9 4Diplomats who wrote memoirs about this period univer­
sally agree on this point. Of course, they were particularly 
sensitive to it, perhaps overly so. Perhaps, too, their 
expectations of the Rogers Act were not matched by the 
results. For example, see Villard, Affairs at State, 1, 2, 5-6; Thayer, Diplomat, 72.
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did businessmen in Europe begin to approach the public
95status accorded diplomats.
Nor had American diplomats adequately defined the job 
of a Foreign Service officer. In explaining the professional 
practice of diplomacy to businessmen, laymen and politicians, 
the diplomats spoke of the "ideal qualities" of the diplo­
matist as delineated by twentieth-century European practi­
tioners, the qualities that differentiated the professional
from the amateur diplomat— truthfulness, precision, calmness,
96modesty, and such things as sound judgment. With no 
tradition of diplomacy by which to measure professionals 
and amateurs, Americans found it difficult, if not 
impossible, to understand why diplomacy, more than other 
occupations, required "special" expertise. Diplomacy 
remained an abstraction to most Americans, while the 
diplomats, themselves, had to build their own tradition, 
borrowing much from the Europeans.
The United States, nevertheless, had framed a solid,
95Norton, "Foreign Service Organization," 51-52.
Norton also states: "The executive personnel of the European 
foreign offices is such as to command the respect of public 
opinion....The executive personnel of the State Department, 
while it includes men of unquestioned ability and while it 
is characterized by a high average of devotion to the public 
service, is little known to the public and is frequently 
subjected to hasty and ill-informed criticism." Ibid., ix.
96 Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 101, 141.
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institutional structure for the conduct of foreign rela­
tions. During the 1920s the Foreign Service built upon 
this framework. The older diplomats instilled in new 
recruits the traditional, time-honored— if not always
practiced— view of diplomacy, and encouraged them to develop
97a "realist" outlook on world politics.
By the time Franklin D. Roosevelt assumed the presi­
dency, the Foreign Service was confident, stable, and 
improving. No one, however, could have foreseen the 
effects of the Great Depression and of the attitudes and 
concerns of a new Democratic President upon the infant 
Foreign Service.
97Ibid., 81, 87-88, 98.
A n.ulz compelling everybody 
In all Embattle.* and Legation* 
to ivoA.fi eight kouAt a day-- 
{loe day* a week--would be 
the. kind o$ cyclone which 
would be heasid nound the 
wo Aid!
President Franklin D.
Roosevelt
3 THE FOREIGN SERVICE UNDER FDR, 1933-1939:
DEPRESSION AND PREJUDICE
The presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt proved to be 
an inauspicious environment for sustaining the development 
of the United States Foreign Service. FDR's attitude 
toward career diplomats, his lack of enthusiasm for pro­
fessional diplomacy, coupled with the exigencies of the 
Depression, stymied the cultivation of a Foreign Service 
capable of assuming a leadership role in the formulation 
and implementation of American foreign policy.
When FDR assumed office on March 4, 1933, the Great 
Depression was at its nadir. Millions of unemployed 
people haunted the nation's streets. Farmers were 
desperate. Bank failures were endemic. Bewilderment borne 
of prolonged desperation gripped the country, while the
FDR to Hull, January 17, 1935, Edgar B. Nixon, ed., 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs (3 vols.; Cam­
bridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969), 
II, 366-367.
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machinery of government seemed hopelessly stalled, unable 
to combat the misery.
President Roosevelt naturally focused his energies on 
the Depression at home for most of his first seven years 
in office. Confronted with unprecedented economic depriva­
tion, most Americans evinced little concern for the crises 
brewing abroad in the Far East and Europe. If anything, 
the Depression exacerbated the inclination of most Americans 
to blame the Europeans and the munitions manufacturers for 
World War I. Many Americans vowed not to permit the United 
States to engage in another foreign imbroglio. Whether 
from political reality or personal conviction, Roosevelt., 
too, revealed little interest in employing the power of 
the United States to halt the world's descent toward chaos.
FDR also embraced deeply-entrenched, popular prejudices 
against career diplomats. He regarded the Foreign Service 
as a playground for dilettantes and socialites. As the 
Depression forced severe retrenchment upon the nation's 
diplomatic resources, Roosevelt looked upon the plight of 
the Foreign Service with almost haughty scorn. He displayed 
little regard for the efficacy of a professional diplomatic 
corps.
Even a more favorable climate would not have compelled
-82-
Roosevelt to assume an active interest in strengthening 
the Foreign Service. Although the Depression would have 
affected adversely the strength of the Service under any 
administration, Roosevelt's demeanor toward diplomats, as 
well as his peculiar administrative habits and supreme 
confidence in his own diplomatic abilities, militated 
against a diligent concern on his part for maintaining a 
vigorous Foreign Service.
Roosevelt's treatment of the Foreign Service augured 
ill for the application of American influence abroad. The 
President's ability to exert leadership in foreign affairs, 
if and when he should choose to do so, rested in part upon 
the health of the Foreign Service. Similarly, the ability 
of the Foreign Service to respond to changes in the inter­
national environment depended in part upon its institutional 
vitality. That the record of United States diplomacy during 
the 1930s is one of singular failure can be attributed, in 
at least some small measure, to FDR's disdain for the 
Foreign Service he inherited from his predecessors.2
2see Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Depression, 
1-18, 225-277; William Manchester, The Glory and the Dream: 
A Narrative History of the United States, 1932-1972 
(Boston: Little Brown, 1974), 68, 174; John E. Wiltz,
From Isolation to War, 19 31-1941 (N.Y.: Thomas Y. Crowell,
196 8)̂ passim.
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I
The Depression shattered the normally imperturbable 
administration of the Foreign Service. Amidst the depths 
of the Depression, the Service suffered a pervasive retrench­
ment in its operations. Although the Service experienced a 
restoration of sorts after 1935, the wounds inflicted upon 
it healed slowly and incompletely.
Reductions in appropriations were most severe. In 
1933 the New Deal.administration, with the assent of Congiessr 
slashed the State Department's budget by 33 percent. The 
decimation of the budget— along with across the board pay 
cuts of 15 percent, the curtailment of rental allowances 
by 65 percent, and the devaluation of the dollar as the 
United ^tates abandoned the gold standard— effectively 
reduced -the salaries of Foreign Service officers serving 
abroad by over 50 percent. Congress restored most of theitsalary Reductions and rent subsidies by the end of 1935.
Not until 1938, however, did the State Department receive 
an appropriation that approached its 1932 level of funding, 
only then to suffer a reduction of nearly $1,000,000, or 
6.25 percent of its allocation, in 1939.
3Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, ,217-219. See 
also FDR to Jesse Isidor Straus, July 11, 1933, FDR to Ruth 
Bryan Owen, November 17, 1933, and Claude G. Bowers to FDR, 
December 13, 1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 329, 
514, 528-529; and FDR to Bowers, February 5, 1934, Elliott
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Recruitment virtually halted. Entrance examinations, 
suspended in 1932, resumed again only late in 1935. The 
number of officers, arbitrarily reduced by 10 percent in 
1934, did not reapproximate the 1932 level of 762 until the 
eve of World War II, when the complement of officers 
reached 72 3.^
Individual career advancement nearly ceased. All 
promotions within the Service were suspended from 1931 
through 1935. Young officers far from retirement filled 
the top four classes of the corps. In 1934, for example, the
5average age of all Foreign Service officers was 40.25 years.
o
Roosevelt, ed., FDR; His Personal Letters, 192 8-1945 (2 
vols.;N.Y.: Duell^ Sloan, and Pearce, 1950), I, 389-390.
The State Department's appropriations were approximately 
$18,000,000 in 1932; $13,500,000 in 1933; $16,000,000 in 
1936; $16,600,000 in 1938; $15,600,000 in 1939. August C. 
Miller, Jr., "The New State Department," American Journal of 
International Law, 33 (July 1939), 518. See also Hugh 
Gibson, "Diplomats Pay to Work," The Saturday Evening Post, 
209 (May 8, 1937),49.
4Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 219. See also 
Graham H. Stuart, The Department of State: A History of
Its Organization, Procedure, and Practice {SJ.Y.: Macmillan, 
1949), 326; Kenneth W. Thompson, Diplomacy and Emergent 
Patterns (N.Y.: New York University Press, 1962) , 85. 
Recruitment was also suspended during World War II. In 1945 
the number of Foreign Service officers was only 785. 
Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 201.
5Skinner, "Ten Years Under," 342. See also Heinrichs, 
"Bureaucracy," 186-187; Shaw, "American Foreign Service," 
329.
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Alt ho ugh few diplomats resigned for the perils of the bread­
lines, they could hardly feel sanguine about their careers.
The high morale fostered in the years since the Rogers 
Act deteriorated. Foreign Service officers, but especially 
politically-appointed chiefs-of-mission, flooded the State 
Department and the White House with letters describing 
hardships. One typical letter reported that a vice consul 
"has had to borrow money to send his wife and child home 
to live with her people while he lives in a cheap furnished
6 froom." Another noted that a diplomatic attache "has gone
home on leave completely broken in health, largely because
of the difficult and arduous work that he has performed
7without vacation during the past two years."
Home leaves at government expense, indefinitely dis­
continued in 1932, placed officers abroad in a state of
virtual exile. Sixteen officers, a State Department spokes­
man told a congressional committee in 1936, had not returned 
to the United States in seven years. Many others had 
served abroad for over three years without leave, although 
the Department regarded a three-year exile as long enough.
^Bowers to FDR, December 13, 1933, Nixon, FDR and 
Foreign Affairs, I, 529. See also Barnes and Morgan,
Foreign Service, 188-189, 214-215.
^Straus to FDR, April 9, 1935, Nixon, FDR and Foreign 
Affairs, II, 465.
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Few officers could afford the transportation expenses.
Fewer still could afford the luxury of a savings account.
In 1936 the government reinstated home leave provisions,
Qbut allocated only $35,000 for that purpose.
The distress of the Service was acute. To Assistant 
Secretary of State Wilbur J. Carr, who had served in the 
State Department since 1892, "the distress of the Foreign 
Service [was] greater [in 1934] than at any time within
9the memory of those of us in the Department." Secretary 
of State Cordell Hull concurred. "Much of the Foreign 
Service," he testified before Congress in April, 1934, "is 
now more or less in a state of demoralization so far as 
actual efficiency is concerned."10
The plight of the Foreign Service severely handicapped
/
the efficient management of foreign affairs. The Service 
confronted a retrenchment in resources at the same time that 
it faced a substantial increase in demands and responsibili­
ties. With the Depression thundering across national 
boundaries "like a global tornado," the comparative serenity
g "A Better Deal for Our State Department," American 
Foreign Service Journal, 14 (August 1937), 464.
 ̂Stuart> Department of State, 326 . See 
also Crane, Mr. Carr, 314-315; Ilchman, Professional Diplo­
macy^ 229-230.
10 Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 229-230.
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of the 1920s evaporated.11 Tumultuous international condi­
tions, sparked by crises in the Far East and Europe and 
fanned by the Depression, expanded dramatically the work­
load of the State Department at home and abroad. From 1929 
to 1939, dispatches between the Department and the diplomatic 
missions abroad increased tenfold. Nearly every day, 
Secretary of State Hull recalled, proved hectic, "being
hopelessly crowded with emergency problems calling for
12feverish activity."
Limitations in personnel posed the greatest problem.
Carr calculated that each of the 4 7 diplomatic missions
and 271 consular offices abroad required four to eight
officers: As of 19 34, when the number of officers in the
classified Service numbered 6 88, an average of no more than
13two could be assigned to each post. Three of the most
critical posts— Berlin, Paris and London— had four, five
14and six officers respectively. In addition, the Service
■^Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Depression, 9.
12Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (2 vols.; 
N.Y.: Macmillan, 1948)1 T~, 183.
13Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 219.
14Hull to FDR, January 14, 1935, Nixon, FDR and Foreign 
Affairs, II, 35 8. Hull notes that there were 7 officers in 
Paris. That number was soon reduced to 5. Straus to FDR, 
April 9, 19 35, ibid., 465.
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employed 3,600 secretaries and clerks, an average of ten
4. 15per post.
More staff is not necessarily synonpmous with more 
efficient administration. Today the embassies in Bonn, 
Paris, and London each employ over 1,000 people. The 
State Department employs over 500 people— nearly the equiva­
lent of all Foreign Service officers in 1933— just to sort
16and distribute the mail. Whether the Department functions 
more effectively today than yesterday is questionable. More 
staff often translates into more work and more burdens, not 
into more efficient operations. Today, at least, small may 
be beautiful and even desirable.
More might have been better during the 1930s, however.
With world conditions descending toward chaos, the State
Department was, as it is today, the smallest of the federal
departments. In 1935 all State Department employees in
Washington, D.C., could assemble together on the steps of
17the Executive Office Building for a photograph. At no
15Hull to FDR, January 14, 1935, ibid., 358.
16Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 101. On the question of 
staff size, see also Ferrell Amer1can Diplomacy, 20-22. 
Classified Foreign Service officers comprise less than -17 
percent of the total number of State Department employees 
today. John Ensor Harr, The Professional Diplomat (Prince­
ton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 94.
17Harr, Professional Diplomat, 95.
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time during the 1930s did the annual appropriations of the 
State Department equal more than 1 percent of the funds 
allocated to the United States military, which, at that 
time, ranked behind the army of Yugoslavia in efficiency 
and preparedness.^
The adversity that afflicted the Foreign Service
largely reflected the exigencies of the Depression. Faced
with the lingering spectre of between 12,000,000 and
18,000,000 unemployed workers, the New Deal administration
necessarily diverted available resources to combating the
domestic crisis. Domestic federal employment projects
sprouted like weeds in vacant lots, particularly during
the famous "First 100 Days" of the Roosevelt administration.
Wilbur Carr, charged with the unpleasant responsibility of
being budget officer for the State Department, acknowledged
that the Depression forced austere economic measures upon
19the nation's diplomatic machinery.
18Manchester, Glory and Dream, 6; Hull, Memoirs, I,
183. See also I.M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats and 
Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19 72), 23.
The total State Department budget in the early 1970s was 
approximately $350 million, while that of the Pentagon was 
nearly $80 billion. Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy 
Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs F7Y7I Harper & Row', 1971) , 4_
^Crane, Mr. Carr, 314.
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Private ly, however, Carr faulted President Roosevelt.
Carr perceived the President as "out of sympathy" with the
Department and the Foreign Service and, therefore, unrespon-
. . 20sive to requests for greater support on appropriations.
In part, Carr's incrimination of FDR revealed his own 
frustration at having to inflict radical economies on 
the structure he had labored so long and hard to construct. 
Reverentially attached to the well-being of the Service,
Carr acquired during the Depression an unjustified reputa­
tion within the Foreign Service for not doing enough to 
convince Congress of the need for additional funds. For
Carr administration of the Service under FDR was a night- 
21mare.
Carr's personal distress also reflected a more funda­
mental human condition. People react to crises in several 
different ways. Sometimes a crisis produces a despondency, 
a sense of hopelessness, a feeling that personal survival 
is all that matters. Sometimes a crisis produces exhilara­
tion, a sense that a challenge exists to be conquered, a 
renewed feeling of alturistic purpose. Not infre-
21Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 184-186.
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quently, the most dire circumstances can provoke in people 
a renewed vigor, a desire to challenge and to overcome the 
worst of situations-— especially if they can be assured that 
their determination is appreciated and supported by their 
leaders.
II
FDR approached the peedicament of the Foreign Service
with cavalier indifference. As one ambassador correctly
suspected, the President believed that the diplomatic
corps was "overstaffed, underworked and overpaid; that
the average career man [was] a tea hound and a lounge 
22lizard."
Secretary of State Hull repeatedly attempted to 
convince the President otherwise. "The employees of the 
Foreign Service," Hull wrote FDR on January 31, 1934, "have 
suffered losses out of all proportion to those which other 
employees of the Government have suffered." A year later, 
with no remedy in sight, and even more reductions forecast 
in diplomatic personnel, Hull predicted dire consequences 
for the future of the Service. In a letter to Roosevelt,
22Straus to FDR, April 9, 19 35, Nixon, FDR and Foreign 
Affairs, II, 464.
23 .Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 621.
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he explained:
There have been no promotions in class or 
filling of vacancies created since 1932.
These drastic reductions in personnel with­
out the recognition of efficient service 
through normal advancement in class as the 
law contemplates will, I fear, have a 
demoralizing effect upon the most capable 
men in the Service and produce a condition 
which it may be difficult to repair.
Hull questioned the wisdom of further reducing the corps
at a time of growing international tension. Instead, he
urged that new candidates be recruited, noting that "it
takes time and patience to make a really good Foreign
Service officer out of a raw recruit."
Hull then implored Roosevelt to obtain a supplemental
appropriation for the Service. He assured FDR that Congress
would be receptive to such a request:
It is my considered judgment that if we are 
to try to have a live, energetic Foreign 
Service personnel capable of meeting what 
I believe to be the need of the present 
situation it would be distinctly in the 
public interest if you could see your way 
clear to restoring all or as much as possible 
of the $200,000 reduction made in appropriation 
for salaries of Foreign Service officers by the 
transmission to Congress of a supplemental 
estimate to that effect. This is not only 
my judgment, but when I and my assistants 
appeared before the Appropriations Committee 
of the House the importance of this action 
was urged repeatedly upon us by members of 
the Committee.... Of course , we declined to
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discuss and in no way advocated a change in 
the amount which you recommended to beappropriated.24
Roosevelt replied briefly, sarcastically to his 
Secretary's lengthy and earnest plea. He would consider 
requesting an additional appropriation, but he was 
confident that "a greater part of" the reduction in the 
proposed budget could "be covered by reducing the staffs 
in the Embassies and Legations especially." FDR concluded: 
"A rule compelling everybody in all Embassies and Legations 
to work eight hours a day— five days a week— would be the 
kind of cyclone which would be heard round the world!"
Knowledge of Roosevelt's attitude soon percolated 
through the ranks of the Foreign Service. Several diplomats 
ventured to transform the President's views. Jesse Isidor 
Straus, an old friend and politically-appointed ambassador 
to France, wrote in the spring of 1935 that he discerned, 
"from various sources," that the President was "being 
filled up with stories about the iniquities of the diplo-
24January 14, 19 35, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, II, 
358-360. Carr probably drafted Hull's letter to FDR. Crane 
states that Carr appeared before the House Appropriations 
Committee on January 4, 1935, and that following the hearing 
he felt compelled "to edit and amplify his [Hull's] state­
ment to make it count for something." Presumably, the 
statement is Hull's plea to FDR. Mr. Carr, 315. In any 
case, it is hardly novel for a subordinate to draft a letter 
or statement for a superior's approval.
25January 17, 19 35, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, II, 366-367.
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matic service." Contrary to the portrait of diplomats
lounging on the public dole, Straus asserted:
Those with whom I have been associated... , and 
those whom I have had the pleasure of meeting... ,
are a lot of serious-minded men who are most
attentive to their duties and spare neither
time nor thought in their endeavors, some­
times under very trying and difficult condi­
tions. ... Long hours mean nothing to them.
Straus regretted that in some circles the view prevailed
that a display of physical activity during prescribed hours
was the prime guage of efficiency. "Most of the information
so necessary to all of us," he revealed, "is gained outside
26of office-hours."
Another ambassador and long-time acquaintance wrote to 
Roosevelt in a similar vein. After echoing Straus' senti­
ments, Jefferson Caffrey sought to dispel the notion that 
social prestige and fraternization were unnecessary accouter­
ments of the diplomatic profession. Caffrey, a career officer 
of twenty-four years experience, explained that a diplomat's 
"efficiency" depended upon prestige, as well as intelligence 
and personality. He defined "prestige" as the respect and 
esteem in which an officer is held by the country to which 
he is accredited. Whether palatable to us or not, he 
continued, foreigners often measure prestige by such ex­
ternal trappings as an envoy's mode of living and social 
habits. Without prestige an officer's efficiency is
26April 9, 1935, ibid., 464-466.
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re duced, for successful diplomacy depends largely upon 
personal contacts, and results are obtained by mutual 
understandings fostered through associations outside of 
the office.
Caffrey then invoked an old stance of the diplomats.
By "successful diplomacy," he asserted emphatically, "I
mean, on the one hand, direct results in thousands and
millions of dollars to American interests and, on the other,
results in the way of confidence and good will on the part
of foreign people." Caffrey believed that much of diplomacy
consisted of cooperating with American businesses. "I take
this Foreign Service business seriously," he concluded; "and
I believe that an efficient Service is worth saving and 
27fighting for."
Roosevelt's attitude toward the American foreign 
affairs community remained unshaken. He treated the State 
Department and the Foreign Service, as institutions, less 
than graciously. In 1939, for instance, Roosevelt asked 
Harry Hopkins, his confidant and secretary of commerce, 
to investigate the contention of the State Department that 
the costs of living in Venezuela exceeded that in Washington,
27March 8, 1935, ibid., 435-537. For a brief portrait 
of Caffrey, which notes his support of American business, 
see Herbert Herring, "The Department of State: A Review
With Recommendations to the President," Harper1s, 174 
(February 1937),, 234.
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D.C., by 100 percent. The subsequent report verified the 
State Department's figure. FDR read the report, according 
to one insider, "with utmost interest" and "with some 
disappointment that he had not caught the Foreign Service 
off base.
III
Roosevelt viewed State Department officials and Foreign
Service officers, as a class, with hearty disdain and
distrust.^ He held a mental picture of the State Depart-
30ment "as a haven of routineers and paper shufflers."
2 8Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins; An 
Intimate History (N.Y.: Grosset & Dunlap, 1959), 116-117.
See also Stuart, Department of State, 326.
29William Lv Langer and Everett S. Gleason were among 
the first scholars to suggest, from a reading of official 
sources, that FD,R was prejudiced against career diplomats. 
They contended, however, that "it would in fact be a mistake 
to underline the President's suspicions." The Challenge to 
Isolation, 1937-1940 (N.YI: Harper & Brothers, 1952), 8.
But it was not ahd is not] The number of career diplomats 
who have commenced upon FDR's deep-rooted prejudice against 
diplomats is suqh as to constitute almost an oral tradition 
in the diplomatic commund/ty. For instance, see J. Rives 
Childs, Foreign Service Farewell: My Years in the Near
East (Charlottesville*.; University Press of Virginia,
1969), 109; Ellis Briggs, Farewell to Foggy Bottom: The
Recollections of a Career Diplomat (N.Y.: David McKay, 1968),
296; Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That .Shaped History 
(N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1951) , 215-2.16; Villard, Affairs
at State, 69; Thayer,; Diplomat, 73^74; John Franklin Camp­
bell, The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory (N.Y.: Basic Books,
1971) , 114; George Kennan, "Future of Diplomacy," 567.
Joseph P . Lash, The Partnership That Saved the West: 
Roosevelt and Churchill , 1939-1941 (N.Y.: W.W.“ Norton, 1976), 182.
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He believed the Foreign Service was rife with holdovers 
from the old Diplomatic Service who had received appoint­
ments more for social reasons than for practical considera­
tions. Along with Harry Hopkins, he reveled in calling the
diplomats "cookie-pushers," "white-spat boys," "tea-drinker^ "
31and "snobbish Europeanized expatriates." He loved to 
crack jokes about the diplomatic establishment. One of 
his favorite, oft-repeated to anyone who would listen, was 
"here's a typical State Department letter; it says nothing 
at all."32
The popular stereotype of diplomats as undemocratic, 
unAmerican and, therefore, unrepresentative of American 
life found consistent expression in FDR's dealings with the 
Foreign Service. Shortly after his inauguration in 1933, 
Roosevelt wrote to Secretary of State Hull in regard to 
representatives sent abroad to attend meetings of inter­
national conferences and congresses :
It seems to me that we have an opportunity 
here to get in new blood and I hope you 
will work up lists that will be more repre­
sentative of this country than some of the 
lists I have seen in the past.
31Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 34. See also Grace 
Tully, FDR: My Boss (Chicago: Peoples Book Club, 1949),
175; John Gunther, Roosevelt in Retrospect: A Profile in
History (N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1950), 127.
32Manchester, Glory and Dream, 34 7.
33March 20, 1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 27.
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Roosevelt did not elaborate upon what he meant by "more 
representative of this country."
FDR evidently feared that the lists might be comprised
of a large number of diplomats. In fact, the lists Hull
contemplated, as he had informed the President earlier, were
largely of "individuals outside of the Government service
selected because of their particular knowledge of subjects,"
including scientists, educators, economists, and humanitar- 
34xans. Most of the conferences attended by delegates on 
these lists were nonpolitical and relatively unimportant:
The United States participated in seventy-five such confer-
O Cences in 1936 alone. J
Roosevelt preferred to approve personally the names of
all persons who represented the United States abroad in any
capacity. In November 1934, Undersecretary of State William
Phillips suggested to FDR— -"with a view of saving your time
and expediting business"— a simple plan for designating
persons to attend the technical but nonvital international
meetings. With no explanation, Roosevelt appended a note
to Phillips' memorandum stating that he preferred "the
3 6present practice as it keeps me 'au courant.'"
Dennis P. Myers, and Charles F. Ransom, "Reorganiza­
tion of the State Department," American Journal of Inter­
national Law, 31 (October 1937), 716.
■^November 9, 1934, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, II, 266,
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FDR believed that the career diplomats were "out of 
touch" with American life. He reasoned that the diplomats, 
elitist by birth and abroad too long, acquired unAmerican 
habits, mannerisms, and thoughts. "Ever since he had been 
in Washington," Roosevelt told Secretary of State-designate 
Edward Stettinius in 1943, he had tried "to reorganize our 
Foreign Service so that these professional diplomats knew 
something about America." FDR "felt diplomats should be
recalled and sent to Tennessee for a year" so that they
; 37could better represent America abroad.
Like most of his countrymen, Roosevelt never questioned 
whether the "unAmerican habits" of American diplomats 
impaired their ability to serve United States interests.
He simply assumed that if the diplomats failed to reflect 
the mores of the ordinary American, they misrepresented 
the United States to foreigners. Roosevelt's attitude, 
like that of the general populace, revealed the American 
penchant for proselytizing American democratic life. Only 
Americans, the national conscience rationalized, could 
represent American democracy and, hence, United States 
interests abroad. Diplomats, by definition, were not 
Americans.
Ironically, amateur American diplomats have succumbed
37Weil, Pretty Good Club, 145.
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more readily to foreign ways and thoughts than professionals. 
The classic example is Walter Hines Page who served as 
Woodrow Wilson's ambassador to the Court of St. James's 
during World War I. Much to Wilson's dismay and the Ambas­
sador's own loss of influence with the President, Page
38became a convinced Anglophile.
FDR, himself, expressed to his intimates his shock 
and surprise over Joseph Kennedy's Anglophilic conversion 
in 1938. Roosevelt had appointed Kennedy— a man of very 
definite campaign contributions and indefinite personal 
qualifications— ambassador to London, in part, because he 
could "trust him." Kennedy, the President felt compelled 
to remark after the Munich Conference, "had been taken in 
by Lady Astor and the Cliveden set." He unfailingly mis­
represents United States policy to the cabinet of Neville 
Chamberlain. "Who would have thought," Roosevelt exclaimed, 
"that the English could take into camp a red-headed 
Irishman!
38For example, see Ernest R. May, The World War and Ameri­
can Isolation: 1914-1917 (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1959); Ross Gregory, Walter Hines Page: Ambassador
to the Court of St. James' (Lexington: University Press
of Kentucky, 19 70) .
39Harold L. Iekes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes,
(3 vols.;N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1953-1954), II, 377, 676,
70 7, 712; John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries 
(2 vols.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959-1965), I, 518.
One historian has stated: "However the State Department
might instruct him, Kennedy was irresistibly tempted to 
reduce American influence abroad to: the sqm.of zezo. " William W.
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Roosevelt never could understand it. To recognize 
the relationship between a diplomat's external demeanor and 
his ability to represent his country requires some subtlety 
of thought. The function of the diplomatist, as the pro­
fessionals know, "is not to serve as a museum exhibit" of 
the external qualities of his countrymen. Rather, he is 
"to constitute an effective channel of communication with 
other governments" and to be "a perceptive observer of life 
in other countries." In so performing, the sensitive diplo­
matist can hardly avoid "acquiring outlooks, habits of mind, 
and occasionally mannerisms" that distinguish him from his 
fellow nationals. In large measure, the diplomatist's use­
fulness rests in his ability to place himself in the position 
of the other man, to understand the interests and motives
of his counterparts so that peaceful accommodations can be
40reached without damage to anyone's national interests.
The "differentness" that separates the professional diplo­
matist from the amateur, as well as from his countrymen, is 
not, therefore, synonomous with disloyalty or an absence of
Kaufmann, "Two American Ambassadors: Bullitt and Kennedy,"
in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds., The Diplomats, 
1919-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953),663.
40Kennan, "Future of Diplomacy," 573-574, and "Foreign 
Policy and the Professional Diplomat," Wilson Quarterly, 1 
(Winter 1977), 148-149. See also Nicolson, Diplomacy,55-67. ---------
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patriotism, although American laymen and politicians 
often assume as much.
Many American career diplomats, returning after long 
years abroad, did find themselves "out of touch" with 
American life, but not because of any disloyalty or 
foreign attachments, as FDR presumed. Rather, these 
diplomats experienced estrangement and alienation in much 
the same manner, but to a far greater degree, as the person 
who returns to his hometown after a long absence: The
changes he sees appear to him more extensive, more stark, 
and less comprehensible than they appear to his high school 
classmate who had never departed and who had gradually 
adjusted to the changes as they occurred. Years of 
shuffling^ from one foreign capital to another did make 
"rootless expatriates" of many diplomats.
Few career diplomats have described the feelings of 
diplomatic "expatriatism" more eloquently than George F. 
Kennan. Following a summer's visit to his hometown in 
Wisconsin in 1936, he wrote:
I came away...aware that I was no longer 
a part of what I had once been a part of—  
no longer, in fact, a part of anything at all.
It was not that I had left the world of my 
boyhood, although this too was true; it was 
also that this world had left me. It had 
left everyone else, for that matter; but 
its departure had been sufficiently gradual 
so that those who remained had been less 
aware of its passage, and had adjusted in
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varying degrees to the change. I, like 
all other expatriates, simply had been left 
behind.
These feelings were only the first strong 
reminder of a reality which affects the situa­
tion of almost every professional diplomatist. 
Increasingly, now, I would not be a part of 
my country.... I, not being a part of it, 
would nevertheless , understand it. It, 
being still to some extent a part of me, 
would nevertheless not understand me. I 
would continue to pay it my loyalty.... ^
What else, after all, could I be loyal to?
To President Roosevelt, another loyalty existed, 
loyalty to the Democratic party, a loyalty equal to or 
synonomous with loyalty to the United States. To it, FDR 
found the loyalty of the career diplomats woefully deficient.
Roosevelt judged the career diplomats to be unsympathe­
tic, if not hostile, to his New Deal programs. He also
42believed that they were Republicans at heart. More than 
any other perception FDR held about the loyalties of 
career diplomats— and he rarely questioned their national 
patriotism— his view that they displayed less than enthusas-
^^George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1967), 76-77.
42Ernest R. May, The "Lessons" of the Past: The Use
and Misuses of History in American Foreign Policy (N.Y.: 
Oxford University Press, 1973), 22; Langer and Gleason, 
Challenge to Isolation, 8-9.
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tic allegience to the New Deal rankled him.^
He expressed his displeasure openly upon several
occasions. For example, in a letter to Ambassador Jefferson
Caffrey on March 20, 19 35, FDR admonished: "I know you will
realize that the only real complaint is against those in
the Service" who "care mighty little about what is happening
in their own country" and who "take very little interest"
in "the masses in the countries to which they are accredited."
Roosevelt continued:
One of our very important new agency heads 
[Harry Hopkins, then chief of the Civil 
Works Administration] went abroad last 
summer and saw several of our Counselors 
[sic] and Secretaries and not one of them 
asked any questions about how our big 
efforts, such as Relief and NRA [National 
Recovery Administration] and AAA [Agricultural 
Adjustment Act ], were working out. They had 
neither the knowledge nor the desire to learn,
43On at least one occasion, however, FDR compared the 
career diplomats to Bolsheviks, only partially in jest.
FDR to William C. Bullitt, February 5, 1935, Orville H. 
Bullitt, ed., For the President: Personal and Secret
Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. 
Bullitt (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), 102. On another,
FDR seriously suggested that an Atlantic Monthly article 
entitled, "Worse Than Arnold," an account of the machina­
tions of Dr. Edward Bancroft during the American Revolution, 
be required reading for all Foreiqn Service officers.
FDR to Hull, December 17, 1935, Nixon, FDR and Foreign 
Affairs, III, 126.
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and yet if they had known they could have 
been far more injuresting in their contacts 
with foreigners.
Roosevelt wholeheartedly believed that the career diplomats
were political conservatives/ as he understood the term in
regard to domestic politics.
To extend the presumed political conservatism of the 
diplomats in domestic matters to the realm of foreign 
affairs was a short leap in political faith for FDR. He 
deduced that the professional diplomats in the State Depart­
ment were generally critical of his foreign policies. In 
his suspicions, FDR received constant reinforcement from 
the ardent New Dealers in his entourage, especially the 
internationalists who, like the First Lady Eleanor, urged 
the President to take a stronger stance against fascism 
abroad. When such a stance failed to emerge, the inter­
nationalists concluded, as did FDR, that the career diplo­
mats deliberately conjured up obstacles to place in the path 
of whatever foreign policy initiatives the President might
44Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, II, 450. Hopkins 
is not identified in FDR's letter or in the accompanying 
notes as the agency head who went abroad. However, it is 
clear that the reference is to Hopkins. See Joseph P. Lash, 
Eleanor and Franklin; The Story of Their Relationship Based 
on Eleanor Roosevelt's Private Papers (N.̂ .: w.W. Norton,
1971), 571.
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contemplate.
The charge that the career diplomats were politically 
conservative, if not anti-New Deal, contained some truth.
The pre-Rogers Act career diplomats had witnessed the 
successful evolution of their profession under the auspices 
of Republican, not Democratic, administrations. In addition, 
their patrician backgrounds inclined them, almost naturally, 
toward conservative modes of thought.
The post-Rogers Act diplomats, on the other hand, 
possessed no vivid memory of how and under whom the Foreign 
Service evolved. They were more democratic and less aristo­
cratic than their diplomatic forefathers. They also were 
less fraternity-oriented, less ideologically-inclined, 
whether conservative or liberal, and less imbued with an 
elitist sense of noblesse oblige than their pre-1924 
cousins. The younger diplomats were more institutionally- 
oriented: They had joined and always had belonged to a
recognized, professional organization. They could claim,
46with some justification, that they had no politics.
45Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, 571. See also Weil,
Pretty Good Club, 91; Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and American Foreign Policy, 1932-194? (N.T7T Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1979), 138.
^Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 148-149, 187-188; Ilchman,
Professional Diplomacy, 224-225, 236.
The memoirs of U. S. diplomats also reveal these dis­
tinctions. For example, compare Wilson, Education of a Diplo-
Both generations of diplomats, moreover, eschewed 
direct participation in domestic partisan politics.47 Both 
owed their allegiance to the United States, whether under 
Republican or Democratic administrations. Both gave their 
allegiance to a professional diplomatic ideal. The only 
evidence FDR possessed of the diplomats' Republican sympa­
thies was their association with past Republican administra­
tions as Foreign Service officers.
IV
FDR's suspicions about the diplomats reflected more 
than a question of simple political partisanship. His dis 
trust mirrored a fundamental strain between democratic 
politicians and professional diplomats, a strain nowhere 
more acute than between American presidents and diplomats, 
a strain nowhere better exemplified than between FDR and 
the career diplomats.
mat with Kennan, Memoirs. Wilson entered.the old Diplomatic 
Service in 1911, while Kennan entered in 1926. See also 
Kenneth B. Moss, "Bureaucrat as Diplomat: George S. Messer-
smith and the State Department's Approach to War, 1933-1941" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 
1978), 1-46.
47However, many a diplomat did not hesitate to ingra­
tiate himself with influential politicians? many also con­
ducted strong letter-writing campaigns on their own behalf 
whenever it seemed that a change in presidential administra­
tions placed their positions in jeopardy.For examples, see 
Werking, Master Architects, 245; Weil, Pretty Good Club, 79- 
82.
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Roosevelt and the career diplomats operated from 
diverse, even conflicting, perspectives. Like most presi­
dents, FDR viewed foreign affairs from a predominantly 
domestic, political vantage point. As President, he was 
both the nation's leading domestic politician and the 
nation's chief foreign policy maker. Elected to office by 
popular mandate, Roosevelt equated his New Deal policies, 
and even himself, with the national interest. Accountable 
to a democratic electorate, he realized that his personal 
survival depended upon how well he fared in foreign as well 
as in domestic affairs.
From such a perspective Roosevelt tended to be oppor­
tunistic. He regarded domestic political considerations, 
with all of their ramifications and constraints, as necessary 
antecedents to the formulation of foreign policy. If and 
when the public became attentive to foreign affairs, he 
would look for opportunities abroad that would enhance or,
4©at least, not diminish his reputation with the voting public. 
The image presented would be as important as the substance
achieved.
—
For a good discussion of the differences in the 
perspectives of presidents and professional diplomats, see 
Monteagle Stearns, "Making American Diplomacy Relevant," The 
Foreign Affairs Quarterly, 52 (October 1973), 153-167, 
especially 159-162. See also Dallek, Roosevelt and American 
Foreign Policy, 138.
The career diplomats, by contrast, focused exclusively 
on foreign affairs. Like most diplomatists, the Foreign 
Service officers of the 1930s regarded domestic political 
considerations as unwarranted and unhealthy intrusions in 
the conduct of foreign relations. They abhorred the thought 
that temporary shifts in democratic opinion at home could 
abruptly alter the course of United States policy abroad. 
They had no domestic political constituency: Their consti­
tuency was an abstraction— the national interest. To the 
impulses of democratic passion, whether of mass opinion or 
of highly organized interest groups, the diplomats preferred
a consistent policy, "founded on the interests of the nation
49as a whole and the needs of world peace and stability."
From such a perspective the diplomats instinctively
\vtended to be conservative'. They were prone to emphasize
risks over opportunities, to delineate the costs of presi-
. 50dentxal mxtiatives abroad. They yearned, moreover, for
I I
a "high concentration of authority /behind them," for an
I  !administration that knew what it was doing, that providedj
clear and consistent direction in foreign policy matters, 
that allowed them to operate with certainty and authority
4 9 .Kennan, "Foreign Policy and the Professional Dxplomat,
149-151.
50Stearns, "Making Diplomacy Relevant," 160.
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in the application of diplomacy abroad.^
Illustrative of the strain in the perspectives of 
Roosevelt and the diplomats was the President's admonition 
to Ambassador Caffrey about "those in the Service" who 
"take very little interest" in the "masses in the countries 
to which they are accredited." For FDR, the rhetoric of 
democracy played just as well abroad as it did at home.
The era of "democratic diplomacy" was in full bloom. If 
the diplomats were democratic instead of aristocratic, they 
would share the President's concern— albeit that of the 
patrician class— for the masses at home and abroad. If the 
masses at home figured prominently in his foreign policy 
calculations, surely the masses abroad counted similarly 
in the calculations of his foreign counterparts.
The diplomats displayed little congeniality for the 
masses. They dealt principally with the established 
authorities abroad, the official representatives of foreign 
governments. They functioned to reach accommodation, not 
to foment domestic political change. Most of the diplomats 
adhered strictly to the view that to cultivate the masses, 
whomever they might be, would be to interfere in the 
domestic affairs of foreign nations. American diplomats 
knew that their foreign counterparts resented, no less than
51Kennan, "Foreign Policy and the Professional Diplomat,"
149.
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themselves, the intrusion of democratic opinion in the 
affairs of state.
Many American diplomats, nevertheless, sought to ascer­
tain the pulse of opinion groups in foreign lands. They 
regularly visited with and sought information from a variety 
of unofficial, as well as official, sources. Correspondents, 
for instance, were always a prime source. No less than the 
foreign diplomats who reported on events in the United 
States, American diplomats realized that their superiors in 
Washington would be interested in the internal affairs of 
the nations to which they were accredited. To anyone in
Washington who cared to read them, the dispatches of American
52diplomats were replete with information on "the masses."
Neither Roosevelt nor the career diplomats ever appre­
ciated the perspective of the other. Roosevelt— as a 
politician— thrived on action; he strived to change institu­
tions, in image if not in substance. The diplomats— as 
professionals— yearned for stability and consistency; they 
sought to preserve institutions, not to reform them.
52See the volumes m  Foreign Relations of the United 
States: Diplomatic Papers, 1933-1939 (29 vols.; Washington,
D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1949-1957), passim.
Others have remarked favorably upon the overall quality of 
American diplomatic reporting from abroad during the 19 30s. 
For instance, see Langer and Gleason, Challenge to I s o l a t i o n , 
!25.
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V
Roosevelt's personal style and administrative methods
precluded him from reaching a modus vivendi with the Foreign
Service. His habits and behavior were antithetical to the
diplomatic mind. Tempermentally flexible but often impatient,
FDR's intellectual processes were "intuitive rather than
53logical." He often "thought lazily and superficially."
He rarely thought through his position on a particular
subject until some concrete action on it was presented to
54him for his approval or disapproval. Generally distrust­
ful of so-called "experts" and genuinely indifferent, if
not antagonistic, to systems of any sort, Roosevelt preferred
55to act in all matters by improvisation and intuition.
He deliberately fostered inconsistency, confusion, and 
Byzantine intrigues among his subordinates. He created 
overlapping administrative empires in competition with each
53Arthur M. SchJesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt 
(3 vols.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957-1960), I, 407.
54Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Depression, 258.
55 .Historians agree on very little about FDR. Like 
FDR's contemporaries, historians generally view 
FDR favorably or harshly. However, almost all agree upon 
his unorthodox administrative methods. See Clarke A. 
Chambers, "FDR, Pragmatist-Idealist: An Essay in Histori­
ography," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, 52 (April 1961),
50-55.
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other and delegated incomplete and uncertain responsibilities 
to his lieutenants.56 Few people inside or outside govern­
ment ever could decipher, to their satisfaction, the overall 
direction of the New Deal. Only FDR knew, and one might 
question whether even he knew, what initiatives his admini­
stration was forging at any given moment.
The President’s peculiar administrative style emanated
from a compulsion to hold power securely in his own hands.
His administrative methods linked access to information and
the power of decision-making to his own survival and
authority. Few presidents, moreover, have possessed a
sharper sense of personal power or more faith in their
57competence to use it than FDR. Whether m  domestic or 
foreign affairs, Roosevelt evinced a supreme confidence in 
his own power of persuasion, divorced from any systematic 
or coordinated planning.
One of the first to offer this interpretation of FDR's 
administrative methods was Schlesinger, Age of Roosevelt,
II, 528. See also Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: 
The Politics of Leadership (N.Y.: John Wiley & Sons, 1960) , 
161; James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the
Fox (N.Y.: Harcourt, Bracer 1956), 373-374; Theodore A.
Wilson and Richard J. McKinzie, "The Masks of Power:
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Conduct of American Diplomacy," 
in Frank J. Merli and Theodore A. Wilson, eds., Makers of 
American Diplomacy: From Benjamin Franklin to Henry Kissin­
ger (N.Y.: Charles Scribner's Sons, 19 74), 475 .
57Neustadt, Presidential Power, 161.
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Roosevelt held a highly personalized view of diplo­
macy, adapted from his domestic political triumphs. He 
believed that his considerable personal charm, if applied 
in face-to-face negotiations with foreign leaders, best 
could resolve differences and rectify misunderstandings.
"I know you will not mind my being brutally frank," he once 
wrote Prime Minister Winston Churchill, "when I tell you
that I think I can personally handle Stalin better than
58either your Foreign Office or my State Department."
About the same time, FDR also told Hopkins that "if I give" 
Stalin "everything I possibly can and ask nothing from him 
in return, noblesse oblige, he won't try to annex anything
59and will work with me for a world of democracy and peace." 
Convinced that he could deal with foreign statesmen as he 
dealt with his own countrymen, Roosevelt never distinguished 
between the conduct of domestic and foreign policy.
5 8March 18, 1942, Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. 
Langley, and Manfred Jonas, eds., Roosevelt and Churchill: 
Their Secret Wartime Correspondenci fa.y.: E .P . Dutton,
T9 757, 196":----------------------------
^^ May, The "Lessons" of History, 23. FDR's 
penchant for personal diplomacy was evident at least as 
early as 1933. Herbert Feis quotes FDR from the Morgenthau 
diaries of March 9, 19 33, in regard to the negotiations 
with the Soviet Union over recognition: "Gosh, if I could
only, myself, talk to some one man representing the Russians, 
I could straighten out the whole question." 1933: Charac­
ters in Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), 309. On
FDR and Mussolini, see Dallek, Roosevelt and American Foreigi 
Policy, 145.
Nor did Roosevelt ever seriously consider the impli­
cations of his unorthodox methods for the implementation of 
foreign policy. That his penchant for indirection and 
inconsistencey— however conducive to the control of the 
bureaucracy and to the exercise of leadership in domestic 
affairs— merely left both friends and foes, including the
State Department, uncertain about American intentions in
6 0foreign relations never troubled him.
He contented himself with occasional fulminations
about the static nature of bureaucracies. To the head of
the Federal Reserve Board, for instance, he commented:
The Treasury [ Department] is so large „and 
far-flung and ingrained in its practices 
that I find it is almost impossible to get 
the action and results I want....But the 
Treasury is not to be compared with the 
State Department. You should go through 
the experience of trying to get any changes 
in the thinking, policy and action of the 
career diplomats and you'd know what a real 
problem was. But the Treasury and the State 
Department put together are nothing compared 
with the N-a-v-y....To change anything in the 
N-a-v-y is like punching a feather bed.
6 0For a critical view of FDR's administrative methods 
as they applied to foreign affairs— views which contrast 
sharply with the laudatory views of Schlesinger and Neustadt 
on FDR— see Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years
in the State Department (N.Yu W.W. Norton, 1969), 734; 
Campbell, Fudge Factory, 98-100; Wilson and McKinzie, "Masks 
of Power," 474-475.
6 1Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 182.
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Devotedly scornful of established routines, FDR regarded 
all bureaucracies as behemoths of inaction and ineptitude 
against which he had to battle.
More so than most bureaucracies, the diplomatic 
establishment was of little use in FDR's eyes. During the 
better part of his first two terms in office, the Depression 
at home occupied his energies and diverted his atten­
tion from all but the most pressing of foreign crises. 
Supremely confident of his own abilities, Roosevelt adhered 
comfortably to his deeply-entrenched prejudices against 
career diplomats.
VI
Roosevelt formed his impressions of career diplomats 
during the pre-Rogers Act era. As President Wilson's 
assistant secretary of the Navy from 1913 to 1920, FDR had 
opportunity to view the foreign services. As President, 
he regarded a few remnants of the old diplomatic corps 
as representative of the new Foreign Service. That Repub­
lican administrations largely created and nurtured the 
Foreign Service did not ameliorate his suspicions. In a 
conversation in January 1935 with Edith Rogers, widow of 
the sponsor of the Rogers Act and a Republican member of 
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Roosevelt discussed 
the Service in terms of its inadequacies as of 1919. Rep-
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re sen tat ive Rogers subsequently reported to Wilbur Carr 
that FDR was "definitely unfavorable" to diplomats, although 
he thought "consuls were good." She concluded that President 
Roosevelt possessed "no clear picture of the Foreign Ser­
vice. " 62
The Service had changed significantly since 1924. It 
was, for instance, much less elitist and more receptive to 
men of diverse social and economic backgrounds. To officer 
George S. Messersmith, who began his career as a consul in 
1915 following several years as a high school teacher and 
who lacked independent wealth, the Service had become by 
the mid-1930s "unquestionably as democratic as one could be 
devised.
Additional reforms, nevertheless, beckoned for attention.
A malaise born of long-standing public opprobrium toward
diplomats and reinforced by economic deprivations stemming
from the Depression haunted the Foreign Service. Acute
sensitivity to the lack of public support for their pro-
64fession embittered many diplomats.
^2Crane, Mr. Carr, 314.
63Memorandum, February 2, 1938, Ilchman,
Professional Diplomacy, 232. See also Heinrichs, "Bureau­
cracy," 187.
64The articles by Kennan, cited supra, are prime 
examples.
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In addition, internal divisions,, competition for 
primacy in foreign affairs with other federal agencies, 
principally the Department of Commerce, and a deeply-held 
feeling among diplomats of the need to protect themselves 
from a hostile environment inhibited innovative thinking 
about the conduct of diplomacy and weakened the diplomatic 
establishment at a time of increasing international tension.®'’ 
The need for leadership to restructure the foreign affairs 
bureaucracy and to instill in it a renewed vigor was clear.
President Roosevelt chose to ignore the need. He 
never looked beyond the superficial portrait that he drew 
of diplomats as cookie-pushers, tea-drinkers, and idlers.
He saw only the outward appearances, not the inward sub­
stance of diplomacy. He never seriously considered reexamin­
ing his indictment of the diplomatic profession. Nor did 
he proffer any positive antidote for the ills, real or 
imagined, that he judged beset the Foreign Service.
FDR was more inclined to discipline the diplomats than 
to reform the Foreign Service. In 19 36, for instance,
®®The United States foreign affairs bureaucracy was 
small and compact, even by the standards of the 1930s, 
reflecting, no doubt, the passive role the U.S. played 
then in world affairs. It is a mistake to equate the 
present bureaucratic apparatus with that of the 1930s, 
as Wilson and McKinzie do. "Masks of Power," 475. They 
refer to "the chaotic foreign affairs bureaucracy," a 
description more relevant to modern times.
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Roosevelt suggested to Assistant Secretary of State R. Walton
Moore that "we should have a definite rule that hereafter
the President will not reappoint to: the Foreign Service any
former officers...who have resigned and become officials of
the Estate] Department." He -further suggested that "we
should discourage appointing any Foreign Service officer as
6 6officials of the Department."
Previous administrations periodically assigned Foreign
Service officers— a few, not all1— to tours of duty in the
State Department to benefit from their expertise. Such a
tour also provided the officer with an opportunity to live
in the United States for an extended period of time. Most
were senior officers. By law, an officer whose stay in the
Department exceeded four years had to resign from the
Service: Upon presidential authorization, he then could
become an official of the Department or be reinstated to the 
67Servxce.
In seeking to abolish this practice, infrequent as it 
was, Roosevelt offered no rationale.' He simply wanted to 
prevent, one might surmise, the "cohabitation" of Foreign
^May 27, 1936, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, III,
314. See also FDR to Rudolph Forster, Executive Clerk,
White House Offices, May 23, 1936, ibid., 310.
^Norton, "Foreign Office Organization," 37; Myers and 
Ransom, "Reorganization of State Department," 717.
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Service and State Department personnel, who easily came to 
share common perspectives. Had the President possessed 
positive intentions, he would have expressed them. He did 
not. Although limitations in the number of competent 
experts available to fill Department slots prevented the 
implementation of Roosevelt's "definite rule," his suggestion 
characterized his approach to the need for improvement of 
Foreign Service operations.
Roosevelt sought to punish the diplomats in other ways 
as well. He held no animosity toward Foreign Service 
officers who performed consular functions. Like the 
average American who knew anything at all about the Foreign 
Service, FDR distinguished between diplomats and consuls.
He believed that the latter were hard-working, unpretentious 
men who provided useful services to the nation. Early in 
1935 Roosevelt ordered the State Department to inform those 
diplomatic officers of pre-Rogers Act vintage who had no 
consular experience that the President expected their 
transfer to the consular branch as part of their training 
requisite to consideration for promotion to a ministerial 
post. He would consider no diplomat, whatever his back­
ground, for chief-of-mission status unless the diplomat
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had consular experience.68 Ostensibly, FDR wanted "all
diplomats to have at least one consular assignment in order
to gain administrative experience and make contact with the
6 9business world." In actuality, he wanted to humble the 
diplomats, to extract punitive retribution for their elitist 
demeanor.
The protests FDR received over his policy on diplomat-
consul interchangeability surprised him. He anticipated
resistance from the senior diplomats. One of the first to
question the President's wisdom, however, was Jesse Isidor
Straus, the head of Macy's department store whom Roosevelt
had appointed ambassador to France. From Paris, Straus
wrote to FDR in April 1935:
I understand that an effort is being made in 
the various appointments in the Foreign Service 
to insist upon experience in both branches 
[diplomatic and consular] of that service.
Of this in theory I heartily approve, provided, 
however, that there is a realization that there 
is a difference in type, in background, in 
acquaintanceship with social amenities and 
customs that must be observed. A good admini­
strative type may be a first class Consul or 
Vice Consul, but often he is not at all 
fitted for a service in which social
6 8Hooker, Moffat Papers,12 4; Crane, Mr. Carr, 318-319. 
See also Ilchman, Professiona1 Diplomacy, 210; Barnes and 
Morgan., Foreign Service, 212-213; Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 
183; Jefferson Patterson, Diplomatic Duty and Diversion 
(Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1956), 187, 206.
^Hooker, Moffat Papers, 124.
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contacts are essential, whether the 
envious, devoid of certain character­
istics, admit it or not.70
A man of impecable business credentials and limited
diplomatic experience, Straus perceived that less than
pragmatic motives inspired the president's policy. He
also perceived a difference in the abilities and functions
of diplomats and consuls.
Roosevelt soon retreated from his strict policy on 
interchangeability. In September, Nicholas Roosevelt, 
a distant Republican cousin of the President's and a 
former chief-of-mission under Hoover then working on the 
editorial staff of the New York Herald-Tribune, added his 
voice to the list of protesters. With a list in hand of 
proposed transfers in the Foreign Service, which he may 
have obtained surreptitiously, Nicholas questioned FDR's 
foresight at a time when new crises arose abroad almost 
daily. In particular, he wondered about the wisdom in 
transferring Jay Pierrepont Moffat, chief of the Depart­
ment's Division of Western European Affairs, to Sidney,
71Australia, as consul general. x FDR replied that
"^April 9, 1935, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, II,
467.
^Notation, ibid., Ill, 10.
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"Moffat was delighted to go" but that "no other shifts"
72would occur "in the present emergency."
The career diplomats/ themselves, were slow to react 
publicly to the president's directive on transfers. Although 
the senior diplomats, especially, never embraced the concept 
of interchangeability with consuls, they had accepted it in 
principle by the time FDR ascended to the White House. In 
part, the "scandal of 192 7" had forced them to accept 
transfers as a reality. They also had employed the argument 
that diplomats, no less than consuls, could and did assist 
American businesses overseas: They had done so as a means
to the end of achieving career status for their profession; 
they could not now comfortably argue for the recognition of 
distinctions between diplomats and consuls, distinctions 
they had worked to blur.
Distinctions did exist, however. Most Foreign Service
officers, whether they served in the diplomatic or consular
branch, knew as much. Yet, they had never deigned to define
73publicly the differences in diplomatic and consular work.
^FDR to Nicholas Roosevelt, September 19, 1935, 
ibid., III, 10. Moffat felt the policy on-transfers "was 
fine only, if the diplomat was a poor organizer." Hooker, 
Moffat Papers, 124.
"^Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 122.
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Nearly all officers, whether distinguished for their 
administrative or analytical abilities, coveted the diplo­
matic rank of chief-of-mission. Nearly all of them also 
believed that American laymen and politicians were incapable 
of understanding diplomatic functions apart from consular 
work. Too often the public had revealed scorn for diplo­
macy.^ The officers had preferred, therefore, to deal 
with the distinctions between diplomatic and consular work 
through internal bureaucratic processes.
The Foreign Service finally addressed the issue of 
diplomatic versus consular work in an article in ;The Foreign
~ 7CAffairs Quarterly published in January 1936. The author 
of the article, G. Howland Shaw, a young career officer, 
argued that excessive attention'had been focused upon the 
administration of the Foreign Service to the virtual exclu­
sion of the more vital elements of work and personnel. "We 
must now face a fact that for eleven years we have endeavored to 
conceal. The work of the higher positions in the diplomatic 
branch differ from that of the average comparable positions 
in the consular branch." The diplomatic branch, Shaw 
explained, afforded greater opportunity for individuality,
74Ibid.
75'-'Shaw, "American Foreign Service," 323-333.
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initiative, and imagination, whereas the consular branch 
required organizational and administrative skills. He 
deplored the concept that shuffled diplomats into consular 
positions and vice versa. The emphasis in consular work 
is on the perfection of individual problems, rather than 
on analytical thought or deduction based © n broad trends; 
a man who is a first-rate administrator does not necessarily 
make a first-rate ambassador, any more than the possession 
of those qualities that make an outstanding ambassador 
guarantees success in administering a large and complex 
consular office. "Such differences of aptitude and there­
fore of function are recognized in other lines of work,"
Shaw wrote. "Why should they not be recognized in the 
Foreign Service?" He then offered several suggestions for
the development of officers according to their interests
76and abilities.
In part Shaw's article signaled the healing of the
schism that had existed between diplomats and consuls since
77at least 1924. He articulated the views of the post- 
Rogers Act generation of diplomats, officers who had little 
stake in the quarrels that beset the older diplomats. The
76Ibid., 327-332.
77Heinrichs provides a detailed analysis of Shaw, 
his career, and his article in relation to the Foreign 
Service. "Bureaucracy," 154-179, 185-188, 192-200.
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new, younger group of officers identified themselves
7 8exclusively with the Foreign Service.
In his article Shaw set aside the old battles and
offered a new direction for leadership within the Service.
Indicative of the support for Shaw's thought among officers
was the plea of one amateur ambassador that FDR appoint
Shaw as chief of Foreign Service Personnel. "The morale of
the Service," Ambassador William C. Bullitt wrote to
Roosevelt in May 1937, "is becoming more demoralized every
day and nothing could turn the tide of discouragement so
7 Qquickly and completely as his [Shaw's] appointment."
In part, too, Shaw's article reflected an attempt to 
explain the mission and needs of the Foreign Service to an 
audience outside of the diplomatic community. "The work of 
the American Foreign Service," the article began, "has 
often been shrouded in mystery. In reality there is nothing 
mysterious about it." Shaw proceeded to describe the work 
of the Foreign Service and the historical and current 
constraints under which American diplomats functioned. He 
also offered several suggestions for reforming the management
78Shaw entered the Diplomatic Corps in 1918. Ibid., 
185-188.
79May 5, 19 37, Bullitt, For the President, 212. Shaw 
was appointed chief of Foreign Service personnel later that 
year.
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of the Service.80
The article garnered a wide readership within the 
diplomatic community. Whether President Roosevelt read the 
article or contemplated its recommendations is doubtful. No 
evidence exists to suggest that he did. The State Department 
and Foreign Service did implement several organizational 
reforms during Roosevelt's second term. The President's 
role in instigating these reforms was negligible.
VII
The major impetus for reform of the foreign affairs
81bureaucracy originated from within the State Department.
Under the direction of Secretary Hull, the Department 
quietly began to formulate plans for reorganizing its internal 
operations in 1935. Policy formulation always had interested 
Hull more than matters of administration. He recognized 
that phe Department could not devote serious attention to 
formulating sound, long-range policies without a more
I _____________
■ 8 0"American Foreign Service," 32 3, 32 7-332.
81See Moore to FDR, December 15, 19 36, Nixon, FDR and 
Foreign Affairs, III, 541? "Hull Reorganizes State Depart­
ment," The New York Times, May 27, 19 37, A3. The Times 
article noted that a quiet reorganization had been underway 
in the Department for the past two years.
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efficient system of meeting the demands of immediate
QOproblems. Although the Department "was excellently
informed about its trees," it "had no time to care for the
83woods entrusted to it." And to Hull, the era had passed
when the United States could afford to treat policy merely
. . 84as a response to a crisis.
A series of departmental orders issued in May and 
August 1937 transformed the State Department's internal 
operations. These orders rearranged and reduced the geogra­
phical divisions in the Department. A new division of 
European Affairs, for instance, absorbed the old division 
of Eastern European Affairs, while a division of American 
Republics consolidated the divisiore of Mexican and Latin 
American Affairs. The orders also created, with congressional 
approval, several new advisory positions and the office of 
counselor. Through reorganization, the Department's hier­
archy hoped to provide more time for personnel to devote to
82Moss, "Bureaucrat as Diplomat," 224.
8 3Myers and Ransom, "Reorganization of the State 
Department," 714.
84Moss, "Bureaucrat as Diplomat," 224-225; Myers and 
Ransom, "Reorganization of the State Department, 713-714; 
Miller, "New State Department," 500-501.
the consideration and formulation of broad governmental
pcpolicies.
The Department remained a compact and a highly inte­
grated organization. In marked contrast to most reorgani­
zations of governmental agencies, the reorganization of the 
State Department did not result in the hiring of additional 
personnel. Nor did the Department receive additional 
appropriations to implement its plans . Indeed, Hull claimed 
that his efforts to reshape the Department had resulted in 
the "weeding out" of forty to fifty inferior officers 
through voluntary or forced resignations since 1935.®^
The reorganization of the Department did produce, 
however, a substantial shuffling of personnel. Reorganiza- 
tional schemes often contain a hidden agenda to shift 
personnel.®^ Such may have been the case, at least in part,
8 5George Messersmith returned to the Department as an 
assistant secretary of state in 1937 after a tour as 
ambassador to Austria and played a crucial role in the 
reorganization planning and implementation.
p  ZT"Hull Reorganizes State Department,"The New York 
Times, May 27, 1937, A3. See also,,Miller, "New State Department," 
505. There were 732 Foreign Service officers in 1932 and 
700 in 1938.
g y   ■ See Harold Seidman, Politics, Position & Power: The
Dynamics of Federal Organization C3ra ed., N.Y.V Oxford' ' 
University Press, 1980), 3-33.
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of the changes implemented by the Department. Beginning
in 1938, several Foreign Service officers— mostly of the
younger generation— received transfers to the Department
where they became chiefs of various divisions. G. Howland
Shaw, for instance, became chief of Foreign Service Personnel.
Simultaneously, several older officials, including Carr,
8 8received assignments abroad as chiefs-of-mission.
The reorganization of 1937 preceded a more significant 
development that occurred on the eve of World War II. For 
two decades the Department of State had faced the steady 
encroachment of the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce 
into the area of foreign relations. Both departments 
operated their own independent foreign services. The 
Commerce Department, especially, had involved itself increas­
ingly in questions of a political nature, instead of simply 
providing liaison support to American businesses overseas. 
Responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations had 
become fragmented. In 1936 the State Department initiated 
a concerted effort to establish its control over foreign 
affairs.
qoMyers and Ransom, "Reorganization of the State 
Department," 506-507; Miller, "New State Department,"716-717; Weil, Pretty Good Club, 130-131. See also 
Chapter 5 infra.
89For example, see Moore to FDR, December 15, 1936, 
Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, III, 541; Moss, "Bureaucrat as Diplomat," 225.
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The State Department realized its objective with 
congressional approval of President Roosevelt's executive 
reorganization plan in 1939. The president's plan instituted 
a broad reordering of bureaus and agencies within the 
executive branch. Among the changes in his plan was the 
amalgamation of the foreign services of agriculture and 
commerce into the United States Foreign Service under the 
supervision of the secretary of state. With amalgamation, 
the State Department finally assumed the dominant role for 
the conduct of American foreign relations, a role envisioned 
for the Department in the Rogers Act of 192 4.90
Roosevelt's support for the State Department's position 
in the reorganization plan was not quixotic. Roosevelt 
harbored no ideals about how and why foreign affairs should 
be consolidated under the direction of the State Department. 
His support derived from less loftier motives. From a 
professional and bureaucratic perspective, the fragmentation 
of authority and responsibility for foreign affairs was 
wasteful and unwieldly. From FDR's perspective, Herbert 
Hoover's old department— the Department of Commerce— was 
partially responsible for the Depression. More than to
90Heinrichs states: "As a result of these developments
(and others), the Foreign Service on the eve of World War II 
was stable, confident, and improving. This was perhaps the 
most favorable position it would ever achieve." "Bureau­
cracy," 20 0. See also Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 
222-223.
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grant firm control in foreign relations to the diplomats,
Roosevelt wanted toveaken the powerful position the Commerce
Department had enjoyed with American businesses since the 
911920s. Including the foreign service of the Agriculture 
Department in his reorganization plan merely served to 
conceal his motives. He always intended to be his own 
secretary of state.
VIII
President Roosevelt demonstrated scant regard for the 
Foreign Service bequeathed to him by his predecessors.
In 1933 he inherited a young, imperfect, but steadily 
improving professional diplomatic corps. Under his admini­
stration, the development of the Foreign Service virtually 
halted. Retrenchment and restoration, devoid of any 
significant departures or progress, marked the path along 
which the Service traveled under the New Deal. By the time 
of the opening salvos of World War II, the Service had 
changed little since the 1920s.
Members of the corps were less illusioned, less
enamored with diplomatic life, more inured to hardships,
92and more professional in their orientations. The Service
91Moss, "Bureaucrat as Diplomat," 215.
92Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 188-201.
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was also vastly understrength, given the new demands placed
upon it. As the result of economy measures and highly
selective recruitment, the Service had only grown by 30 per-
93cent since the Rogers Act. Many officers were near 
retirement. Despite the presence of many talented diplomats 
within the Service, the future augured the onset of anemia. 
The Service suffered from the lack of life-sustaining 
transfusions— the infusion of new recruits, who require 
years of training and experience to develop into professional 
diplomats, and upon whom the future institutional capacity of 
the nation to conduct diplomacy rested.
Underlying the lack of development sustained by the 
Foreign Service was FDR's prejudice against career diplomats.
The Depression forced austerity on the Service and inhibited
\ .1
Roosevelt from assuming a more active role in foreign affairs. 
The Depression did not shape his behavior regarding the 
Service. The Depression was more a situation that constrained
I Ithe making of foreign policy than it was a factor that If. Iconditioned attitudes toward the machinery responsible foi: 
implementing policy. With rare exception, FDR confined his 
interest in the Foreign Service to admonishing certain, 
characteristics that he perceived in diplomats.
93Ibid., 201.
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Roosevelt's prejudices against the Foreign Service 
reflected traditional, popular American attitudes toward 
diplomats and diplomacy. He personified the "chronic 
distaste of democratic opinion for the image of the pro­
fessional diplomatic agent." He suspected career diplomats 
for their isolation from the mainstream of American society, 
for their mode of dress and social mannerisms, and for 
their presumed leanings toward foreign ways and thoughts.
He sometimes thought that career diplomats should reimburse 
the government for allowing them to lead their idyllic lives. 
Although he liked consuls, whom he judged by little more than 
their presumed appearance, he associated the Foreign Service 
with the unflattering popular image of the old Diplomatic 
Service.
Like the average American FDR seldom subjected his 
prejudices against diplomats to critical analysis. He 
considered the Foreign Service unrepresentative of American 
society and less than suitable as a vehicle for the promul­
gation of United States foreign policy. Combined with his 
haphazard administrative methods and penchant for personal 
diplomacy, his attitudes bespoke a lack of concern for the 
development of an institutional diplomatic capability. He 
simply had little use for the Foreign Service.
The Foreign Service, nevertheless, still conducted the
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bulk of the nation's diplomacy under FDR. How well American 
diplomacy fared during the tumultuous years prior to World 
War II depended, in part, upon the chiefs-of-mission that 
FDR appointed to head the embassies and legations abroad.
In the matter of appointments, no less than in other aspects 
concerning the Foreign Service, Roosevelt found little to 
attract him to professional diplomats.
On the eve of World War II, the President cordially
ridiculed career chiefs-of-mission in a memorandum to
Secretary of State Hull. "You get to be a Minister if
(a) you are loyal to the Service, (b) you do nothing to
offend people, (c) you are not intoxicated at public 
94functions." Although FDR was partially correct, he might 
have added, in fairness, another compendium of qualifications 
for selection as chief-of-mission, to wit, if you possess no 
diplomatic experience, you are a loyal Democrat, and you have 
contributed to the campaign coffers.
QAAugust 28, 1938, Roosevelt, His Personal Letters, 1928-1945, II, 914.
Thz two-A.tng zIa ca6 ofa diplo­
matic. appolntmznt6 --the. 
?AZ6ldznt'6 pzA.6on.al pAzdllzz- 
t-con and thz zaAzzA oi£ic.zA.6> 
zholzz by ability and 6znloAl- 
ty-- lka6 bzgunl.
Assistant Secretary of State 
Sumner Wellesl
4 THE PRESIDENT, THE STATE DEPARTMENT
AND THE APPOINTMENT OF CHIEFS-OF-MISSION: 
THE WARD'-HEELERS VERSUS THE OLD-BOY NETWORK
During a press conference in the executive offices of 
the White House on July 12, 1933, a reporter queried Presi­
dent Roosevelt regarding reports that he had encountered 
"difficulty in finding enough rich Democrats to fill the 
diplomatic posts." FDR replied bluntly. "Now don't you 
believe it. I have in the diplomatic folder, I think there 
are two hundred and fifty or three hundred names of deserving 
Democrats who would like to have places under any condition, 
salary or no salary." As an afterthought, Roosevelt added: 
"Then, for instance, just to give you an example, we have
2career diplomats. Of course, we are going to keep them in."
President Roosevelt deviated little from traditional 
ways of selecting men to represent the United States abroad.
Keith Eagles, "Ambassador Joseph E. Davies and Ameri­
can-Soviet Relations, 1937-1941" (unpublished Ph.D. disser­
tation, University of Washington, 1966), 90.
2Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 301.
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Like most presidents before and since, he reserved the most 
prestigious and important diplomatic posts for loyal parti­
sans. Although he appointed nearly as many career diplomats 
as deserving Democrats to head diplomatic missions, he rele­
gated the career chiefs to the least desirable and least 
significant posts.
That career officers headed a proportionate share of the 
diplomatic missions derived more from the tenacity of State 
Department officials than from the beneficence of the Presi­
dent. Like most Foreign Service officers before and since, the 
career diplomats and their colleagues in the Department view­
ed the appointment of chiefs-of-mission with particular sen­
sitivity. Chief-of-mission status represented the highest 
mark of professional distinction within the diplomatic community.
The appointment of amateurs denigrated the office in the 
eyes of the diplomats and their foreign counterparts. The 
appointment of amateurs also augured for the relinquishment of 
a measure of professional diplomatic control over foreign 
policy. Amateurs owed their loyalty to the White House, not 
to the Foreign Service. With political acumen born of earlier 
struggles to enhance their profession, the diplomats engaged 
FDR and his patronage advisers in a battle over appointments.
President Roosevelt established and maintained the boun­
daries within which the struggle ensued. In typical Roose- 
veltian fashion, he allowed the proponents of patronage and
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the proponents of professionalism to compete for his favor 
in the selection of envoys. He delegated responsibility to 
both factions for recommending nominees, while reserving 
final authority for the selections to himself.
Roosevelt never cherished the idea of appointing career 
diplomats to American legations and embassies. In the end, 
the precedent of appointing career diplomats as chiefs-of- 
mission, established during the 1920s, contributed to the 
relative success of the diplomats as much as any other factor. 
The ratio of approximately equal career-to-noncareer appoint­
ments, reached under Hoover in 1932, remained unchanged under 
the New Deal. After 1944 the proportion of career chiefs- 
of-mission again rose steadily. By 1960 career diplomats 
filled 71 percent of the United States missions abroad.
Had Roosevelt wanted to, he could have appointed sub­
stantially more career diplomats as chiefs-of-mission. De­
spite the pressures of patronage, the opportunity to do so 
existed, particularly after 1936. Then, with the increasing 
erosion of world peace, even the President's dispensers of 
patronage would have approved. Instead, little changed. Im­
bued with a commanding assurance of his own diplomatic 
abilities, Roosevelt viewed the need for experienced 
representation abroad in the same light that he viewed the
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value of a healthy Foreign Service.
I
Loyal Democrats and Roosevelt supporters awaited the
advent of the New Deal with eager anticipation in 19 33.
FDR's triumph of the previous November ended twelve years of
Republican dominance of the White House. With the long
drought over, the Democratic faithful looked forward to a
hearty feast at the trough of political patronage. Rarely
in the history of the United States, one commentator wrote,
had a national administration faced so much pressure from
3hungry job-seekers.
The President-elect was inclined to satisfy them. FDR
harbored few qualms regarding the application of spoils
politics. A tireless, adroit player of the patronage game,
the former New York Governor well understood the strategies
of job distribution. Shortly after the election, Roosevelt
informed his closest associates that, while he would not
accept "political suggestions" for cabinet appointments,
loyalty and campaign contributions naturally would be among
4the criteria for many other appointments.
3Harold Brayman, "Roosevelt and the Spoilsmen," Current 
History, 41 (October 1934), 17.
4Edward J. Flynn, You' ie the Boss (N.Y.: Viking Press, 
1947), 123.
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FDR especially wanted the "Roosevelt-Before-Chicago" 
men to receive just awards. Known by the acronym RBC, 
the group numbered thirty-four. While many traditionally 
large Democratic contributors waited until after the Chicago 
nominating convention to commit themselves, the RBC group 
thoroughly won Roosevelt's devotion by pledging considerable 
financial assistance to his bid for the nomination. Follow­
ing the election, FDR's close advisers formed an informal 
committee for the purpose of "taking care" of the RBC people. 
As one adviser, Edward J. Flynn, remarked: "There was more
or less tacit understanding between the President-nominate
5and us that wherever possible they should be taken care of."
Seven members of the RBC group later sought and received
. 6 prestigious diplomatic appointments.
* ’ T---- -̂----------- L------ -
' R•, Ibid., 84-85, 123. See also Burns, Lion and Fox, 187- 
189; Henry Carter, "The Spoils," The North American Review, 
235 (June 1933S) , 523-528; Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roose­
velt) (4 vols.;| Boston: Little, Brown, 1956), III, 172;
Schlesinger, Age of Roosevelt, I, 420-421.] Gunther states: Roosevelt was a long-minded man. To the
end bf his life he maintained a zealous loyalty to almost 
all /members o/f the small original clique of his supporters, 
and /indeed! to most others who came out for him before the 
actual nomination.... Conversely, he never forgave some 
leading. Democrats who opposed him, or were lukewarm, before 
the Chicago Convention. It is striking in the extreme that 
he never gave any really big job to any Democrat, no matter 
how eminent or potentially useful, who did not think he was 
fit to be/President in 1932." Roosevelt in Retrospect, 265.
6The 7 immediate members of the RBC group who received 
diplomatic assignments were: Judge Robert Bingham, Joe
Davies, Joseph Kennedy, Breckinridge Long, David H.
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The task of assembling information on deserving 
Democrats fell to James A. "Big Jim" Farley. A strapping, 
genial, redheaded Irishman and former New York boxing 
commissioner, Farley had worked "with furious energy" as 
Chairman of the Democratic National Committee during the 
1932 campaign. Following the election, Roosevelt slated 
Farley for postmaster general, a position traditionally 
held by the "keeper of the plum tree." Roosevelt's advisers 
concurred with the choice of Farley as the administration's 
chief dispenser of spoils: No other man knew more about
who ought to be rewarded and why.
Farley plunged into his job as "captain of spoils" with 
unabashed enthusiasm. Flouting custom, he publicly pro­
claimed that his job was to reward the politically deserving.
In regard to the customs patrol along the Mexican border,
Farley announced to the press that "Democrats would look
gjust as well riding horses as Republicans."
Morris, Laurence Steinhardt, and Jesse Isidor Straus. Sever­
al others, just as loyal to FDR, but on the fringe of the 
RBC groups also received eminent diplomatic posts. See 
chapter 5 infra.
7Raymond Moley, The First New Deal (N.Y.: Harcourt,
Brace & World, 1966), 75; /"“John F.~Carter7 The Nev/ Dealers (N.Y.: Simon and 
Schuster, 1934), 244-245.
gBrayman, "The Spoilsmen," 19.
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He openly systematized patronage procedures. Not 
content to rely upon memory alone, Farley developed an 
elaborate filing system. He established a folder for every 
person who sought a position, and he maintained numerous
Qlists of political loyalists and their preferences. One 
list— the Preferred List— comprised the names of those who 
qualified for major appointments by virtue of their political 
loyalty and munificient financial donations to the campaign 
coffers.^
The Preferred List included many potential candidates 
for chief-of-mission posts. Like nearly all administrations 
before and since, the New Deal administration regarded 
ambassadorships as prize plums with which to reward the more 
generous campaign contributors. The Preferred List was . 
also the one patronage list that commanded FDR* s assiduous 
attention. He was its principal compiler.^
^Ibid., 17-20; New Dealers, 244-246.
1{̂ Ralph Robert Stackman, "Laurence A. Steinhardt: New
Deal Diplomat, 1933-1945" (unpublished. Ph.D. dissertation, 
Michigan State University, 1967), 33-34.
■'■"̂ Ibid. Many presidents have maintained a Preferred 
List— at least in the twentieth century. For instance, an 
eyewitness recounts how President Eisenhower, glancing down 
the list, recalled that he had promised Senator Aiken of 
Vermont to appoint the first person from that state who made 
the Preferred List to a particular vacancy. Reportedly, Ike 
casually stated: "Take him— take this fellow from Vermont."
U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Appointments 
to the Regulatory Agencies: The Federal ■Communications
Commission and the Federal Trade Commission, 1949-1974,
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Foreign Service officers were naturally apprehensive 
of their fate under the new Democratic administration.
Prior to Roosevelt's inauguration, word circulated through­
out the State Department that the President-elect distrusted
professional diplomats and viewed the development of the
12Foreign Service during the 192 0s with a jaundiced eye.
Most officers were assured of job security by law.
The Rogers Act had granted career status to the diplomats, 
and no public official seriously considered undoing what the 
Rogers Act had accomplished. Nevertheless, the President's 
biases, as well as the pressures of patronage, appeared to 
limit the prospects for promotion to the rank of chief-of- 1 
mission for many career diplomats.
Career diplomats who served as chiefs-of-mission under 
President Hoover awaited the commencement of the Roosevelt 
administration with particular anxiety. Technically, 
these officers were without legal protection. United States 
ministers and ambassadors served at the pleasure of the 
president; they were his personal representatives to other
Commerce-Committee Print. (Washington, D. C.: Govern­
ment Printing Office, April 1976), 120. For other examples, see also page 390.
12Crane, Mr. Carr, 311-323; Freidel, Franklin D. Roose­
velt, IV, 360; Weil, Pretty Good Club, 72, 79.
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chief s-of-st ate . Once a diplomat accepted an appointment 
as a chief-of-mission, he was no longer regarded as a 
Foreign Service officer under the law. If a President 
replaced him with a political appointee or with another 
diplomat, he could be readmitted into the Service only upon 
authorization of the President. In 19 33 rumors abounded 
that President Roosevelt intended to dismiss all chiefs-of- 
mission who had had close ties with the Hoover administra­
tion. ̂
To the diplomats who held chief-of-mission posts in 
1932 the advent of the New Deal invoked nightmarish visions 
of the last Democratic regime. In 1913 the administration 
of Woodrow Wilson virtually obliterated the progress 
achieved in appointing only professional diplomats as 
chiefs-of-mission. Wilson and his secretary of state, 
William Jennings Bryan, dismissed nearly all of their 
predecessor's veteran, as well as political, ministers and 
ambassadors.
The appointment of Raymond Moley as an assistant 
secretary of state only served to heighten the disquietude
13 Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 360;
Crane, Mr. Carr, 311-323.
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of the professional diplomatic corps. Temporarily vacating
his position as a professor of government and political
science at Columbia University, Moley joined the Roosevelt
entourage early in 1932, and quickly established himself as
the leader of Governor Roosevelt's "Brain Trust." A man of
strong views, exaggerated self-importance, and phenomenal
tactlessness, Moley held an intense antipathy toward career
diplomats, whom he beheld as rather elegant, pro-British,
14whxte-spat boys.
Roosevelt ensconced Moley in the State Department more
for reasons of personal convenience than for matters relatiig
to foreign affairs. Congress provided no funds for White
House assistants until 1939. The President wanted his
chief trouble-shooter where he could be reached quickly.
Besides a salary, the position of assistant secretary of
state provided Moley with an office adjacent to the executive
offices of the White House. In appointing Moley to the
State Department, Roosevelt neither consulted with Secretary
15Hull nor defined Moley's duties.
14Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (N.Y.: Harper Brothers, 
1939), 131, and "Shake-Up," Newsweek, 10 (July 17, 1937), 44. 
See also New Dealers, 324-329; Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
III, 317-318; Schlesinger, Age of Roosevelt, II, 204.
1 SFeis, Characters in Crisis, 100; Freidel, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, IV, 135, 363-364.
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One of Moley's informal tasks was that of ousting from 
the State Department all Hooverites. Upon his appointment 
in March 1933, Moley immediately discerned that "the New
16Deal desperately needed friends in the State Department."
On March 6, Moley conducted a brief press conference during
which he announced that he "would certainly work to clean out
the Department of all Republicans." When several reporters
responded that career diplomats had "no politics," Moley
declared that anyone who had served in the Hoover administra-
17tion had politics.
II
The prospect of a massive infusion of politically- 
appointed amateurs into the diplomatic ranks deeply disturbed 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull. A distinguished trim-ldpk- 
ing gentleman of sixty-two, Hull was in the twilight of his 
career in public service when Roosevelt tapped him to head 
the State Department in 1933. For twenty-three years, Hujl 
had served loyally the state of Tennessee and the Democratic 
party as a U.S. congressman and senator. From 1921 to 1924, 
he had held his party's national chairmanship. A lawyerby 
training, Hull was also idealistic. As secretary of state,
16Moley, After Seven Years, 114.
17Diary entry, March 6, 1933, Hooker, Moffat Papers,
90.
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he aspired to be an elder statesman of the stature of a
1 8Thomas Jefferson or of a John Quincy Adams. He profoundly 
wanted to be above politics.
Hull long had believed that United States foreign
affairs "should not be the football of domestic politics."
As a congressman in 1914, he had witnessed the Wilson
administration's blatant use of spoils politics to fill
diplomatic missions.
I could not but remember [Hull wrote] the 
long line of suitcases stretching along the 
corridor wall outside of William Jennings 
Bryan's office when he became Wilson’s 
Secretary of State. They belonged seemingly 
to every Tom, Dick and Harry from the 'sticks' 
who had been his friends and had done Democratic 
service. These men came straight from the 
railroad station to this office, without 
even going to a hotel, feeling sure that he 
would instantly create jobs for them.
The portrait of a secretary of state actively engaged in
patronage politics was repugnant to Hull.
The Secretary held professional diplomats in high 
esteem. The knowledge and political wisdom of those career 
officers Hull met in the early days of the New Deal admini­
stration, and later, impressed him. Although bereft of
Hull, Memoirs, I, 179-180. See also Julius W. Pratt,
Cordell Hull, 1933-1944 (2 vols.; N.Y.: Cooper Square Publish-
shers, 1964), I, 3-23.
19Hull, Memoirs, I, 180.
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diplomatic experience himself, he appreciated the
advantage of experience in the conduct of foreign policy,
especially in times of acute international tension. "It
matters not how brilliant an appointee may be," Hull stated,
"he is helpless when deep-seated questions arise in rapid
succession about whose background he knows little or 
20nothing." The inexperienced amateur envoy, Hull thought, 
was more apt to be a liability than an asset in the conduct 
of United States foreign relations.
Hull had no intention of sanctioning the wholesale
replacement of professional envoys with amateurs. Early
in the spring of 1933, he recommended to Roosevelt that
diplomatic appointments be divided equally between career
and noncareer men. The Secretary had hoped that his
recommendation would counter those presidential advisers
who urged that "sweeping changes" be made in the Foreign
21Service to accommodate deserving Democrats. Hull was 
sufficiently realistic to appreciate the improbability of 
preventing the bestowal of some diplomatic posts as 
political rewards. If the status quo could be preserved, 
if the precedent established during the 1920s of appointing 
career officers to at least half of the posts could be
20Ibid., 181, 188-189.
21Ibid., 179, 181-182.
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xnaintained, the Secretary would be satisfied.
President Roosevelt responded equivocally to Hull's 
proposal on diplomatic appointments. Ingeniously indirect
with people on nearly all matters, FDR neither approved nor
22disapproved Hull's prescription. To Roosevelt, who 
displayed dogmatic inconsistency, a proposal to establish a 
policy on diplomatic appointments, however broad, appeared 
too staid, too implacable. Instead, the President indicated 
to Hull that he would entertain suggestions on diplomatic 
appointments from the State Department as well as offering 
his own recommendations from time-to-time.̂
With his recommendation to FDR on diplomatic appoint­
ments, Hull ended his active participation in the selection 
of chiefs-of-mission. He early decided not to concern 
himself with appointments. As befitted a secretary of stata 
he preferred to concentrate upon broad policy matters and
22From Hull's recommendation, Warren Ilchman concludes 
that FDR and Hull early agreed upon a rough balance between 
career and noncareer appointments. Ilchman provides no other 
documentation to^support his contention, which he employs 
to support his claim that "every administration and its 
Secretary of State in the period [1924-1939] advanced the 
cause of professional diplomacy." Moreover, Ilchman states 
that Hull had "a strong voice in the appointment of ambassa­
dors and ministers." Professional Diplomacy, 212-213.
^Hull, Memoirs, I, 200-201. See also Pratt, Cordell 
Hull, I, 22.
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to leave administrative affairs to his subordinates.
Hull also disliked making direct representations to
the President. A proud man with a reservoir of humility who
endeavored to avoid confrontation, Hull despaired early
of Roosevelt's disregard of him. More than once Hull
complained about "that man across the street who never tells 
25me anything." In his twelve years as secretary of state,
a tenure unmatched by any other secretary, Hull received few
invitations from FDR to discuss foreign matters. During
2 6World War II, FDR almost totally ignored him.
24Moley, First New Deal, 241. See also Beatrice Bishop 
Berle and Travis Beal Jacobs, eds., Navigating the Rapids, 
1918-1971: From the Papers of Adolf A. Berle (N.Y.: Har-
court, Brace Jovanovich, 1973), 110; R. Walton Moore to 
Bullitt, May 20, 1937, Bullitt, For the President, 214.
Then an assistant secretary of state, Moore wrote Bullitt 
in regard to the selection of a successor to Undersecretary 
of State Phillips: "I can also understand in what a sweat
the Secretary has been involved for several months, in view 
of his disinclination to deal with the matter of appointments."
25Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 459.
2 6The cordial but distant relationship Hull had with 
FDR is well-known. Numerous contemporaries and historians 
have described the details. For instance, see Crane, Mr.
Carr, 310, 324-325, 357; Hooker, Moffat Papers, 93, 108; 
Richard P. Traina, American Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil 
War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968), 18-21;
Drummond, "Cordell Hull," 184-207; Pratt, Cordell Hull, I, 
13-15, 28, 38-39.
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Hull's influence with Roosevelt was marginal.
Domestic political expediency, not foreign policy, had 
bound Roosevelt and Hull together. In his years on Capitol 
Hill as a congressman, Hull had acquired many important 
friends. "Judge Hull" from Tennessee would be, FDR reasoned, 
a politically valuable member of his cabinet, dominated as 
it was by Northern liberals. Roosevelt always intended to 
be his own secretary of state.
To discuss appointments with FDR and his political
cronies ventured to be an unpleasant experience for Hull.
In Hull's opinion, petty politics too often guided Roose-
2 8velt's actions. Besides, Hull was not familiar with the
qualifications of many of the members of the Foreign Service
who might be worthy of promotion to chief-of-mission status.
Consequently, he entrusted to his undersecretary of state
the responsibility of conferring with the White House on
29diplomatic appointments.
The position of undersecretary of state has become over 
the years a post comparable to that of the executive officer
^Drummond, "Cordell Hull," 194-196; Crane, Mr. Carr, 
310; Freidel, Franklin P. Roosevelt, IV, 459.
2 8Traina, Diplomacy and Civil War, 19-20.
29Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 240.
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of a ship. Whereas the secretary is the captain, the 
undersecretary is in charge of day-to-day operations, 
including recommending to the captain the placement of 
subordinates. Today, the position of undersecretary is one 
of great responsibility, reserved for men of high profes­
sional calibre, whether from within or outside the Foreign
o ■ • 30Service.
The role of the undersecretary was still largely 
. 31experimental m  1933. Then, the undersecretary could 
receive or assume any number of responsibilities. Of the 
nine men who had borne the title since the creation of the 
office in 1919, six had been political appointees and
30three had come from the ranks of the diplomatic corps.
Foreign Service officers considered the office more as a 
stepping-stone to higher posts abroad than a major appoint­
ment at home. Although ranked number two in the hierarchy,
the undersecretary received $1,000 less in salary than the
33four assistant secretaries.
30Harr, Professional Diplomat, 107, 334-335. Chester 
Bowles noted that as undersecretary in the Kennedy admini­
stration, he "was given primary responsibility for recruit­
ment" of chiefs-of-mission. Promises to Keep: My Years in
Public Life, 1941-196 9 (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1971), 315.
■^Henry K. Norton, "Foreign Office Organization," 23-24.
32U. S. , Department of State, United States "Chiefs of Mission, . 
1778-1973 Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), 185-136.
33Norton, "Foreign Office Organization," 2 3-24, 37.
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As a condition for accepting the secretaryship, Hull
insisted that his chief lieutenant be a person of experience
who knew the diplomatic world. Hull appreciated his own
limitations in diplomacy. He also held an aversion to the
social amenities that accompanied the life of the nation's
number one diplomat, as well as to the administrative
responsibilities of a cabinet officer. He hoped that the
undersecretary would attend to the necessities of diplomatic
entertainment and to administrative matters. Hull's
stipulation also eliminated Raymond Moley as a contender
to the office. With Hull's warm endorsement, Roosevelt
34chose William Phillips.
Phillips served as undersecretary through most of 
FDR's first administration. In 1936 he received an assign­
ment he had long coveted, the ambassadorship to R o m e . 35 
Phillips' replacement as undersecretary was Sumner Welles, 
then assistant secretary of state for Latin American 
affairs.
34Hull, Memoirs, I, 158, 160-161; Feis, Characters in 
Crisis, 99; Louis B. Wehle, Hidden Threads in History:
Wilson Through Roosevelt (N.Y.: Macmillan, 195 3) , 129-130.
^Richard N. Kottman, "Hoover and Canada Diplomatic 
Assignments," Canadian Historical Review, 51 (September 
1970) , 297 ftn, 8.
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III
Both Phillips and Welles could be counted upon to 
defend the interests of the Foreign Service. Both were 
career diplomats with distinguished records of service. 
Between them in 1933, Phillips at age 55 and Welles at 41 
possessed a total of 47 years of diplomatic experience.
William Phillips epitomized the American professional
diplomat. Described by a contemporary as "the career man's
perfect picture of a diplomat," Phillips combined many of
the attributes that marked the demeanor of the sophisticated,
cosmopolitan diplomatist of the old world. He possessed
complete self-assurance masked by an appealing shyness; he
displayed a capacity for gracefulness under any circumstance.
and in any language; he was able "to say yes and no with
such distinction as to leave one in doubt as to whether the
36sun sets in the east or west." Warm, friendly, and 
courteous, Phillips was also tenaciously loyal to the 
Foreign Service.
Phillips was one of the "founding fathers" of the
36 Herring, "A Review With Recommendations," 227.
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37Foreign Service. A member of a wealthy Boston Brahmin 
family and a great-nephew of Wendell Phillips, the abolition­
ist, he decided during his senior year at Harvard to seek 
a career in diplomacy. Like many American diplomats of his 
generation, Phillips found the prospect of a family business 
career tcoconfining, too much a life of ease. Imbued with 
a sense of noblesse oblige, he responded to the call of 
progressives like Theodore Roosevelt to entertain service 
in the public interest. In 1903 he entered the Diplomatic 
Service as a private, nonsalaried secretary to Ambassador 
Joseph H. Choate in London. Eager and intelligent,
Phillips heeded every opportunity to learn diplomatic pro­
cedure and to cultivate contacts in diplomatic society.
That he counted., among his early friends Franklin D. Roose­
velt, Elihu Root, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Cordell Hull helped 
assure him of a long diplomatic career.
Phillips rose rapidly among the diplomatic ranks. In 
190 7 he became chief of the newly-created Division of Far 
Eastern Affairs within the State Department. In December
37Phillips' career can be traced in his Ventures in 
Diplomacy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952). See also Schulzing-
er, Diplomatic Mind, 54-58; Werking, Master Architects, 131. 
Feis states of Phillips: "His presence provided signs of
continuity in the State Department; his dress, gentlemanly 
manners and direct talk reminded me of what I had found 
admirable in the upper reaches of Boston society when I was 
a student at Harvard....Phillips' assignments in other lands 
made him feel closer to people of another race, religion or 
color than the usual members of the Boston society to which he belonged." Characters in Crisis, 100.
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1908, President Theodore Roosevelt elevated him to assistant 
secretary of state. At the same time, Phillips gained 
admission to the select social group of the President's 
friends known as the "tennis cabinet." In 1920,after 
several years in which his career followed a more erratic 
course, Phillips received his first chief-of-mission post, 
that of minister to the Hague. From 1922 to 1924, he 
served as undersecretary of state, the Department's fourth, 
and played a major role in securing the creation of the 
career service.
Even more so perhaps than Phillips, Welles "was the 
quintessential diplomat." In the words of commentators and 
peers alike, he possessed "a firm hold on everyone of the 
diplomatic virtues." Welles combined studiousness with
\ j
worldliness; cosmopolitanism became him naturally. Six 
feet three inches tall and always impeccably dressed in
• I 38Savile Row suits, Welles presented an impressive figure.
Fourteen year/s junior to Phillips in age, Welles' rise
38Theodore A. Wilson, The First Summit: Roosevelt and
Churchill at Placentia Bay, 1941 (Boston; Houghton Mifflin, 
1969), 34-36. Another excellent description of Welles is 
in Traina, Diplomacy and Civil War, 22. See also Herring,
"A Review With Recommendations," 228; Weil, Pretty Good 
Club, 87; Nicholas Roosevelt, A Front Row Seat (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1953), 67. Like Phillips, 
Welles' backgro'und included an abolitionist family 
relative— his great-uncle after whom he was named, U.S. 
Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts.
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in the diplomatic corps was meteoric. He entered the old 
Diplomatic Service in 1915 as a private secretary, carrying 
with him a letter of recommendation from Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt. In six years Welles 
became chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs, the 
youngest divisional head in the history of the State Depart­
ment. Welles was then twenty-nine years old. During the 
1920s he served the Republican administrations as an adviser 
on the volatile situation in the Dominican Republic. He
also published a creditable two-volume history of that
40country m  1928.
The appointment of Phillips and Welles to positions in 
the New Deal administration was almost axiomatic. FDR 
enjoyed a special relationship with both. During the Wilson 
administration, Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt dined often 
with William and Caroline Phillips, firmly cementing a 
friendship that had begun almost twenty years earlier by 
virtue of shared backgrounds. Similarly, Welles shared 
with FDR, as well as with Phillips, a Groton and Harvard 
education, security of wealth, high social standing, and 
mutual friends. Moreover, Welles had served as a page at
40Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic, 1844-1924
(2 vols.; N.Y.: Payson and Clark, Ltd., 1928).
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41the Roosevelt wedding in 1905. Among all State Depart­
ment officials, Welles was Eleanor's favorite, one of the
42few inhabitants of Foggy Bottom she trusted. The trust
FDR embraced for Welles and Phillips derived not from their
credentials as career diplomats but from the comfortable
friendship, erected upon common foundations, each had
43developed with FDR over many years.
Roosevelt knew he could rely upon the fidelity of
Phillips and Welles to the New Deal. Neither was in the
employ of the Hoover administration when FDR achieved his
victory in 1933. Both were unemployed. After serving as
the first American minister to Canada under Coolidge,
Phillips found himself replaced by a political appointee
soon after Hoover assumed office. Rather than reenlist
in the Foreign Service, Phillips opted for a few years 
44 . .of retirement. A similar experience found
41Traina provides one of the best, short analyses of 
the FDR-Hull-Phillips-Welles relationship. Diplomacy and 
Civil War, 19-23. While Hull and Phillips got along well 
together, Hull and Welles did not. Welles often dealt 
directly with the White House, bypassing Hull to the 
latter's intense displeasure.
42Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, 375. See also Weil, 
Pretty Good Club, 130-131.
43Traina, Diplomacy and Civil War, 22.
44Kottman, "Hoover and Diplomatic Assignments," 296- 
298; Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy, 149-155.
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Welles acting as FDR's unofficial adviser on Latin American 
affairs during the 1932 campaign. Both hoped, however, to 
return to government service under FDR. Both also contri­
buted to FDR's campaign, Welles' $2,500 donation topping 
Phillips' lesser offering of $1,000.
IV
The knowledge that Phillips had assumed responsibility 
for the State Department on appointments revived the sagging 
spirits of the career diplomats. During his lengthy diplo­
matic career, Phillips had survived the purges that usually 
accompanied a change in administration. He had served tinder 
both Republican and Democratic presidents. Whenever his 
career had appeared in jeopardy— as it occasionally had—  
he had managed to reappear, often in a better post, much to 
the envy and admiration of some of his less fortunate 
colleagues.̂
Phillips was a seasoned bureaucratic in-fighter. He 
understood that internal, bureaucratic politics— more so thai
45Louise Overacker, "Campaign Funds in a Depression 
Year," American Political Science Review, 27 (October 1933), 
782. See also Beatrice Farnsworth, William C. Bullitt and 
the Soviet Union (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1967) , 206 Ftn7"54.
Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy, 45-46, 5 7-59, 62-68, 
100, 155.
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electoral politics— was a tough business, that one had to
identify the games, the players, the conditions, and the
bargains, and act accordingly to succeed. To the advice
that the British diplomat Humphrey Trevelyan offered his
colleagues, Phillips would have nodded knowingly. Only
half facetiously, Trevelyan wrote in 1973:
A diplomat should...above all, seek to pack 
the department with his friends^ If he 
achieves this, he need have no thought for 
the morrow. His peccadilloes will be 
suppressed before they come to the ears 
of ministers perennially nervous of the 
press; his errors of judgment will be 
forgotten; his unfulfilled prophecies 
will be lost in the files; all will be 
given unto him. 1
Phillips, like many of the first generation of American
career diplomats, acquired a knowledge of the politics of
survival in an era of blatant spoils politics.
Phillips was a charter member of the American diplomatic 
old-boy network. Whenever he had been in a position to do 
so, he saw that his fellow diplomats received preferential
47 Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 151. Graham T.
Allison states: "The hard core of the bureaucratic politics
mix is personality. How each man manages' to stand the 
heat..., each player’s basic operating style....” E ssence of 
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1971), 166.On the modern-day Foreign Service, Harr notes; "Elitism 
is manifested in the essentially defensive posture of most 
FSO’s in regard to the Service. If one is a member of an 
elite group there is a strong tendency toward having a stake 
in protecting the elitism of that group. This is done in a 
number of ways." Professional Diplomat, 209.
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treatment. He also had found occasion to enlist the 
support of influential people, including a U.S. senator 
from his home state of Massachusetts, on his own behalf as 
well.48
Throughout his career Phillips managed to remain on
the good side of his colleagues and co-workers. In
contrast to FDR, Phillips treated Hull with great deference,
49thereby earning him the Secretary's respect. "I found it 
pleasant to work with and for the new Under-Secretary," 
Herbert Feis, the Department's economic adviser, remarked.88 
Although Phillips was to confront Farley and Moley on 
appointments, they never expressed rancor toward him.
FDR's undersecretary of state could be beguiling.
Phillips prepared to do battle with the Farley-Moley 
patronage cartel soon after assuming his position as under­
secretary of state in March. With Assistant Secretary of 
State Wilbur Carr, Phillips reviewed the status of the 
incumbent chiefs-of-mission. Carr, who served as the chief
48Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy, 45-46. See also 
Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 57, 171 ftn. 28; Werking, 
Master Architects, 144; Kottman, "Hoover and Diplomatic 
Assignments," 287 ftn. 8; Weil, Pretty Good Club, 19, 73-74.
49Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy, 185; Wei], Pretty 
Good Club, 77, 79.
^8Feis, Characters in Crisis, 100.
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administrative officer of the Foreign Service, had prepared
a detailed report on all of Hoover's chiefs-of-mission in
anticipation of whatever changes the new administration
might contemplate. In reviewing the report, Phillips and
Carr designated in each case which chiefs could be regarded
as patronage appointees in any sense, which ones— amateurs
and professionals— the President probably would want to
replace, and which posts might yield opportunities for the
51appointment of career officers. Their list was no less 
detailed or less meticulously devised than the patronage 
folders maintained by Farley.
Phillips and Carr presented together a formidable 
front to the dispensers of political patronage. No one 
knew the State Department and the Foreign Service better 
than Carr. After entering the Department in 1892, he had 
gradually acquired, through diligence and devotion, command 
of the administrative structure of the foreign affairs 
bureaucracy. By 1933 Carr had had forty-one years in the 
Department under eight presidents. Like Phillips, Carr had 
always worked to take care of "his boys," those who shared 
his concern for the diplomatic machinery.52
5^Crane, Mr. Carr, 311-312, 326.
5 2Ibid. See also Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 47; Werking, Master Architects88-90.
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Once before, during Woodrow Wilson's presidency,
Phillips and Carr had collaborated on appointments.
Phillips then was a member of the diplomatic branch, while
Carr headed the Consular Service. At the latter's request,
Phillips had assumed the task of presenting suggestions on
consular appointments to Secretary of State Bryan. In
contrast to Wilson's purge of the chiefs-of-mission, most
53veteran consular agents were retained.
The task of dealing directly with Roosevelt and Farley
belonged to Phillips. During FDR's second administration,
Welles would adopt the same role. In contrast to Carr, and
to Hull as well, Phillips and Welles knew how to talk to
Roosevelt. They possessed the kind of precision, alacrity,
and self-assurance that FDR admired, and which Carr and Hull,
both slower, more circuitous and cautious, lacked. Indeed,
Roosevelt preferred to discuss foreign policy with Phillips
54and Welles rather than "with Hull. Thus, as the administration 
marshalled its forces to combat the Depression in 1933, 
Phillips assumed the role of challenger to the ward-heelers.
The competition for leverage with the President on 
appointments proved keen. Moley vividly recalled the
53 Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 60, 66.
C. ATraina, Diplomacy and Civil War, 19-23.
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imbroglio that developed between Phillips and Farley.
While retaining final authority on all appointments, FDR 
directed Farley to confer with Phillips on diplomatic 
vacancies. In the meantime, Phillips bypassed Farley. 
Phillips consulted directly with Roosevelt, offering 
several suggestions for chief-of-mission appointments. When 
Farley learned of Phillips' maneuvering, he "raised the 
roof." With gentlemanly tact, Phillips then agreed that he 
and Farley should confer on all prospective appointments.
The encounter between the old-boy network and the ward-
heelers over appointments had only just begun. Phillips'
"preference for career boys" soon proved "so overpowering"
that Farley— who oversaw dispensation of patronage throughout
all of government— finally demanded that Phillips consult
with Moley "before he made any moves." Farley "turned over
to" Moley "his complete file on diplomatic prospects,
designating in each case what they had contributed in effort
and money to the 1932 campaign." He asked Moley to use his
influence with Phillips and Roosevelt "in providing suitable
55appointments for these people."
^Moley, After Seven Years, 13], and First New Deal, 242. 
See also Weil, Pretty Good Club, 71-74. For examples of 
Phillips' large role in the matter of appointments, see Nixon, 
FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 50-51, 301, 303, 361, 459, 492; 
II, 560.
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Mo ley 1s position was clear. He did not intend to 
permit Phillips "to ignore every last one of the campaign 
contributors." Moley held "that appointment as a 
reward for political service" was neither wrong nor undesir­
able. Nor did Moley believe that "a career man [was] per se
c 7preferable to an amateur."
Less certain was Moley's tenure in the Department. 
Invading the confines of a bureaucracy, however small and 
compact, poses some risks. Bureaucratic routines are not 
easily disrupted. Nor are bureaucratic loyalties readily 
undermined. For the bureaucratic novice, caution is well- 
advised. As a university professor, Moley should have 
been better versed in the mores of bureaucratic politics.
He was not. Instead, he had challenged publicly the "rights?1 
of the career professionals to retain their jobs from one 
administration to the next.
The professionals in the Department set about immediate­
ly to undermine Moley. They convinced Hull that, whereas 
they were loyal to him, Moley was not. Hull required little 
convincing. The Secretary respected loyalty, a trait he, 
himself, possessed in abundance. He also believed that
56Moley, After Seven Years, 132.
^Moley, First New Deal, 242.
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Moley intended to construct his own cadre of followers
within the Department, separate and apart from the Secretary
of Jtate. Moley lost no time in providing ample evidence
to confirm Hull's suspicions. In marauding between the
White House and the State Department without the secretary's
5 8knowledge, Moley soon earned Hull's lasting enmity.
The celebrated estrangement between the two during the
London Economic Conference in July 1933 sealed Moley's fate.
When Moley implied via an indiscreet cable to Roosevelt
that Hull was incapable of leading the American delegation
to the conference, the Secretary erupted with full fury.
Roosevelt was forced to choose between Hull and Moley. He
59chose to dismiss Moley. In describing Moley's ouster to
his associates, Hull pulled his forefinger across his
throat and stated: "I cut the son of a bitch's throat from
ear to ear."^ With Moley's departure, there was "an
unanimous sigh of relief from everybody in the Department,"
61Sumner Welles informed a friend.
5 8Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 481; Weil, Pretty 
Good Club, 78.
Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 491-495.
S O w e i l ,  Pretty Good Club, 7 8 .  See also 
Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 493-494.
61Welles to Norman Davies, August 19 33,
Schlesinger, Age of Roosevelt, II, 232.
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The jubilation within the Department, however 
restrained, was premature. Well into 1935 Moley continued 
to consult with and advise the president on numerous matters 
from his position as editor of a new magazine, Today. By 
his own account, he spent 132 days in Washington after his 
resignation. On a few occasions he used his connections to 
influence diplomatic appointments. Gradually, however,
Moley became less sympathetic to the New Deal. His influence 
waned. By 19 37 he was a conservative opponent and no longer 
of value to Roosevelt.6^
V
The spiritual departure of Moley from the ranks of the 
New Dealers left Farley virtually alone to deal with the 
State Department in the years prior to World War II. FDR, 
of course, continued to have the final decision on all 
appointments. Even he realized, however, that Farley was 
no match for Welles and the career boys, especially in the 
latter"s backyard. Late in 1937 Roosevelt asked Adolf Berle, 
one of his original "Brain Trusters," to accept an appoint­
ment as an assistant secretary of state. The President 
told Berle that the State Department needed a New Dealer, 
that "Hull was magnificent on principle but timid," while
6 2Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 4 94. See also 
Schlesinger, Age of Roo seve11, II, 549; New Dealers, 328.
"Sumner was fundamentally a 'career man.'"
Berle accepted FDR's offer. Treated as an outsider by
his colleagues in the Department, the abrasive Berle was
neutralized if not ignored. He provided no assistance to
64proponents of patronage in the matter of appointments.
Farley encountered less and less support for his job
of rewarding the party faithful as the crises in Europe
became more acute. One friend of Farley's and the
President's, William C. Bullitt, objected strongly to the
practice of selecting diplomatic chiefs based upon their.
campaign largesse. Although not bereft of diplomatic
experience, Bullitt, himself, was not a career diplomat.
Appointed by FDR as ambassador to the Soviet Union in 19 33
and to the embassy in Paris in 1936, Bullitt maintained a
close confidential relationship with the President until at
least 1939. On December 7, 1936, Bullitt wrote to FDR:
Jim Farley has just passed through Paris....
In talking with Jim, I tried to convince 
him (and I believe I did) that the situation
in Europe today is too serious for him to
suggest the planting of duds in diplomatic 
posts in order to repay them for contribu­
tions to the campaign fund.
Diary entry, December 10, 1937, Berle, Navigating the 
Rapids, 151. See also Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 181-182.
64For instance, see Weil, Pretty Good Club, 78.
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Sup re me ly confident of the wisdom of his advice, Bullitt
further noted: "Jim said that he agreed with me, and we
went on to discuss how it might be possible... to get rid
of...the men who are not fit to hold their present jobs as
6 5chiefs-of-mission."
Bullitt submitted a simple plan to Roosevelt with
Farley's concurrence. FDR should issue "at once" a circular
instruction from the State Department requesting that all
chiefs-of-mission submit their resignations to the President
no later than January 15, 19 37, under the pretext that the
date of the presidential inauguration had been changed from
March 4 to January 3. In this manner, Bullitt submitted,
the President could do with the chiefs as he pleased without
having to engage .̂n the unpleasant task of requesting indi-
66 'vidual resignations. Bullitt believed, as Farley evidently
told him, that while FDR "wciuld be glad to get rid of" ainumber of incompetent chief£, he "would hesitate to ask for
,67their resignations."f I--- --- j--— j
^Bullitt, For the President, 194-195. See also Nixon, 
FDR and Foreign A f f a i r s III, 528-529. "Genial Jim" Farley, 
incidentally, was well-liked by many people, a natural 
salesman who rarely worried about consistency.
6 6Bullitt, For the President, 195.
67Bullitt to R. Walton Moore, December 8, 1936, Nixon, 
FDR and Foreign Affairs, III, 545.
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Roosevelt accepted Bullitt's idea. By custom, not law, 
chiefs-of-mission often offer their resignations when a new 
president is inaugurated. In following Bullitt's recommen­
dation, Roosevelt suggested the issuance of a general 
circular requesting the resignations of all c h i e f s . W h e t h e r  
inadvertently or by design, the President's suggested wording 
applied only to those "who belonged to the career service," 
and not to the amatuers.
The State Department was quick to decipher the flaw in 
the Bullitt-Roosevelt plan. Within five days of receiving a 
draft of the circular, Acting Secretary of State R. Walton 
Moore, a confidant of Hull's, sent the President a letter, 
along with1’ a memorandum prepared by the chief of Foreign 
Service Personnel.
The letter and memorandum tactfully presented the 
following points.
(1) The President's circular referred "only to those who belonged 
to" the career service.
(2) Career chiefs-of-mission who resigned "would lose their re­
tirement rights if they broke their service by retiring at 
the end of a presidential term."
(3) "Should a career chief's resignation be accepted, the President 
would have the authority to reinstate him to the classified 
Foreign Service." However, "at this moment" only "seven 
reinstatements to Class I would be permissable" under the
law, whereas there now were twenty-five career officers
^®FDR to Moore, December 19, 1936, Roosevelt, His 
Personal Letters, 1928-1945, I, 641.
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serving as chiefs-of-mission.
(4) Hie reinstatement appointments might have to be confirmed 
by the Senate.
At a minimum, the Department wanted FDR to alter the circu­
lar on resignations to account for the peculiar circumstances 
of the career chiefs.681
Roosevelt replied four days later in a manner perfectly 
suitable to the diplomats. To Moore, he penned a brief 
message:
In regard to resignations of 
Chiefs-of-Mission, it seems best to 
do nothing further in regard to the 
career men but the non-career Chiefs 
should, of course, submit their resig­
nations as has always been done inthe p a s t . 69
Whether accidental, or planned by one party and reacted to 
by the other, this procedural duel rebounded to the advan­
tage, however slight, of the career diplomats. Theoretically, 
the result portended more potential vacancies in diplomatic 
posts. On a more mundane level, even the President's most 
trusted adviser on patronage--Jim Farley--apparently had 
become reticent about annointing political hacks with key 
chief-of-mission slots.
^^Moore to FDR, December 24, 1936, Nixon, FDR and 
Foreign Affairs, III, 556-557.
^December 28, 1936, ibid. , 558.
-172-
VI
The initial skirmish over appointments produced a
standoff of sorts between the ward-heelers and the old-boy 
7 nnetwork. Of the 51 diplomatic missions maintained abroad 
by the United States, career diplomats headed 24 or 47 per­
cent after FDR's first year in office. An assortment of 
campaign contributors and amateurs filled the remaining 53 
percent of chief-of-mission slots. By the end of Roose­
velt's first term, these figures remained virtually unchanged: 
Career chiefs-of-mission held 25 or 48 percent of the 
missions. Of the 29 individual career diplomats who 
received chief-of-mission commissions from 1933 to 1936, 
ten served in more than one post; four others retired or 
resigned before 1936. By comparison, of the 31 individual 
political appointees who headed diplomatic missions during 
the same period, five served in more than one post. Another 
five moved on to other challenges after brief tours as 
diplomats.
Amateurs dominated the more prestigious and important 
diplomatic missions. The initial appointees to Great 
Britain, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, the Soviet Union,
70The’-statistical breakdowns on the diplomatic appoint­
ments were calculated from information in U.S., Depart*-"~ 
ment of State, State Department Biographic Register, 1933- 
1940 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1932- 
1941), and United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1973. Most
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Belgium, Poland, Austria, as well as to three of the four 
Scandinavian countries, were amateurs. Although professional 
diplomats held the two most important Far Eastern posts—
Japan and China— most were relegated to Latin America.
That Japan and China were virtually at a state-of-war in 
1933 made even FDR reticent about sending glove manufacturers 
or toy tycoons to those countries. Of the 20 Latin American 
countries in which the United States maintained missions, four­
teen opened their doors to career chiefs-of-mission in 1933.
That amateurs received the best diplomatic assignments 
presaged no break with traditional practice. With rare 
exception, all presidents have practiced the custom of re­
warding generous campaign contributors, who possess little or
71no diplomatic experience, with ambassadorial appointments. 
President Richard Nixon, for example, bestowed upon generous 
campaign donors fifteen of the most prestigious embassies, 
with Paris and London heading the list for $300,000 and 
$254,000 respectively. Under Nixon, the "price" for even 
the less esteemed missions appeared to run to five figures, 
prompting The New York Times to declare that "every
of the statistical calculations can be traced from a careful 
reading of the appendices to this thesis.
71For examples, see Ferrell, American Diplomacy, 3-14.
four years" the United States "auctions off its embassies
in Western Europe and in a few other agreeable areas to
72the highest bidders."
FDR was no exception. He employed the spoils system 
pervasively in selecting diplomatic envoys. While foreign 
affairs commanded little of his attention during his first 
administration, he fully recognized the relationship 
between ambassadorships and domestic politics. To reward 
loyal followers with glamorous foreign posts was to retain 
loyalty to his domestic programs and to himself.
In 1936 Roosevelt asked many of his ambassadors— all
.loyal and deserving Democrats— to return to the United States
to assist him in his reelection campaign. Ironically, nearly
all of them had come to regard their diplomatic assignments
more seriously than did the President. "I think you ought
to consider," one politically-appointed ambassador wrote,
much to Roosevelt's chagrin, "the... political effect...of
letting a number of men from key posts in Europe return
to participate in political activities during a period"
73that "is more dangerous than any since 1918."
72April 4, 1973, A42.
73Breckinrxdge Long to FDR, March 13, 1936, Nixon, FDR 
and Foreign Affairs, III, 254-255. See also FDR to Lincoln 
MacVeagh, May 23, 1936, Roosevelt, His Personal Letters, 192 8- 
1945, I, 5 92; Grenville T. Emmett to FDR, February 26, 1936, 
Jesse Isidor Straus to FDR, May 1936, Robert W. Bingham to 
FDR, September 2, 1936, Claude Bowers to FDR, October 29, 1936,
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Nevertheless, the practice of conferring celebrated 
missions upon political loyalists remained intact.
Roosevelt also recognized the distinction between the 
prestigious and the dreary diplomatic posts. Beneficient 
campaign contributors often balk at accepting appointment 
to missions outside of Western Europe and Scandinavia. 
Consequently, a president can employ the less desirable 
assignments— in Latin America and Eastern Europe, for 
example— for other purposes.
Again President Roosevelt proved to be no exception. 
Sometimes he was ingenious. In the autumn of 1934, for 
example, Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes complained to 
Roosevelt about a politically-appointed official in his 
department who had become particularly troublesome. In­
clined not to offend anyone— FDR rarely could dismiss any­
body outright— the president wrote to Hull in a "private 
and confidential" memorandum: "Do you think it would be a
terrible thing to send this man as Minister either to
74Ireland or Albania? I really think we should help Ickes."
Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, III, 218, 300, 412, 464; 
Claude Bowers, My Life: The Memoirs of Claude Bowers (n .Y.:
Simon and Schuster, 1962), 289-290; William E. Dodd, Jr., 
and Martha Dodd, eds., Ambassador Dodd's Diary, 1933-1938 
(N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace, 1941), 309.
"^October 8, 19 34, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, II, 
230. Hull's reply is not recorded in the public documents.
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That career diplomats received a predominant share
of the Latin American missions thus foretold no great
departure from past practice. Much has changed since the
New Deal in regard to the status and amenities associated
with United States diplomatic missions throughout the world.
During the 1930s and before, however, Foreign Service
officers regarded, with some justification, Latin America
75as "the graveyard of American diplomats." Most Latin 
American posts then were unhealthy, desolate, and poor, 
lacking in comfort and prestige.
Hugh Gibson aptly summarized the low esteem in which 
diplomats held Latin American posts. A distinguished 
career diplomat, Gibson had received the ambassadorship to 
Belgium under Coolidge in 1927. Hoover had retained him 
there. Upon his transfer to Brazil by FDR in 1933, he wrote 
a friend:
It's dreadful how the sins of your youth 
come home to roost. All my life I've 
preached to the other [career] boys 
that when they were honored with an 
appointment to Latin America they must 
dash away with courage high and hearts 
aglow...and when I was offered Rio I took 
one big gulp and sent off a telegram of
75Beaulac, Career Ambassador, 135. According to 
Schulzinger, the Foreign Service Personnel Board 
relegated the poorer diplomats to Latin America in the 
1920s. Diplomatic Mind, 95, 113.
-177-
. 76appreciation.
However the diplomats felt about Latin American posts, 
they were often the only ones "available" for those who 
aspired to chief-of-mission status.
Roosevelt differed little from his predecessors in 
sending the career diplomats to Latin America. Fourteen of 
the 24 career chiefs-of-mission under the New Deal in 19 33 
were in Latin America, while 15 of the 25 career chiefs 
under Hoover in 1932 were similarly ensconced.
The Republican administrations of the 192 0s, however,
had improved considerably upon the performance of their
predecessors in appointing career diplomats as chiefs-of-
mission. Hoover, for instance, announced prior to his
inauguration that he believed career diplomats were
77preferable to amateurs. Although he selected his share
of worthy politicos, he did appoint career diplomats to
78Belgium, Italy, Norway and Poland. By comparison, the 
proportionate rise in the number of career diplomats
76Gibson to William R. Castle, May 11, 1933, Galpin, 
Hugh Gibson, 54.
77Herbert Hoover, Memoirs of Herbert Hoover (3 vols.. 
London: Hollis and Carter, 1952), II, 332. See also
Kottman, "Hoover and Diplomatic Assignments," 296.
^United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1973, 12, 83, 
115, 124.
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selected to head missions in the 1920s was not sustained in 
the 1930s.
Throughout the process of appointments Roosevelt 
assumed a characteristic posture. He retained the final 
authority over all nominations, while playing the role of 
mediator between the old-boy network and the ward-heelers.
He allowed both factions to compete for his favor and to 
believe that they each commanded his bidding.
Aware that career diplomats received nearly 50 percent
of the diplomatic posts in 1933, Joseph C. Grew, a first-
generation professional diplomat, expressed great enthusiasm
for the President: "Isn't it fine the way the President is
supporting the career diplomats? Some day that will cease to
7 9be a term of opprobrium in the United States." Stationed 
in Japan, Grew was neither privy to the machinations 
surrounding the appointments nor totally accurate in his 
reflections.
One close observer of the process more accurately 
reflected the President's manner in steering a course 
between the proponents of patronage and career appointments. 
Caroline Phillips, the wife of the Undersecretary, confided 
to her diary in 1933:
79Grew to Norman Armour, September 11, 1933,
Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 362.
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Franklin R. is rather ruthless and thinks 
only of handing out diplomatic plums to 
some of the many hungry Democrats just to _ 
be relieved from their ceaseless clamoring.
Mrs. Phillips' statement also expressed her husband's
frustration in not being able to secure more favorable
posts for his colleagues.
The success of Undersecretary Phillips in protecting
the interests of his colleagues during FDR's first term
was indisputable, nevertheless. Only seven of the 25
career diplomats serving as chiefs-of-mission under Hoover
failed to receive appointments under FDR: five of the
seven voluntarily resigned or retired; another became an
assistant secretary of state, while a cloud enveloped the
81removal of only one. Moreover, seven diplomats, four of 
whom had prior experience in the consular branch of the 
Service, received their first ministerial post between 1933
on Diary entry, April 9, 1933, Weil, Pretty 
Good Club, 71.
81Robert Woods Bliss, Edwin V. Morgan, Charles C. 
Eberhardt, John W. Garrett, and Irwin B. Laughlin retired 
or resigned. Jefferson Caffrey became an assistant secretary 
of state. Why F. Lamont Belin left is unclear; the Senate 
failed to confirm his appointment under Hoover in 1932 to a 
different post, after which information is sketchy. State 
Department Biographic Register, 1933-1934, 124, 127, 16 3,
174, 205, 225.
Whether these officers retired voluntarily is 
also unclear. FDR did force out several State Department 
officials, including William R. Castle, a man much respected 
by the career diplomats, who was a close friend of Hoover's.
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and 1936. Of the 18 "Hooverite" professional chiefs who 
survived the anticipated purge, 12 were retained initially 
in the same post in which they served Hoover, while the 
other six received different chief-of-mission assignments. 
Finally, all but two members of the old-boy network survived
o othrough 1936. Upon their own turf, the old-boy network—  
buttressed by the homework of Phillips, Carr and Hull—  
proved difficult to dislodge.
VII
Sumner Welles performed equally well in securing 
appointments for the career diplomats during FDR's second 
term. As assistant secretary of state for Latin American 
affairs from 1933 to 1937, he assisted Phillips in procur­
ing suitable appointments for Foreign Service officers,
8 3especially to the more desirable posts in Latin America.
As undersecretary of state, a position he held from 1937 to 
1943, Welles continually urged upon the President the appoint-
8 2Sheldon Whitehouse resigned on December 8, 1933,soon 
after being transferred to Columbia. Francis White retired 
on November 30, 1933, . 5. months after being transferred 
from Latin America to Czechoslovakia. White, in particular, 
was dissatisfied; he knew little about Eastern Europe, but 
was considered an expert on Latin America.
83For example, see FDR to Hull, October 29, 1934, Nixon, 
FDR and Foreign Affairs, II, 248. FDR begins: "I enclose
suggestions made by Sumner Welles for Diplomatic transfers."
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men t of career officers as chiefs-of-mission. He also 
embarked upon a campaign to raise the status of the American 
missions in Latin America— fourteen of which were legations in 
1933— to embassies, a step in image building warranted, in 
part, by the Good Neighbor policy. By 1943 all United
84States missions in the Southern Hemisphere were embassies.
Insiders dubbed the men elevated from ministers to ambassa-
85dors in Latin America "Sumner's shambassadors."
Welles championed the cause of the career diplomats 
in the press as well. He maintained a close relationship 
with syndicated columnist Drew Pearson, and he occasionally 
consented to interviews with sympathetic journalists.
In an interview with a former State Department official 
that appeared in The New York Times on August 22, 193 7, 
Welles remarked:
84Nine of the legations were raised to embassy status 
between 1941 and 1943. United States Chiefs of Mission, 
1778-1973, passim. Some authors imply that all of the Latin 
American posts became embassies in the 1930s. See Etzold, 
Conduct of Policy, 88-89;. Robert Freeman Smith, "The Good 
Neighbor Policy: The Liberal Paradox in United States
Relations With Latin America," in Leonard P. Liggio and 
James T. Martin, eds., Watershed of Empire: Essays on New
Deal Foreign Policy (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, Pub­
lisher, 1976), 70. That most of the legations became 
embassies after the beginning of World War II suggests 
that the exigencies of the war and America's relations 
with Latin America,more than the Good Neighbor policy, 
incited the changes.
85Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 89.
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There is not: much use in the government's 
spending money on a career service unless 
the best men get a chance to serve in the 
best posts. The President supports this 
policy. 86
More than FDR's "policy,” Welles' statement reflected his 
own efforts. Although career officers received appointments 
to the important embassies in Rome and Berlin in 193.6 and 
19 38, respectively, few other advances in the career 
position occurred during Roosevelt's second term.
The relative position of the career diplomats remained 
unchanged from FDR's first, term. Of the 25 incumbent career 
chiefs as of July 1, 1936, nine resigned or retired prior 
to the Nazi invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939. An 
equal number— six of whom had served in the consular branch- 
received their first chief-of-mission posts during the same 
period. Thirteen of the remaining 16 served in more than 
one capital. Only three— Joseph brew in Japan, Nelson T. 
Johnson in China, and William Phijllips in Italy— served 
the entire 30 months of! FDR's second term prior to World War
I ■ III in the same country./ However, the number of career offi-
/ ' 87cers in chief-of-mission positions— 25-— remained the same.
86 .Weii, Pretty Good Club, 130.
8 7Ilchman contends that in FDR's second term "the 
career position was advanced." Professional Diplomacy, 213.
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VIII
Given the circumstances, Phillips, Welles, and their 
associates proved capable of matching the acumen and zeal 
of the ward-heelers. Within the general boundaries of the 
most and least desirable missions available, the diplomats 
managed a semblance of control over appointments.
Within these confines, too, seniority and preference 
counted. Of the 42 individual career diplomats who received 
chief-of-mission appointments between 1933 and 1939, three 
had entered the diplomatic profession prior to 1900, 32 
had embarked upon a diplomatic career between 1900 and 1915, 
and seven had become diplomats between 1915 and 1920. For 
the most part, the senior diplomats— members of the old-boys 
club of the pre-Rogers Act era— received preferential consi­
deration in appointment to the few desirable posts "open" 
to the diplomats. At one time or another, for instance,
Hugh Gibson held the Belgian post, Hugh Wilson headed the 
embassies in Berlin and Berne, Leland Harrison also filled 
the Swiss post, and Phillips served in Rome. Twenty-two 
of the 42 career chiefs, moreover, had held one or more 
positions within the State Department— as assistant secre­
tary of state, as division chief, as a member of the Foreign 
Service Personnel Review Board— during the 1920s.
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Bureaucratic patronage operated upon the Foreign 
Service from within in much the same manner as political 
patronage operated upon it from without. In 196 9 Foreign 
Service officers listed three factors that they regarded 
as important to the advancement of their careers. These 
factors were, in order: (1) friends in the State Depart­
ment; (2) experience in Washington, D.C.; and (3) political 
8 8connections. While never so publicly blunt, their precur­
sors, the "founding fathers" of the Foreign Service, would 
have agreed.
Members of the old Consular Service, however, were 
neither overlooked nor ignored by their colleagues in the 
Department. Of the 42 career chiefs, 17f or 40 percent, 
had served in the old Consular Service. Another six chiefs 
had held consular positions for brief periods. Of the 16
officers elevated for the first time to chief-of-mission
1status, nine came from the consular branch of the Foreign1 JService. If hostility still prevailed between diplomats
8 8 ''Harr, Professional Diplomat,. 213.'In the fall of 1932, Hoover 'submitted a nurrber of nominations 
for chief-of-mission appointments, many of them career 
officers, to the Senate for confirmation. The Senate 
refused to confirm them, preferring instead to await the 
outcome of the November election. This may have been an 
attempt by Hoover, perhaps in cooperation with the career 
diplomats, to limit— or at least to make more difficult—  
FDR’s use of patronage to fill diplomatic posts. On 
Hoover's nominations and the Senate's refusal to confirm, 
see United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1973, passim.
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and consuls, it was not in evidence in chief-of-mission 
appointments.
The absence of post-Rogers Act diplomats on the 
list of career chiefs-of-mission conformed with the natural 
order of career advancement. Their absence alone revealed 
no antagonism or undue influence on the part of the senior 
diplomats. Generally, 15 to 2 0 years of experience was, and 
is, regarded as an appropriate apprenticeship prior to the 
attainment of the higher positions in the diplomatic pro­
fession, as it was, and is, in many other occupations. As 
of 1936, for example, diplomats who joined the Foreign 
Service between 1924 and 1927 were, on the average, 31 to 
35 years of age with between eight and 11 years of experience. 
The median age of the career chiefs-of-mission under FDR was
52.5 years. On the average, each possessed 23.5 years of
8 9diplomatic experience at the time of their appointment.
The achievement of the diplomats in retaining nearly 
half of the top positions abroad owed much to their persis­
tence and perspicacity. In openly supporting the appoint­
ment of diplomats, Secretary of State Hull established a 
positive climate within the Department, while Phillips and
89The medium and average statistics were calculated 
from information in the State Department Biographic Register, 
1933-1940. These statistics can also be calculated using 
the information in the appendices to this thesis.
Welles exerted their influence with the President. At 
the same time, the diplomats employed the techniques of the 
lobbyist, encouraging and cajoling their colleagues and
90sympathizers to speak and write to FDR on their behalf.
Carr's early preparation, too, was invaluable. The
list that he mainly devised and that Phillips used as a
guideline demonstrated prescience. By the end of 1933, for
instance, New Deal political appointees largely filled the
same posts that Hoover's political appointees had headed.
Career diplomats similarly received appointments to the
same missions. Only 17 of the 51 posts changed complexion-
from career-to-noncareer and vice-versa— from 1932 to 1934.
Even then the changes were almost evenly divided between
91amateurs and professionals. Although shifts in chiefs-of 
mission occurred frequently thereafter, the ratio of career 
to-noncareer appointments remained stable.
Precedent also contributed immensely to the relative 
success of the career diplomats. By 1932 they held 49 per-
90 For examples, see Weil, Pretty Good Club, 79-82; 
Phillips to FDR, April 8,. 1933, Ni xon, FDR and~Foreign 
Affairs, I, 50; Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 189^-190; 
Werking, Master Architects, 245; Kahn, China Hands, 136; 
Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 90, 284-286.
Nine were noncareer; 8 were career.
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cent of the legations and embassies. Whatever the public 
thought of professional diplomats, the practice of filling 
nearly all missions with patronage appointees had become 
less and less acceptable.
The practice of patronage, generally, had fallen into 
disrepute. The more the federal government intervened in 
the lives of its citizens— whether required or called upon 
to do so— the more the citizens and the press demanded,that 
government personnel be selected on the basis of "merit." 
Under the pressures applied by progressives and "good govern­
ment" \ types, merit system coverage of federal employment 
increased from 10 percent in 1884 to over 70 percent by the
Q ?end of World War I. In 1924 Congress placed all diplomatic 
positions below the rank of minister under merit coverage. 
Chiefs-of-mission, like cabinet officers, have never been
92Jay M. Shafritz, Public Personnel Management: The
Heritage of Civil Service Reform (n.y .: Praeger, 1975), 24. 
Shafritz notes: "American presidents during the reform 
period typically entered office taking full advantage of 
their patronage perogatives and left office with extensions 
of the merit system to their credit. This was the case from 
Arthur to Wilson*•• *lame duck presidents being succeeded by 
someone of a different party would 'blanket in' large 
numbers of employees in order to reduce the amount of pat­
ronage available to the opposition party... .civil service 
rules....made it easier for retiring American presidents... 
to extend the classified service to cover their party 
friends."
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included.^ They represent the ? resident. Nevertheless, 
the view that the highest diplomatic positions should be 
filled by men of experience and training gained currency 
during the 1920s as more and more career diplomats achieved 
chief-of-mission status.
The heyday of brazen spoils politics had passed by the 
time FDR became President. The open display of patronage 
dispensation by Jim Farley attested more to the strength of 
FDR's electoral mandate in 1933 than it presaged popular 
acceptance of a return to the spoils system of an earlier 
era. Moreover, Secretary Hull's recommendation to FDR to
o
divide the diplomatic appointments about equally between 
career and noncareer appointees revealed more than a fear 
of flagrant patronage: Hull's suggestion also reflected
the precedents established and followed during the 1920s. 
While less unfavorable publicity attended FDR's use of 
patronage than would later plague his successors, its use 
was no longer followed by general public acquiescence.
Roosevelt discovered as much soon after his inaugura­
tion. On March 29, 1933, George McAneny, president of the
93In 1955 Congress created the rank of Career Minister, 
thus providing some merit coverage protection to FSO's who 
became chiefs-of-mission. Whether this protection, like 
that afforded academics through tenure, is desirable is 
another matter altogether.
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National Civil Service Reform League (NCSRL) —  a citizens
organization comparable, in the context of its time, to
Common Cause of today— wrote FDR on behalf of the League.
McAneny enclosed a list of Foreign.Service career officers
94and urged FDR to retain them as chiefs-of-mxssxon.
Roosevelt responded circuitously. Faced with pressure
from an attentive citizens group, his reply was also devious.
Thank you for your letter...with its 
memorandum. Some day I hope to have 
a chance to talk over the Foreign Ser­
vice with you. May I suggest that as
one who helped in getting the 'career
service' established, I am anxious that 
it be maintained— nevertheless, the 
situation is not so delightfully simple, 
so far as merit and good government areconcerned, as the memorandum suggests 1^5
Since 1908 FDR, himself, had belonged to the League and its
predecessors. He may have offered more support for the
creation of a "career service" than the average League
member, who probably limited his support to writing a letter
96to his congressman. If so, the record is strangely sxlent.
94Notation in Nixon, FDR and Forexgn Affaxrs, I, 40.
95FDR to McAneny, Aprxl 4, 1933, Nxxon, FDR and Forexgn 
Affairs, I, 40.
96 . .For xnstance, there xs no mentxon of the Forexgn
Service or of professional diplomacy in Elliott Roosevelt, 
ed., FDR: His Personal Letters, 1905-1928 (2 vols.; N.Y.:
Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948). Nor are there any such 
letters during the years 1928-1933 in the third volume of 
E. Roosevelt's series.
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Roosevelt was cognizant, in any event, of the power of 
precedent. To ignore it would be to risk at least a modicum 
of public disfavor as well as to court accusations that he 
had failed to abide by the standards set in motion by his. 
cousin, Theodore Roosevelt, thirty years earlier. During his 
press conference of July 12, 1933, FDR indirectly acknowled­
ged the presence of precedent. Career diplomats, as well as 
deserving Democrats, he said, would receive consideration 
for chief-of-mission assignments.
He then offered to elaborate. With perhaps the 
Carr-Phillips list or the NCSRL list sketched in his mind, 
he remarked:
As a matter of fact, on the total thing 
we filled quite a lot of places and there 
are still quite a number going to be changed..., 
there are quite a number of posts where the 
individual who happens to be there, irrespec­
tive of whether he is a political appointee, 
is doing special work and I may want to keep 
him on to finish up the special work. There 
are half a dozen cases of that kind and, of 
course, those political appointees will be re­
placed in time. I think I told Bill Phillips 
to go ahead and make three or four changes.
If there is some political appointee carry­
ing on special business..., I may want to 
keep him on until possibly the fall and, when 
he goes out, I may move a career diplomat from 
some other place into his place....it means 
that his place will be filled either by a 
career diplomat, or by a political appointee.
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Roosevelt concluded that "it would take me probably the
balance of the year to get the diplomatic posts more or
97less permanently straightened out."
IX
FDR never succeeded in "permanently" straightening 
out the diplomatic assignments. Numerous influences, 
including his personal predilections, the demands and the 
choices of political contributors, and the preferences of 
the career diplomats kept him busy shifting and shuffling 
chiefs-of-mission in almost spasmodic fashion.
Roosevelt played a variation of musical chairs with 
United States legations and embassies. In seven years, 
from 1933-1939, he presented 132 chief-of-mission nomina­
tions to the Senate for confirmation, 75 during his first 
term and 67 during the first three years of his second. 
Although great variations occurred in the length of each 
appointee's tour, the average time spent in any single post 
by a chief-of-mission amounted to 2.5 years. A total of 84 
individuals, 42 amateurs and 42 professionals, served in 
chief-of-mission posts. Of the career diplomats, 22 
served in only one post, 15 served in two posts, three in 
three posts, and two in four posts. Of the amateurs, 2.6
97Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 301.
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served in one mission, 11 in two missions, and five in 
three missions. Stated differently, 23 of the posts 
changed chiefs twice, 18 posts experienced a change in 
command three times, and six posts had four chiefs-of- 
mission. In only six, or 10.5 percent of the missions,
98did a single chief-of-mission serve the entire seven years. 
One well-travelled amateur chief thought that FDR had 
"borrowed [his appointment procedure] more or less from the 
football field.
The process of appointing chiefs-of-mission basically 
bored Roosevelt. He focused his efforts on controlling 
the effects of the Depression. If and when foreign affairs 
demanded his attention, he could, he believed, employ his 
own diplomatic abilities to lead the nation. Others would 
follow. If necessary, American technology— navy ships, 
planes, lend-lease— might have to be used.'*'^ Except as 
rewards to loyal supporters, a retinue of ambassadors
9 8Those missions were China, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, 
Japan and Mexico. Amateurs headed all but China and Japan.
99stackman, "New Deal Diplomat," 46.
^^Until at least the fall of 1941, FDR believed that, 
if his personal diplomacy failed, American technology could 
render all necessary assistance to American allies in their 
battles against fascism. See Dallek, Roosevelt and American 
Foreign Policy, 138.
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and ministers was of little value to FDR. For the most 
part, the appointment of envoys was a necessary chore.
Sometimes, however, the chore appeared to be more
trouble than it was worth. Secretary of Interior Harold
Ickes, for instance, recounted a conversation he held with
Roosevelt on March 26, 19 37!
The President called me last night from 
Warm Springs.... The President said that 
he was spending a dull evening trying to 
shift a lot of ambassadors and ministers.
I told him that I had not supposed he 
had many vacancies to fill. He said that 
he hadn't but that many of those now 
occupying diplomatic posts wanted to be 
sent somewhere else. He didn't seem to 
find it even amusing.
Hesitant about firing anyone, particularly campaign
contributors, and unwilling to appoint a greater number
of career chiefs, Roosevelt preferred to steer a middle
course.
Roosevelt often steered his course, however, without
102benefit of compass and rudder. A close examination of
FDR's appointments— who they were and how they came to 
occupy the diplomatic missions— reveals neither a well- 
defined purpose nor an underlying pattern in the selection 
of the nation's principal representatives overseas.
‘*'̂ '*'Diary entry, Secret Diaries, II, 102.
102 . , ,Frerdel contends otherwise. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
IV, 357.
[FPR] chopped fcoh amba&&adon.&, 
It seemed, Itkz a houAmt&z 
zkoottng among apptzi ovzn, thz 
tztzphonz. 1 
John Gunther
5 THE CHIEF-OF-MISSION APPOINTMENTS:
DESERVING DEMOCRATS AND CAREER DIPLOMATS
No clear design or systematic search for talent guided
FDR in the appointive process. Reflective of his enigmatic
administrative methods, Roosevelt left the appointment of
chiefs-of-mission exposed to shifts in the wind of circum-
2stances and the gusts of personalities. Happenstance and 
chance occurrence often were as decisive as any other influ­
ence in determining who occupied which diplomatic post when.
Roosevelt in Retrospect, 128.
2Herbert Fexs states about policy making under the New 
Deal that "the flexibility of procedure they [FDR and Moley] 
preferred left the formulation of our policies more exposed 
to temporary shifts in the wind of circumstances and the gusts 
of personalities." Characters in Crisis, 111-112.Some historians contend that i'UK gave great care arid thought
to the selection of his top administrative officials, includ­
ing his chiefs-of-mission. Most prominent among those histor­
ians is Frank Freidel who states that the selection of FDR's 
chiefs "was a task of large purport....They must be both loyal 
and competent, yet their appointments must enable Roosevelt 
to repay some of his political debts....while Roosevelt 
measured candidates by standards of idealism in part, he 
acted even more on the basis of common sense.... Roosevelt1 s 
appointments demonstrated that he basically favored inter­
national cooperation....In his political appointments,
Roosevelt sent distinguished men'to the' more important posts." 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 137, 359-360.
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Spoils politics and a score of factors unrelated to 
foreign affairs determined the selection of most of FDR's 
amateur chiefs-of-mission. Roosevelt rarely considered or 
attempted to predict the future performance of those amateurs 
whom he annointed with diplomatic appointments. For the 
amateur candidate who possessed the appropriate political 
credentials, the lack of any special diplomatic qualification 
posed no barrier.
Beyond employing chief-of-mission appointments as a 
patronage vehicle, FDR demonstrated little interest in the 
selection of United States envoys. In appointing career diplo­
mats to a number of ambassadorial and ministerial posts, 
Roosevelt generally relied upon the advice of his chiefs in 
the State Department, principally Secretary Hull and Under­
secretaries Phillips and Welles.
Within the State Department, bureaucratic politics— in 
the cloak of the old-boy network— influenced the selection of 
many a career chief-of-mission appointee. More obscure from 
public view and slightly less insidious than political pat­
ronage, bureaucratic politics differed from spoils politics 
primarily in its inherent outcome. Those who achieved chief- 
of-mission status through bureaucratic politics possessed—  
by virtue of their positions as career Foreign Service offi­
cers— experience and training in foreign affairs that most 
amateurs lacked.
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Like many other processes peculiar to politics, the 
appointment of chiefs-of-mission under FDR was systematic 
only as to fundamentals. As often as not, a host of influ­
ences, none easily charted, dictated the results of the 
appointive process.- Neither political patronage in the case 
of the amateur appointees nor merit, strictly defined, in the 
case of the career appointees was necessarily the first or 
only criterion in appointments.
Nor was President Roosevelt necessarily unique in his 
approach to appointments. Few presidential administrations 
have employed systematic strategies in the selection of 
chiefs-of-mission. If anything, the story of FDR's appoint­
ments reflects a model— a model of the use of spoils, of the 
haphazard and diffuse influences that govern the process, of 
the "subtle intricacies and...windfall patterns of the 
appointive process."'*
3Appointments to the Regulatory Agencies, 375. Commis­
si oned'TyHEhe-uTsT-Senate~Trr-TT76^ this is the best single 
study available on presidential appointments to major federal 
positions.No’single study exists on the appointment of chiefs-of- 
mission. But, examples abound, scattered throughout a number of 
publications, of the unsystematic and haphazard manner in 
which presidents have chosen individuals to represent the 
U.S. abroad. For examples, see Etzold, Conduct of Diplomacy, 
19-20; Werking, Master Architects, 10-11; Melosi, "Amateur 
Diplomats During the Administrations of Woodrow Wilson," pas­
sim; Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the
Fall of New York (N.Y~ Random House, 1975), 787; Ferrell, 
American Diplomacy, 13; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Robert 
Kennedy and His Times (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,. 1978), 4 38;
"Ex-Nixon Lawyer Pleads Guilty to 2 Political Fund Charges,"
-197-
Typical of the consideration Roosevelt accorded many
political appointments was his selection of Robert W. Bingham
4for the prominent London embassy in 1933. Colonel Edward M. 
House had recommended Bingham, a millionaire Louisville news­
paper publisher, for secretary of state. Roosevelt, however, 
was personally unfamiliar with Bingham. In eliminating him 
from consideration for the top post in the Department of 
State, FDR told Moley that "frankly...he knew little or 
nothing" about Bingham "except the facts" of his liberal 
journalism and his substantial campaign contributions. Moley 
thought, nevertheless, "that Bingham's very obscurity, so far 
as national politics was concerned, intrigued" Roosevelt.
The President "spoke laughingly of the 'stiff dose for the
\international bankers' Bingham's appointment" as secrjetary
5of state "would be."
In appointing Bingham to London, perhaps FDR ha^ in mind
I f
Great Falls Tribune [Montana] , February 26, 1974, 1; "Auction," 
The New York Times, April 24, 1973, 42; Roger Morris, "Diplo­
matic Spoils," Harper1s, 25 7 (November 1978), 69.
^The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography (N.Y.: 
James T. White, 1941), XXIX, 6; Arthur Krock, Memoirs: Six ty
Years on the Firing Line (N.Y.: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968), 46-
47.
5Moley, After Seven Years, 111-113. See also Freidel, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 144.
the "international bankers," whom he found less than enchant- 
ing. Bingham's two immediate predecessors to the Court of 
St. James's were Charles G. Dawes and Andrew W. Mellon— both 
well-known multimillionaire financiers selected by Hoover. 
That Bingham was one of the few newspaper publishers to sup­
port FDR's candidacy may also have influenced the President's 
decision. Roosevelt always was acutely sensitive to
7the press .
Bingham's principal qualification, nonetheless, was his 
high standing on the Preferred List. An original member of 
the "Roosevelt-Before-Chicago" or RBC group, Bingham had 
mailed a contribution of $1,000 to FDR on October 31, 1931, 
one of the earliest donations to the New York Governor's bid
Qfor the presidential nomination on the record. Bingham 
followed his early gesture of support with a more generous
C.For example, see Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV,
397; Elliott Roosevelt and James Brough, An Untold Story:
The Roosevelts of Hyde Park (N.Y.: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1973),
—
7On FDR and the press, see Richard W. Steele, "The 
Pulse of the People: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Gauging
of American Public Opinion," Journal of Contemporary History, 
9 (October 1974), 195-216, and "Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
His Foreign Policy Critics," Political’ Science Quarterly,
94 (Spring 1979), 15-32.
8Elliott A. Rosen, Hoover, Roosevelt and the Brain 
Trust: From Depression to New Deal (N.Y.: Columbia Univer­
sity Press, 1977), 23, 385 ftn. 19.
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qoffering of $15,000 in 1932. Bingham, thus, was available, 
and Roosevelt wanted to replace Hoover's ambassador to London 
as quickly as possible. The World Economic Conference was 
scheduled to convene in London in July, and the president 
wished to disassociate himself from his predecessor, symboli­
cally if not substantively.^
More perplexing was Roosevelt's appointment of Joseph P. 
Kennedy to succeed Bingham. Seriously ill, Bingham returned 
to the United States for treatment late in 1 9 3 7 . Bingham's 
resignation was imminent— he soon died— but not yet official 
when Kennedy began lobbying to replace him. Roosevelt,
9Overacker, "Campaign Funds," 782.
■^Early in March 1933, FDR penciled a note to Hull:
"How about inquiring if Judge Bingham will be acceptable as 
Ambassador to Great Britain? If OK I can appoint him at once 
& the quicker he goes over the better— don't you think so?" 
Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 360.Huir agreed. "H«- later, stated: "Daniel C. Roper [Secre­
tary of Commerce] and I had been interested in Bingham in 
view of his fine career generally and his great support of 
Roosevelt. I never knew whether our recommendation was the 
influence that tipped the scales for Bingham's appointment 
to London, or whether Mr. Roosevelt had made the decision on 
his own at the same time." Hull, Memoirs, I, 182.
^^During Bingham's tour, Norman Davis, one of FDR's early, 
official, roving ambassadors-at-large, conducted the major 
share of diplomacy with the British, leaving the Louisville 
publisher with only secondary diplomatic duties. For examples, 
see Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 105-106, 114-116, 130- 
131, 359, 372-38C.
At one point, Bingham had: had 337 days of home leave in 
less than three years. Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, III, 
569 ftn. 1. : :
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almost inadvertently, yielded to his blandishments.
Roosevelt personally disliked Kennedy. Only grudgingly 
had the president agreed to appoint him to a position in the 
administration in 1934. Kennedy, however, had contributed 
substantially in money and in time to Roosevelt's presidential 
campaign.
Kennedy was one of the few influential members of the
business community to actively support FDR's first bid for
the presidency. The son of an Irish-Catholic immigrant, born
and raised in Boston, Massachusetts, Kennedy pursued a
12spectacular career in the world of finance. By 1930 he 
had amassed a fortune of nearly $10,000,000. Nominally a 
conservative Democrat, he sided with Roosevelt in 1932 be­
cause he knew that Hoover would lose and that the New Deal 
would demand reform in the financial practices of Wall
Street. "It was," Kennedy said, "good politics to be on the
13side of the angels."
12For details on Kennedy's life and career, see Richard 
J. Whalen, The Founding Father; The Storv of Joseph P. Ken­
nedy (N.Y.: New American Library, 1964); David E. Koskoff,
.Joseph P. Kennedy: A Life and Times (Englewood Cliffs*
Prentice-Hall, 1974); Roger Bjerk, "Kennedy at the Court of 
St. James," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington State 
University, 1971); and Michael R. Beschloss, Kennedy and 
Roosevelt: The Uneasy Alliance (N..Y.: W.W. Norton, 1980).
In describing Kennedy's diplomatic appointment, each of these 
authors relies heavily upon Moley's recollections.
"^Whalen, Founding Father, 128-129, 137; Moley, First New Deal, 380-382.
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Kennedy expected a reward for his campaign efforts. He
had good reason. He contributed $25,000 directly to the
Roosevelt coffers, lent the Democratic party another $50,000,
and raised $100,000 more among his friends, many of them Wall
14Street financiers. In addition, the aggressive and shrewd
Irishman proved valuable in mollifying the fears of William
Randolph Hearst, the isolationist newspaper magnate, concern- .
ing FDR's alleged internationalism, and he helped persuade
Father Charles E. Coughlin, the Detroit radio priest, to
support the Roosevelt cause. For his endeavors, Kennedy
wanted and anticipated the position of secretary of the 
15treasury.
President Roosevelt, however, hesitated to admit Kennedy 
into the administration. He thought Kennedy too independent 
and too strong-minded. Kennedy, Roosevelt told Farley, could 
not have the treasury post because he "would want to run the
Treasury in his own way, contrary to my plans and views.
(
Whether Kennedy would receive any position in 19 33
14Whalen, Founding Father, 119; Beschloss, Uneasy Alli­
ance, 75.
15Whalen, Founding Father, 113-128; Beschloss, Uneasy 
Alliance, 70-78; Moley, First New Deal, 380-382.
16James A. Farley, Jim Farley's Story: The Roosevelt
Years (N.Y.: Whittlesey House, 1948), 115.
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appeared doubtful. Roosevelt's personal secretary and close
confidant, Louis McHenry Howe, detested Kennedy, as did the
President's wife, Eleanor. Together, they formed a formidable
wall between Kennedy and government service. For several
months following the inauguration, President Roosevelt com-
17municated only infrequently and informally with Kennedy.
The New Deal administration's neglect of him irritated 
Kennedy. He privately exchanged abuse of FDR with William 
Hearst, and he confided to Raymond Moley his amazement that 
he had ever supported the President. Still, a position in 
the upper echelon of government would help relieve the frus­
tration that Kennedy, the Irish immigrant, always felt at 
failing to be accepted as a social equal by the Boston 
Brahmins.
Kennedy continued to seek a position in the New Deal.
He requested Moley's assistance. He even offered to supple­
ment Moley's income so that the Assistant Secretary of State
could live in Washington in a manner more suitable to his 
18status.
17Whalen, Founding Father, 131.
18Moley, First New Deal, 381-382. Moley quickly adds 
that he did , not regard Kennedy's offer as a bribe. See 
also Whalen, Founding Father, 138-141? Beschloss, Uneasy Alliance, 79-88.
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Mo ley eventually secured Kennedy's entrance into the 
administration. Believing that Kennedy richly deserved a 
reward, Moley repeatedly reminded FDR of his "obligation" 
to the generous financier. Finally, in June 19 34, an oppor­
tunity to help Kennedy appeared. Moley "was able to override
19both the prejudice of Howe and the reluctance of Roosevelt." 
Kennedy became Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commis­
sion, a new agency created to oversee Wall Street operations.
Service as head of the SEC and, in 1936, as chairman of 
the United States Maritime Commission failed to satisfy Ken­
nedy's ambitions. He continued to hope for a cabinet post. 
Barring that, he sought a prestigious embassy. In 1936 he
again campaigned vigorously and contributed handsomely to
20Roosevelt's election.
A year later, when Bingham became incurably ill, Kennedy 
moved quickly to claim the London embassy. He bluntly in­
formed James Roosevelt, the President's eldest son whose 
friendship he had assiduously cultivated, that he wanted the 
London ambassadorship when Bingham died or resigned. James
"^Moley, First New Deal, 381-382, 519.
Of) Beschloss, Uneasy Alliance, 123-128.
Business support for FDR was less in 1936 than in 1932. 
Business campaign contributions to FDR's campaign, which 
were 25 percent of FDR's total in 1932, amounted to only 4 
percent in 1936. Kennedy was one of the few prominent busi­
nessmen who continued to support the President. Manchester, 
Glory and Dream, 139.
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prompt ly delivered the message to his father and personally 
endorsed Kennedy's candidacy.
President Roosevelt apparently consented to Kennedy's 
wishes without much thought. Besides, he had tired of Ken­
nedy. He considered him a "prima donna." He often complained 
to his associates that "the trouble with Kennedy is you always
have to hold his hand...he calls up and says he is hurt be-
21cause I have not seen him." Perhaps the thought flashed 
through FDR's mind that a Kennedy in London was preferable 
tp a Kennedy in Washington.
FDR soon had second thoughts. Liberals within the 
administration, having learned of Kennedy's pending appoint­
ment, urged the president to select someone else. They re­
garded the business tycoon as a rich man, untrained in diplo- 
1macy, who 
United States.!') a
j Roose
aspired to be the first Catholic President of the 
22
jfevelt momentarily yielded to the pressure. Employ­
ing James as an emissary, he suggested that Kennedy accept
21 .Diary entry, October 9, 1936, Ickes, Secret Diary, I, r 
692. See also, diary entry, April 13, 1935, Blum, Morgenthau 
Diaries, I, 241; Farley, Farley's Story, 198.  ..
22For instance, see diary entry, April 17, 19 38, Ickes, 
Secret Diary, II, 370, and Krock, Firing Line, 399.
Hull clearly indicates that Kennedy was not his choice. Hull, 
Memoirs, I, 200.
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the secretaryship of commerce instead of the ambassadorship.
Kennedy reacted angrily. "You know what Jimmy proposed!"
Kennedy exclaimed to New York Times columnist Arthur Krock.
"That instead of going to London, I become Secretary of
Commerce! Well, I’m not going to. FDR promised me London,
and I told Jimmy to tell his father that's the job, and the
23only one, I’ll accept."
James Roosevelt, in the meantime, authorized Krock to 
publish the fact of Kennedy's appointment. It was a big 
news story, for Kennedy was the first Roman Catholic chosen 
to represent the United States at the Court of St. James's. 
Kennedy was also Irish. Traditionally, presidents had ap­
pointed men of Anglo- Saxon ancestry and of Protestant faith 
to London.
The publication of Kennedy's appointment infuriated FDR.
Bingham had not yet resigned. When Bingham died shortly
afterwards, the President accused Krock of hastening his
24death by publishing the story of his replacement.
Roosevelt, nevertheless, commissioned Kennedy to succeed 
Bingham. His son, James, who made promises that seemed to
“̂ Krock, Firing Line, 333.
24Farley, Farley's Story, 126; Krock, Firing Line, 333.
have special authority but did not, had guaranteed Kennedy 
the London vacancy. Having given no prior consideration to 
Bingham's replacement, the president confirmed, without much 
reflection, his son's pledge.
Had FDR reflected upon his choice of Kennedy, he might 
have realized the inappropriateness of dispatching an Irish 
Catholic, who was also liberally profane, to London. Perhaps 
the very inappropriateness of Kennedy's appointment amused 
Roosevelt. The President was not above wagging the. British 
lion's tail.' That Kennedy was a Democrat and campaign con­
tributor should not have weighed heavily with FDR in 1937. 
Then, the theoretical maximum for any President was two terms. 
Unless FDR already contemplated a third term, Kennedy's sup­
port was not needed. The precise reasons, if any, for Ken-
25nedy's appointment remain securely buried.
25Kennedy's biographers offer an assortment of reasons 
for his appointment, most of which cite Kennedy's business 
and administrative qualifications.Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,.re­
corded in his diary on December 8, 1937, that FDR "considered 
Kennedy a very dangerous man and that he was going to send 
him to England as Ambassador with the distinct understanding 
that the appointment was only good for six months and that, 
furthermore, by giving him this appointment, any obligation 
he had to Kennedy was paid for." Beschloss, Uneasy Alliance, 
157. Kennedy remained in London for nearly 3 years, until 
October 1940. '
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The first envoy chosen for the historically important 
embassy in Paris possessed solid political credentials. The 
circumstances that compelled the designation of Jesse Isidor 
Straus, however, were accidental, if not fortuitous.
Straus fully anticipated a position in the New Deal 
administration, although not the Paris embassy. A lifelong 
friend of FDR's and president of Macy's department store, 
Straus had organized the Roosevelt Business and Professional
Men's League in 1932 and had contributed $10,000 to the Demo-
2 6cratic coffers. Through Louis Howe, Roosevelt had promised
Straus the secretaryship of the Department of Commerce, a
cabinet seat the department store executive coveted. His
uncle had held the same position in Theodore Roosevelt's
27administration.
The old Wilson wing of the Democratic party, however, 
wanted one of its own to receive the top post in the Commerce 
Department. They pressured Roosevelt to appoint Daniel C. 
Roper. Early in March 1933 Roosevelt succumbed.
Unfortunately, no one bothered to inform Straus of the 
change in FDR's intentions. When Henry Morgenthau, Sr., who
26Overacker, "Campaign Funds," 782.
27Alfred B. Rollins, Jr., Roosevelt and Howe (N.Y.: Al­
fred A. Knopf, 1962), 374-375; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hop­
kins, 32, 34.
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had been denied the chief post in the Department of Agricul­
ture, told Straus that he, too, would not be in the cabinet, 
Straus became irate. Upon learning of Morgenthau's unauthor­
ized communication and of Straus' resultant displeasure, 
Raymond Moley immediately informed Roosevelt.
The President in turn hastily phoned Straus. In an
effort to soothe his friend's vexation, Roosevelt offered
Straus the prestigious ambassadorship to France. Straus
hesitated for a few days, consulted with his family, and
2 8finally accepted the appointment.
The president's impulsive decision to appoint Straus to
Paris evidently confronted him with another embarrassing
situation. Reputedly, he had offered the Paris embassy to as
29many as two other aspirants. One of them-— William C. Bul­
litt— had hoped for the appointment and had received the 
recommendations of at least two of the President's friends.
Bullitt later contended that he withdrew his claim to the
30Pans mission so that Roosevelt could appoint Straus. How- 
2 8Moley, After Seven Years, 12 4-125, and First New Deal, 
73, 75, 271. See also Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 
145, 152-153.
29According to Louis B. Wehle, FDR had slated someone 
else for the Paris post as early as December 1932. Wehle, 
Hidden Threads, 119.
■^Colonel Edward M. House to Bullitt, February 23, 1933, 
Bullitt, For The President, 30-31. See also Farnsworth, Bul­
litt and the Soviet Union, 86-87. At a minimum, Howe appears
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eve r accurate Bullitt's contention, his worldly experience 
and friendship with FDR made him a likely successor to Paris 
when Straus died of cancer in 1936.
William C. Bullitt was no diplomatic neophyte. Although
technically not a career diplomat, he had experienced a wide
31and spectacular involvement in the diplomatic world. Born 
into a wealthy and prominent Philadelphia family in 1891, Bullitt 
was graduated from Yale, attended Harvard Law School, and 
traveled extensively in Europe as a correspondent for the 
Philadelphia Public Ledger.
Upon returning to the United States in 1916, the short, 
prematurely bald, and vivacious journalist met President 
Wilson's chief adviser, Colonel Edward House. Impressed with 
Bullitt's background and exploits, House secured him an 
appointment as a special assistant to Secretary of State 
Robert Lansing in 1917. Two years later Bullitt accompanied 
President Wilson to the Paris Peace Conference as chief of 
the American delegation's Division of Current Intelligence.
The Peace Conference proved to be a portentious diplo­
matic sojourn for Bullitt. In February 1919 President Wilson 
sent him on an "unofficial," secret mission to Moscow to
to have led Bullitt to believe that he would receive the 
Paris embassy.
31For details on Bullitt's career, see Farnsworth, Bul­
litt and Soviet Union.
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determine the conditions under which the Bolsheviks would 
negotiate peace. Three weeks later Bullitt returned to 
Paris with what he believed was a realistic Soviet proposal 
for peace. He had negotiated directly with Valdimir Lenin 
and Leon Trotsky. For reasons still obscure, Wilson declined 
to receive his secret emissary, and David Lloyd George, the 
British Prime Minister, publicly repudiated Bullitt. Bitter 
and disillusioned, Bullitt resigned from the American peace 
delegation.
Bullitt's pique toward Wilson knew few bounds. Since 
the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in 1917, he had fol­
lowed closely the activities of the Bolsheviks. Idealistic 
and intensely romantic, he pictured the Bolshevik movement 
as the vanguard of world liberalism. He envisioned the Soviet 
as a "brotherhood, a spiritual conversion, indeed a state of 
grace." Bullitt concluded that Wilson had failed to under­
stand his own pronouncement that Russia was "the acid test"
32of the good will of the allies. He believed that the fail­
ure of the allies to reach a modus Vivendi with the Bolsheviks 
planted the seeds of international chaos and doomed the League 
of Nations to failure.
32Ibid., 12-14. Farnsworth states that Bullitt's report 
on the Bolsheviks "was the product of a one-week sojourn and 
a preconceived belief that what he would see, he would like." 
She also quotes the reaction of the British diplomat-histor- 
ian Harold Nicolson to Bullitt's trip and report. He said:
"I blink politely." Ibid., 44-46, 51, 54-55.
Bullitt decided to publicly castigate Wilson and the 
League of Nations. In the fall of 1919 he appeared before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by the Re­
publican Senator from Massachusetts, Henry Cabot Lodge. 
Bullitt's testimony proved valuable to Lodge, a critic of 
Wilson, in his efforts to discredit the President, the Treaty 
of Versailles, and the League.
Bullitt's act of indiscretion also proved to be his 
nemesis. Like many figures in classical antiquity, Bullitt 
had tempted fate without thought of the consequence of his 
action. Whatever his .motivations, he succeeded in his 
appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 
destroying a favorable impression he had created while work­
ing in the State Department. Many Democrats swore never to 
forgive Bill Bullitt.
Retiring to Europe in 1920, Bullitt'planned to 
loaf and watch the world fail apart. He resumed the 
life of a dilettante, traveled extensively, married the widow 
of the American Communist, John Reed, and collaborated with
Sigmund Freud on a critical psychoanalytical study of Woodrow
33Wilson. In addition, he remained abreast of foreign affairs 
and formed a wide circle of highly-placed friends.
33 Woodrow Wilson: A Psychological Study (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 196 7).
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Bullitt always hoped that his role in the events of 1919 
would be forgotten. With Republican domination of the White 
House obviously at an end in 1932, he yearned to reenter gov­
ernment service. In October one of Bullitt's friends, Louis 
B. Wehle, a prominent New York attorney and Harvard companion 
of Roosevelt's, arranged an interview for Bullitt with the 
Democratic presidential nominee.
Wehle judged that Bullitt and Roosevelt "immediately" 
became friends. He perceived that Bullitt shared a "temper- 
mental congentiality" with FDR. Like Roosevelt, Bullitt was 
charming, brilliant but erratic, boldly intuitional, and 
contemptuous of the traditional bureaucracy of foreign 
affairs-. ̂
Roosevelt, nevertheless, hesitated to include Bullitt in 
his coterie of official advisers. Following the November 
electjion, he had sent Bullitt to Europe on two "unofficial" 
fact-jfinding missions. Bullitt had indiscreetly informed a 
friend of his role as a secret emissary. The press had 
learned of Bullitt's trips and had reported them with ample, 
and in Roosevelt's eyes, undesirable publicity. Obviously 
irritated, FDR may have recalled Bullitt's earlier trans­
gression and suspected his reliability. Bullitt feared that
34
Wehle, Hidden Threads, 112-115; Farnsworth,
Bullitt and Soviet Union, 77-80.
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he had harmed irreparably his opportunity to obtain a diplo­
matic post. ̂
The man responsible for recruiting numerous New Dealers,
however, was "very favorably" impressed with Bullitt. Raymond
Moley found Bullitt interesting, well-informed, and anxious
to serve the New Deal. He thought Bullitt could "help infuse
36new life into the career service."
To secure an appointment for Bullitt, Moley had to over­
come the opposition of Undersecretary Phillips. Late in 
March, Moley prepared a memorandum concerning an appointment 
for Bullitt, which the President initialled. Thus armed, he 
"went to Phillips, who thereupon showed more emotion than I 
knew he was capable of." Phillips "bitterly reminded" Moley 
that Bullitt had been "disloyal" to the Wilson administration. 
Moley retorted that Wilson had wronged Bullitt. After further 
"customary tussles," Moley and Phillips agreed that Bullitt 
could be appointed as a special assistant to Secretary of
State Hull. Moley's office prepared Bullitt's commission,
37and on April 20 FDR signed it.
35Farnsworth, Bullitt and Soviet Union, 84-87. See also 
Bullitt to Governor Roosevelt, January 14, 1933, Bullitt, For 
T.he President, 24-25.
36Moley, After Seven Years, 102; Farnsworth, Bullitt and 
Soviet Union, 88.
37 ,Moley, After Seven Years, 102, 16 4.
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Phillips believed that Roosevelt allowed Bullitt into
the State Department in order to facilitate United States
recognition of the Soviet Union. Early in the spring of 1933,
the Eiresident had decided upon recognition. He may have re-
38called Bullitt's earlier enthusiasm for the Russians.
Roosevelt apparently regarded Bullitt as a likely pros­
pect for the Moscow embassy. As early as December 1932, FDR 
concurred with Louis Wehle that Bullitt would make a good
ambassador if and when the United States extended recognition
39 . . .to the Soviet Union. When recognition became imminent m
November 1933, Roosevelt sought and received Hull's approval
40to appoint Bullitt as ambassador to Soviet Russia. As if
to relieve any doubts, Roosevelt detained Phillips after 
signing the recognition documents on November 16 and asked 
the undersecretary his opinion of Bullitt. Phillips tact­
fully praised Bullitt's role in the recognition negotiations.^
38Farnsworth, Bullitt and Soviet Union, 88-89.
39Ibid., 107; Wehle, Hidden Threads, 119-120.
40Hull, Memoirs, I, 296, 302. others were not so approving. Wilbur Carr confided to his diary on Bullitt's appointment: 
"What a travesty and how extraordinary. But it means his de­
parture from the Dept, which will please Hull." Thomas R. 
Maddux, "American Relations with the Soviet Union, 1933-1941" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1969, 
84.
41Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy, 258.
The next day Roosevelt announced Bullitt's appointment as
42the first American ambassador to the U.S.S.R.
Bullitt seemed a logical choice. He had played a role 
in the negotiations that led to the resumption of U.S.- 
Russian relations. He was familiar with many of the Russian 
leaders and was well-regarded in Soviet circles. Maxim 
Litvinov, the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, who negotiated 
the recognition agreement for the Soviets, had expressed
4 3to Bullxtt xn June his wish that Bullitt would be chosen.
His appointment to Moscow surprised Bullitt. State
Department officials had discreetly groomed John V.A.
MacMurray for the Soviet post. They had engineered his
appointment as minister to the "Russian affiliations" of
Riga, Estonia, and Lithuania in April 1933, presumably
44the fxrst leg on his journey to Moscow. A respected career 
42Roosevelt Press Conference, November 17, 1933, Nixon, 
FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 494.
4 3Farnsworth, Bullitt and Soviet Union, 108-109.
44The New Dealers, 386.
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officer and former minister to China, MacMurray was well-
versed on the Far East, an area of major concern to the
45Soviets. On the other hand, Bullitt, whose knowledge of 
Western Europe was extensive, knew little or nothing about 
the Far East. He had hoped to be appointed to Paris, where 
he had friends in influential circles and where the social 
life was more palatable.
The Soviet assignment, nonetheless, delighted him. Four­
teen years earlier his government had repudiated his nego­
tiations with the Bolsheviks. Now that government had 
selected him as its chief agent to establish cordial relations 
with the Soviet Union. This ironic twist in events appealed 
to his romanticism, to his sense of diplomatic intrigue. For
Bullitt, his second sojourn to Moscow represented a special
46triumph.
Misunderstandings and personal differences, however, 
soon led to an annulment of Bullitt's honeymoon with Russia's 
leaders. He became a bitter critic of the Soviet regime.
His expectations of grandiose accomplishments eviscerated,
45See Thomas Buckley, "John Van Antwerp MacMurray: The
Diplomacy of an American Mandarin," in Richard Dean Burns and 
Edward M. Bennett, eds., Diplomats in Crisis: United States-
Chinese-Japanese' Relations, 1919-1941 (Santa Barbara: Clio
Press, 1974), 27-48.
46For example, see Bullxtt to FDR, January 1, 1934, 
Bullitt, For The President, 61-73.
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Bullitt decided late in 1935 that he would not remain in the
47Soviet Union much longer.
Once again Bullitt focused his ambitions upon the Paris 
embassy. In March 1936, Assistant Secretary of State R. Wal­
ton Moore told Bullitt that he had discussed with the Presi­
dent Bullitt's desire to become the ambassador to France.
Two weeks later, Moore inquired of Bullitt: "Veiy confidenti­
ally, of course, I wish to ask you whether you would care to 
go to Rome...with the prospect of going from there to Paris.... 
I think there is a probability of [Breckinridge] Long
4 8[ambassador to Italy], and a possibility of Straus retiring."
Bullitt replied to Moore that he preferred Paris 
"infinitely" to Rome.
Life in Italy would, of course, be extremely 
pleasant in contrast to the extremely unpleasant 
life here, and I should like the climate. But I 
do not feel that there would be any outlet for the 
energy which is, at the moment bursting within me....
Another consideration weighs heavily with me 
and is perhaps controlling: I want Anne [his daughter]
to have an American education and I want to be with 
her....I should not hesitate to take Anne to Paris 
where there are good American schools; but she 
could not find an American education in Rome and I
47R. Walton Moore to FDR, December 27, 1935, Nixon, FDR 
and Foreign Affairs, III, 143-144. See also Bullitt, For The 
President, 115-163.
48Bullitt, For The President, 157.
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am certain that she would not be happy thej|.
Paris, I should prefer infinitely to Rome.
He would wait until Paris became available. In the meantime,
he would return to the United States to campaign for FDR's
reelection.
Bullitt possessed more impressive credentials for the 
Paris ambassadorship than the usual amateur candidate. 
Although a consistently controversial figure, he was conver­
sant in German and French and, already in 1936, on intimate 
terms with several high-ranking French officials. Equally
important, he had developed a close relationship with the 
50President. Bullitt had only to wait until Straus resigned 
to realize his aspirations.
Without apparent reservation Roosevelt grafted Bullitt 
carte blanche to succeed Straus in Paris. On August 18, 1̂ 36, 
Straus tendered his resignation to the President. Straus 
had intended to retain the ambassadorship, but his physicijans 
ordered him "to have a complete rest for six months," and Ihe
believed it was "imperative to keep the Embassy Istaff at /its
51 'full complement." On August 25, Roosevelt accepted Straus'
4^Bullitt to Moore, April 8, 1936, ibid., 158E.
5 0Farnsworth, Bullitt and Soviet Union, 155-156.
51Straus to FDR, August 18, 1936, Nixon, FDR and Foreign 
Affairs, III, 389.
- 2 2 0-
resignation and announced Bullitt's appointment as the new
52ambassador to France.
On that same day Roosevelt also granted Joseph E. Davies 
his choice of available embassies. Davies chose to succeed 
Bullitt in Moscow. Unlike the license granted to Bullitt, 
however, Davies' contained no testimonials to diplomatic 
experience. His wife wanted to be an ambassadoress, and he 
had rendered valuable services to Roosevelt's campaigns. In 
sending Davies to Russia, FDR repaid a political debt.
Handsome and gregarious, Joseph Davies combined a suc­
cessful career as a businessman-lawyer with an active role
53in Democratic politics. Born m  Watertown, Wisconsin, 
he was graduated from the.University of Wisconsin Law 
School in 1901. Nine years later he became chairman of the 
Wisconsin Democratic Central Committee and, in 1912, he 
managed Woodrow Wilson's campaign in the midwestern states.
He then served as Wilson's commissioner of corporations and 
as the first chairman of the Federal Trade Commission. After 
failing in a bid for a United States senate seat in 1918,
52FDR to Straus, August 25, 1936, Roosevelt, His Personal 
Letters, 1928-1945, I, 60 9-610. See also Eagles, "Ambassador 
Davies," 80-81.
5 3On Davies' life and career, see Eagles, "Ambassador 
Davies," 1-25; "Ambassador Davies," Fortune, 16 (October 193^, 
94-98; Eugene Lyons, "Moscow Likes Millionaires, " Current His- 
tory, 44 (April 1937), 42-45; National Cyclopaedia of American 
Biography, C (1930), 456-457.
- 22 1-
Davies resumed his lucrative law practice.
Davies again entered the political arena in 1932 to 
campaign for Roosevelt. While serving in the Wilson admini­
stration, he had become an enthusiastic admirer of FDR.
Membership in the "Roosevelt-Before-Chicago" club
subsequently entitled Davies to a position in the New Deal
administration in 1933. He refused an appointment, however,
prompting FDR's secretary to send him an autographed photo:
"To Joe Davies, the wonder man, who didn't want a job— with
54tears of gratitude from Louis McHenry Howe." Approximately 
60 percent of Davies' fortune, estimated in the millions, 
had evaporated in the 1929 stock market crash, and he preferr­
ed to recoup his losses at law.
Three years later Davies' financial position changed 
considerably. In December 1935, his first wife divorced 
him. A few weeks later he married Marjorie Post Hutton, 
the wealthy General Foods heiress.
Davies now prepared to assume his place in the Roosevelt 
administration. As vice chairman of the Democratic National 
Committee, he worked vigorously during the 19 36 campaign. He 
and Mrs. Davies reportedly contributed $17,500 to the Roose-
54 .........Joseph E. Davies, Mission to Moscow (N.Y.: Simon and
Schuster, 1941), xi-xii.
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velt campaign chest.
During the campaign Washington buzzed with the rumor 
that Davies' wedding present to the new Mrs. Davies would be 
to make her an ambassadoress. It was. With Mrs. Davies 
aspiring to enter Washington political life, the earlier 
reluctance of Joe Davies to accept a political appointment 
vanished. At a dinner party in New York, he told Stephen 
Early, the President's press secretary, that an ambassador­
ship would be a suitable reward for a lifetime of Democratic 
56service.
Before the campaign ended Roosevelt casually permitted 
Davies to claim the Moscow embassy. On August 25, Steve 
Early summoned the fifty-seven year old attorney to the 
White House "to discuss" a diplomatic appointment with the 
President. During lunch, FDR asked Davies to name the 
embassy of his choice. Davies responded: "Either to Russia
or Germany." They were, in his opinion, "the two most 
dynamic spots in Europe." For many reasons, Davies continued, 
"neither. Mrs. Davies nor I would like to go to Paris." 
Roosevelt then said that he, himself, "would mighty well"
55
Bendiner, Riddle of the State Department, 133; W.M. 
Kiplinger, Washington Is Like That (N.Y.: Harper & Brothers,
1942), 261; Olive Ewing Clapper, Washington Tapestry (N.Y.: 
Whittlesey House, 1946), 79-85.
56Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 88-89.
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like to see Russia. He suggested that Davies proceed to
Moscow with the possibility of transferring to Berlin within 
57a year.
The announcement on November 16, 1936, of Davies' appoint­
ment created a furor in the liberal press. Several journal­
ists predicted that Davies— the president of Washington's 
swankiest country club, a millionaire corporation lawyer, 
and an avowed "capitalist"— would clash violently with the 
leaders of Soviet Russia. Mrs. Davies supplied further fuel 
to the journalistic outbursts when she commenced "the mission 
to Moscow" by carting along 30 trunks, 50 pieces of smaller
luggage, 6 personal servants, 2,000 frozen Birds Eye pints
58of cream, and 25 freezers. Her display of conspicuous
consumption also elicited a comment from a Soviet spokesman
in New York. "Contrary to popular belief," he stated, "there
59are cows m  Russia."
Davies candidly attributed his appointment to politics and
57Davies, Mission to Moscow, xi-xiii; Eagles, "Ambassador 
Davies," 91.
5 8Charles W. Thayer, Bears in the Caviar (Philadelphia: 
J.B. Lippincott, 1951), 94] Eagles,"Ambassador Davies," 92,
99.
59William Harlan Hale, "The Road to Yalta," in Oliver 
Jensen, ed., America and Russia: A Century and.a Half of
Dramatic Encounters (N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1962) , 23*3.
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to his friendship with the President. There was little else 
to recommend him. His background touched only the periphery 
of diplomatic experience. Except for a brief stint as an 
economic adviser to Wilson at Versailles in 1919, Davies could 
claim experience in international affairs only through his 
legal clientele. His clients had included the governments 
of Mexico, Peru, Chile and the Dominican Republic.
Davies, nevertheless, considered his legal work "a 
training ground for diplomacy." When queried about his 
qualifications as he and Marjorie embarked upon their voyage 
to Communist Russia, Davies replied: "I am a corporation
lawyer with a liberal outlook." Although he expected to be 
in Russia only a short time— FDR had persuaded him to look 
forward to the embassy in Berlin by the fall of 1937— he 
also expressed optimism about his ability to induce a thaw 
in the icy atmosphere that had marked United States-Soviet 
relations since 19 35.^
Roosevelt was less sanguine. He did not expect, in 
1936, a significant amelioration in relations with Russia.
He had appointed Davies to Moscow to honor a political debt. 
In announcing to his cabinet the appointment of Davies, the 
president— who "would mighty well" like to see Russia him­
self— laughingly remarked that "three or four months in
^Davies, Mission to Moscow, xi-xiii.
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Moscow would be all that Mr. and Mrs. Davies could stand
6 1in that country." When he suggested to Davies that he 
consider an early transfer to Berlin, where the incumbent 
ambassador was about to resign, FDR may have been thinking of 
his earlier difficulties in finding an envoy to serve in 
that post.
Filling the Berlin embassy in 19 33 posed special problems 
6 2for Roosevelt. Democratic campaign contributors evinced no 
interest in an appointment to Germany. The glamour of the 
Berlin mission had vanished with the ascent of the Nazis. In 
the course of three months, Roosevelt offered the German post 
to four men and considered at least five others before he 
appointed a southern historian with whom he was only vaguely 
familiar. None of the potential appointees was a professional
Diary entry, November 20, 1936, Ickes, Secret Diary,
II, 7.
6 2The best account of FDR's search for an envoy to Ger­
many is in Robert Dallek, Democrat and Diplomat: The Life of
William E. Dodd (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1968), 186-
195. See also Dallek, "Beyond Tradition: The Diplomatic
Careers of William E. Dodd and George S. Messersmith, 1933- 
1938," South Atlantic Quarterly, 66 (Spring 1967), 233-244; 
Arnold A. Offner, "William E. Dodd: Romantic Historian and
Diplomatic Cassandra," The Historian, 24 (August 1962), 451- 
469; F. Claybrook Lewis, "William E. Dodd, Democratic Diplo- 
mat," The John P. Branch Historical Papers of Randolph-Macon 
College, n.s., 2 (March 1953), 91-140; Franklin L. Ford, 
"Three Observers in Berlin: Rumbold, Dodd and Francois-Pon-
<jet," in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds., The Diplo­
mats, 1919-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1953), 437-47 6.
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diplomat.
The search for an ambassador to Nazi Germany began on 
March 9, five days after the inauguration. With the Berlin 
embassy, Roosevelt hoped to appease the demands of the con­
servative wing of the Democratic party for spoils. He first 
offered the embassy to James M. Cox, his presidential running-
mate in the 1920 election. Citing the obligations of his
6 3publishing business, Cox declined. FDR next approached
Owen D. Young, the millionaire founder of RCA and chairman of
64the board of General Electric, who also declined. He then 
considered Newton D. Baker, an eminent corporation lawyer, 
until Secretary of State Hull mentioned that the German gov­
ernment might refuse to accept Baker. Baker had served as 
Woodrow Wilson's secretary of war during World War 1.^
\ A
i Rooseveltf next concocted a clever patronage scheme.
With, one or two simple maneuvers, he would fill both the 
Berljin embassy and a U.S. senate vacancy. He would appoint 
Senator Roya]/ S. Copeland of New York, a Hearst prote*ger, to 
Germany; Governor Herbert Lehman of New York then would select
63 jDallek, Democrat and Diplomat, 187-188. See also FDR 
to Cox, March 9, 1933, Roosevelt, His Personal' Letters, 1928- 
1945, I, '337-338; Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs" I, 143 ftn. 1.
64Dallek, Democrat and Diplomat, 188.
6 5Ibid. See also FDR to Hull, April 20, 1933, Nixon,
FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 58.
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Edward J. Flynn, one of FDR's most trusted political advisers,
to replace Copeland in the Senate. As the President stated,
in unveiling his plan to Flynn:
He had not yet appointed an Ambassador to Germany 
....he had heard that Mrs. Copeland was rather 
'fed up' with the life in Washington and that she 
was very eager to have the Senator receive a major 
diplomatic appointment. If the German appointment 
were offered Senator Copeland, the President felt, 
he would most certainly accept it....This would 
create a vacancy in the Senate, and Governor Lehman 
...would have the power of appointment.
Flynn said he "should be happy to" accommodate the 
president. Copeland, too, agreed "to go along." He would 
accept the ambassadorship to Germany, subject to Roosevelt's 
stipulation that Lehman first guarantee Flynn's senate 
appointment.
The plot failed to materialize, however. Indeed, the 
plan almost rebounded to Roosevelt's detriment. Lehman felt 
obligated to obtain the approval of former New York Governor 
Alfred E. Smith on the senatorial appointment. Smith, who 
harbored great animosity toward Roosevelt, equivocated in 
sanctioning the nomination of Flynn. When Smith finally 
indicated that he wanted the Senate seat himself, FDR abruptly 
aborted his scheme. The President then "urged" Flynn "to go 
to Germany." After discussing the matter with his wife, Flynn, 
like the others before him, declined.^
66Flynn, You're The Boss, 146-148; Dallek, Democrat and 
Diplomat, 188-189.
-228-
When his patronage machinations failed to produce an 
ambassador to Germany Roosevelt directed his political 
advisers to find a candidate. In May, two of them, probably 
Louis Howe and Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,
submitted to the President the names of four liberal acade-
. . 67micians.
Obviously desperate, Roosevelt agreed to consider them.
On May 17, he asked Phillips and Hull what they knew of the
four individuals, three of whom were university presidents.
FDR added that he wanted a prompt reply. The next day
Phillips responded. Neither he nor Hull was personally
6 8familiar with the four candidates. Roosevelt, subsequently, 
offered the Berlin post to none of them.
Nearly three months had lapsed since the search for an 
ambassador to Germany began. On June 7, Roosevelt conveyed 
his frustration to a small group of advisers. He faced in-
The four candidates were: Ernest M. Hopkins, president
of Dartmouth College; Glenn Frank, president of the University 
of Wisconsin; William Mather Lewis, president of Lafayette 
College; and Harry Emerson Fosdick, a theologian.
68Phillips to FDR, May 18, 1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign 
Affairs, I, 142-143.
Why FDR failed to seek more information about;, or" to 
consider further, William Mather Lewis is puzzling. As Phil­
lips noted in his letter to FDR, Lewis was 5 3 years old, had 
studied in Germany prior to the World War, was reputedly a 
fine speaker and sound administrator, and was a wealthy Demo­
crat.
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creasing pressure to fill the Berlin embassy: Hoover's
ambassador to Germany, Frederic M. Sackett, had retired at 
the end of March; if the Senate adjourned prior to confirming 
a replacement, a new envoy would not receive a salary before 
the next session of Congress. The latter loomed as an impor­
tant consideration in finding someone willing to $rve in 
Berlin; several men of wealth had declined the nomination.
Nazi Germany, moreover, appeared hostile to the United States. 
An ambassador, Roosevelt concluded, had to be found soon.
Secretary of Commerce Daniel Roper immediately responded
to thePresident's expression of exasperation. "How about
William Dodd?" he asked. Dodd was a good friend of Roper's
and a fellow North Carolinian. His specialty was American
history, but he knew Germany well, having acquired a Ph.D.
from the University of Leipzig in 1898. "Dodd would be astute
in handling diplomatic duties," Roper told Roosevelt, "and
when conferences grew tense, he would turn the tide by quoting 
69Jefferson."
Roosevelt reacted enthusiastically to Roper's suggestion. 
Although he only knew Dodd vaguely, if at all, and was unfami­
liar with his reputation as an historian, FDR phoned him the
69Dallek, Democrat and Diplomat, 190. See also Daniel C. 
Roper, Fifty Years of Public Life [N.Y.: Greenwood Press,
1968), 334-335.
-230-
next day, June 8. "This is Franklin Roosevelt.... I want you
70to go to Germany as Ambassador."
Overwhelmed, Dodd requested time to contemplate the 
appointment. He also wanted to confer with officials at the 
University of Chicago, where he was a faculty member. The 
President replied: "Two hours, can you decide in that time?"
Roosevelt added that Dodd's "work as a liberal and as a 
scholar" were the main reasons for his "wishing to appoint" 
him. "I want an American liberal in Germany as a standing 
example....You may return [to the United States] in the 
winter of 1934, if the university insists."
Dodd's superiors at the university urged him to accept 
the appointment. Two-and-a-half hours later, on the after­
noon of June 8, Dodd returned the president's call and
71accepted the appointment. The quest for an envoy to Nazi 
Germany had ended.
The effort expended to find an ambassador to Germany 
hardly matched the insignificance that Roosevelt attached to
70Diary entry, June 8, 1933, Dodd, Dodd's Diary, 3.
~^Ibid., 4. See also Martha Dodd, Through Embassy Eyes 
(N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace, 1939), 10-11.
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72the Berlin post. The President initially sought to pacify 
the claims of conservative Democrats for patronage. He 
offered the post to Cox and to Young, and he considered Baker. 
None of them was close to him personally. Nor did FDR feel 
particularly indebted to them. Cox had supported Baker for 
the Democratic presidential nomination in 1932, while Young 
had remained neutral during the Chicago convention. Of all 
the candidates Roosevelt considered, only Flynn was a personal 
friend, and FDR offered him the post only after his plot to 
appoint Senator Copeland failed. Roosevelt had wanted to see 
Flynn in the &enate, not in the Berlin embassy.
Historian Frank Freidel unconvincingly argues other­
wise. About the Berlin post, he states: "For no other diplo­
matic appointment were so many candidates so carefully con­
sidered." Franklin D . Roosevelt, IV, 361. About the selection, 
FDR, himself^ publicly hailed Dodd's appointment to Berlin as 
the end of a careful search for just the right man. Dallek, 
Democrat and Diplomat, 190.
' Offner offers a slightly different assessment. He 
contends that FDR "delayed" his selection of an envoy to Ber­
lin because "he wanted to get a closer look at the activities 
of the new German government, and he regarded the Berlin post 
as of "special importance."" American Appeasement: United
States Foreign Policy and Germany, 1933-1938 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1969),54.
More accurate is Franklin L. Ford who suggested in 
1953 that FDR's precise reasons for appointing Dodd will 
never be known. "Three Observers in Berlin," 448.
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William E. Dodd became ambassador to Germany "by 
73default." Unable to dispose of Berlin as a patronage plum 
and anxious to appoint somebody, Roosevelt leaped at Roper's 
suggestion of Dodd. Yet, FDR hardly knew Dodd, and he was 
not especially fond of Roper, whom he had appointed secretary 
of commerce at the expense of his friend Jesse Straus. Be­
cause he nurtured a deep prejudice toward professional diplo­
mats, Roosevelt never considered a Foreign Service officer
74for Germany.
Amateur diplomats often are selected for reasons of 
politics. Dodd was a conspicuous exception. His forays into 
partisan politics had been brief and unobtrusive. He had 
participated actively in Woodrow Wilson's two presidential 
campaigns. In 1932 he had championed the nomination of \ 
Newton Baker and, after the convention, the election of FDR. 
During the Democratic hiatus of the 1920s, Dodd had immersed
himself in the study of the past. He was not, in 1933, well-‘/j
known politically, and his donation to the Roosevelt causje
75was a meager $25.
7 3Dallek, Democrat and Diplomat, 171, 195.
74Ibid., 195.
75 .Diary entry, November 25, 1935, Dodd, Dodd's Diary, 
278; Overacker, "Campaign Funds," 728.
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The historical past more than the political present had 
engaged Dodd's attention. In thirty years he had produced 
eight historical monographs, had edited six others, and had 
published scores of articles. From 1905 until his appoint­
ment to Berlin, Dodd had taught at the University of Chicago, 
where he had earned the respect of his colleagues for his
teaching ability and for his critical treatment of the weak-
76nesses and virtues of his native South.
Prominent in Dodd's works was an abiding faith in the
common man and in the ultimate righteousness of democracy.
To Dodd, Thomas Jefferson, with his "boundless faith in the
77masses," was the "greatest American idealist."
Dodd often looked nostalgically upon the rural simplicity 
of America's Jeffersonian past. He regarded the cities, 
such as Chicago, as "no suitable place for humans," and he 
once proposed, as the solution for the economic crises of the 
1930s, the transfer of millions of people from the industrial 
centers to the country. He appreciated, however, that it
76Wendell Homes Stephenson, "William E. Dodd: Historian
of Democracy," in Stephenson, The South Lives in History: 
Southern Historians and Their Legacy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1955), 28-57; Offner, American Appease­
ment, 56; Ford, "Three Observers in Berlin," 448.
77For instance, see William E. Dodd, Statesmen of the 
Old South (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1926), 55, 67, 82.
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would be "no easy job to transfer unwilling and miseducated
78city folk to small farms all about the country."
At the time of his appointment to Berlin, Dodd appeared 
destined to spend the remainder of his life in the quiet 
pursuit of historical truths. He had neither sought nor 
expected a major diplomatic assignment in the New Deal admini­
stration. He was sixty-three years old, near retirement from 
regular academic duties and had not spoken German on a 
consistent basis for thirty-five years. His colleagues had 
just bestowed upon him one of the highest honors of the 
history fraternity— the presidency of the American Historical
• 4. '  7 9Association.
Secretary of State Hull, moreover, expressed reservations 
about Dodd's appointment. Although Hull was well-acquainted 
with and fond of Dodd, he questioned his effectiveness. The 
Secretary feared that Dodd, who was outspoken in his inter­
nationalism, might "get out of bounds in his excess of enthu­
siasm and impetuosity and run off on tangents every now and
7 8Diary entry, October 24, 1917, W. Alexander Mabry, ed., 
"Professor William E. Dodd's Diary, 1916-1920," The John P . 
Branch Historical Papers of Randolph-Macon College, n.s., 2 
(March 1953), 49; Dodd to FDR, February 8, 1934, Nixon, FDR 
and Foreign Affairs, I, 637. See also Roper, Fifty Years,
335.
79Dodd, Through Embassy Eyes, 10-12; Dallek, Democrat 
and Diplomat, 194.
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80then, like our friend William Jennings Bryan."
Roosevelt ignored Hull's qualms. He submitted Dodd's
nomination to the Senate, and that august body dutifully and
unanimously confirmed the history professor's appointment on
June 13. In discussing the Berlin assignment with Dodd,
prior to the latter's embarkation for Germany on July 6,
Roosevelt encouraged the Jeffersonian-Democrat to believe
that his President wanted him to represent a "living sermon
81on democracy" to the Nazi "Hun."
With Dodd's departure, Roosevelt figured he had finally 
more or less permanently straightened out the Berlin 
appointment. It was not to be. More than any other diplo­
matic assignment, the Berlin post became— for Dodd, for the 
men subsequently offered it, for the man later appointed to 
it— a source of unfulfilled expectations, unforgivable 
effrontery, vindictiveness, personal tragedy, and cruel 
machinations. In the middle of the disorder and confusion 
stood Roosevelt, the ringmaster praised by some and maligned
80Hull, Memoirs, I, 182. To what extent Hull's qualms 
might have been the product of hindsight is uncertain.
^Dallek, "Beyond Tradition," 233-2 34. See also, Ford, 
"Three Observers in Berlin," 448; Dodd to FDR, October 13, 
1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 425.
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by others for his haphazard methods of administration. 
Throughout the course of events that enveloped the imbroglio 
over American representation in Berlin, Roosevelt chose the 
twisted path of uncertainty and appeasement over a course of 
decisiveness and compassion.
Within six months of his arrival in Berlin, Dodd's
ambassadorship ensued upon a downward spiral from which it
82never recovered. A passionate Democrat of guileless
character who embodied the virtues of rural simplicity that
had bound him to the teachings of Jefferson, Professor Dodd
quickly found the Nazis totally repugnant. Hitler "is such
a horror to me," Dodd remarked to British Ambassador Sir
Eric Phipps following the infamous Nazi Blood Purge of
83June 30, 1934, "I cannot endure his presence." From the 
outset of his appointment, Dodd had mounted the crucible of 
democracy against Nazi tyranny only to be met by protestations 
of helplessness from the State Department and by displays of 
mockery from German officialdom. Six times during his four- 
and-one-half year nightmare in Berlin, Dodd thought out loud 
about resigning. Each time he resisted the temptation, hoping
82Although Dodd's biographers interpret his performance 
differently, all agree that Nazi Germany exacted a heavy toll 
on him psychologically and physically.
8 3Diary entry, July 13, 1934, Dodd, Dodd's Diary, 126.
See also Dodd, Through Embassy Eyes, 14 8; Dallek, Democrat 
and Diplomat, 237.
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he could propel Germany— a country he loved— back on the 
road to democracy and decency. After 1935, however, he re­
fused to speak to any of the high Nazi officials. Despondent
84and broken, Dodd, nevertheless, was reluctant to leave.
Roosevelt should have encouraged Dodd to resign. He 
permitted him to remain, although he was fully aware of the 
deterioration in his ambassador's mental and physical well­
being. Instead, FDR quietly allowed it to be known in the 
autumn of 19 36 that the Berlin post soon would be vacated.
He convinced Davies, upon appointing him to Moscow in November,
that he would be transferred to Berlin before the following 
85September. About the same time, with Berlin in mind,
Ambassador Hugh Wilson in Switzerland wrote Hull to explain
that FDR personally had promised him one of the plum posts
86available to a career Foreign Service officer. By the 
spring of 19 37 the enchantment of Moscow had worn thin for 
the Davieses, especially Mrs. Davies. They began to look for­
ward to Berlin, the "nerve center" of Europe as Ambassador
84Dodd, Through Embassy Eyes, 351-352; Dallek, Democrat 
and Diplomat, 234, 254-255, 295; Offner, "Historian and 
Cassandra," 460.
8 5Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 96, 237.
86Ibid., 90.
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87Davies described it. In April Roosevelt set in motion 
arrangements to fulfill Davies' desire.
Roosevelt's intentions, remained unknown to Dodd. In 
August the Anbassador returned to the United States for 
consultations. A tacit understanding existed between Dodd 
and FDR that the former might elect to retire in the fall. 
However, Dodd easily persuaded Roosevelt to allow him to 
remain in Berlin indefinitely. Dodd hoped that FDR would 
agree to replace him with James T. Shotwell, a professor of
8 8history at Columbia University and a known internationalist. 
Hope sprang eternal in Dodd. They did not establish a firm 
date for Dodd's resignation.
A dilemma of Roosevelt's own making now presented itself. 
What could he do with Davies, who was then in Washington, 
about to leave on a tour of Europe, and who expected to 
receive the Berlin post upon the conclusion of his journey? 
Shortly before Davies' departure, Stephen Early, the Presi­
dent's press secretary, took Davies aside and explained to him 
that what he was about to say was not intended as a reflection
87Davies, Mission to Moscow, xii-xiii, and diary entry,
May 7, 1937, 142; Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 237.
8 8Diary entries, May 19, 1937, August 11, 1937, October 19, 
1937, Dodd, Dodd's Diary, 409, 426, 428-429. See also Dallek, 
Democrat and Diplomat, 308-309; Offner, American Appeasement, 
205.
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on FDR's character. A busy President, Early continued, might 
forget a promise to transfer a friend from one post to 
another unless he had committed it in writing. Berlin was
onno longer a certainty. ^
Davies remained confident, nevertheless. He assured 
Early that he believed the matter would be settled to every­
one's satisfaction once he returned to Washington from his
Q nEuropean trip.
Events and the President's personal predilections soon 
conspired to produce a situation which satisfied no one. The 
press denounced Davies' voyage with satirical articles about 
the "boondoggling" of "our freshman" envoy to Moscow.
Roosevelt reacted angrily: He insisted that Davies forget
\ *about returning to Washington, that he concentrate on his
. . i  9 1Moscow assignment until late fall.
'
iIn the meantime, the German government confidentially
informed thejNew Deal^administration that Ambassador Dodd 
would no longer be considered persona grata in Berlin. How­
ever morally correct, Dodd— who had not spoken with the Nazi
89Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 238-239
9 0Ibid., 239-240.
91Ibid., 238-240.
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leadership in twenty-one months— impetuously objected in
September to a State Department decision authorizing official
United States attendance at a forthcoming Nazi Party Nuremberg
rally. Dodd's strong letter of protest to Secretary Hull
appeared in the press, much to the Department's embarrassment
92and the Nazi government's anger.
At the same time, Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles
began maneuvering to install a career officer in Berlin. In
October Welles presented a list to Roosevelt of potential
successors to Dodd. Hugh Wilson's name headed the list.
93Davies' name was not on the list at all.
Roosevelt procrastinated for nearly a month. He evaded 
94action. Late m  September he had informed the German gov­
ernment that Dodd would be relinquishing his post before the 
end of the year. In early November he left Dodd with the 
distinct impression that the Ambassador would be allowed to
92 Dallek, Democrat and Diplomat, 313; Offner, American 
Appeasement, 208-209; diary entry, September 4, 1937, Dodd, 
Dodd's Diary, 427.
93Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 240-241. See also diary 
entry, November 22, 19 37, Berle, Navigating the Rapids, 148. 
Dodd reports that FDR told him that his eventual successor 
to Berlin would be either James T. Shotwell "or a service 
man, Hugh Wilson." Diary entry, October 19, 1937, Dodd,
Dodd's Diary, 428.
94Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 240.
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95remain in Berlin until March 1, 1938. Dodd dxd not want
egthe Nazis to believe that he had succumbed to their demands. 
Neither Dodd, who had returned to Berlin, nor Davies, who was 
still inhaling the ocean air, knew what the president had in 
mind. Neither, perhaps, did Roosevelt.
On November 22, 1937, Roosevelt acted. In rapid suc­
cession, he altered the complexion of three embassies.
Through the State Department he informed Dodd that, while he 
regretted "any personal inconvenience which may be occasioned 
you," the Ambassador must arrange to leave Berlin, "if
possible, by December 14 and, in any event, not later than 
9 7Christmas.'' Almost simultaneously, Roosevelt announced
Hugh Wilson as Dodd's replacement, offered Davies the embassy
in Brussels, and "fired" Hugh Gibson, then the ambassador to 
98Belgium. The embassy in Moscow, where Davies had spent 
very, little time, was to remain vacant until March 23, 1939.
^Diary entry, November 3, 1937 , Dodd, Dodd1 s Piary, 430.
96Offner, American Appeasement, 209-210.
97Hull to Dodd, November 22, 1937, Foreign Relations of 
the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1937, II, 383. See
also Offner, American Appeasement, 210; Dallek, Democrat 
and Diplomat, 314.
9 8Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 240.
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The announcements stunned Dodd. He felt deceived and
cheated. With some justification, he blamed Welles and the
State Department— with whom he frequently had traded insults—
for his dismissal. Dodd also came to realize that he was un-
99suited to serve in Berlin. By January 1938, he "doubted if 
any American envoy who held his ideals of democracy could rep­
resent his country successfully among the Germans at that 
,,100time.
Dodd never blamed the President. However, Roosevelt's 
role was disturbing. He never informed Dodd of his intentions 
before he acted. Not everyone comprehended Roosevelt's pen­
chant for indirection, least of all the university professor 
from North Carolina who believed that his president wanted 
him in Berlin. FDR knew that Dodd, for his own welfare, 
should have resigned long before he was summarily forced to.
At a minimum, Roosevelt could have offered to transfer Dodd 
to another, less demanding post as he willingly did with 
others. Perhaps, as one student of the period thought, FDR 
"took curious delight in maintaining a Jeffersonian Democrat 
in the Third Reich.
9 9Diary entries, November 23, 1937, December 23, 1937, 
Dodd, Dodd's Diary, 433-434, 443. See also Dodd, Through 
Embassy Eyes, 358, 360.
100
Ford, "Three Observers in Berlin," 454.
101Offner, American Appeasement, 211-212.
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Davies greeted the news of the offer of the Brussels 
post with near disbelief. He immediately cabled Hull. While 
he would serve wherever the President sent him, "certain 
factors'.'— his wife's desire to reside in Berlin or Paris—  
necessitated that he consult personally with FDR before con­
senting to a change in assignment. He said he would conclude 
his trip promptly and return to Washington. Upon conferring
with Roosevelt in December, Davies emerged despondent. He
102had lost his case. Roosevelt persuaded him to accept the
Belgium mission: It was an "important listening post" on
103European events, and the President needed him there.
Roosevelt's rationale for replacing Dodd with Wilson 
offered Davies little solace. During their conversation, FDR 
explained that "it was perfectly clear that there was no 
possibility of doing anything to divert the forces of Germany 
which...were driving inevitably to war." Under these circum­
stances, Roosevelt argued, he wanted "the Berlin appointment 
to be distinctly formal for conventional representation only. 
A career appointment would be one that would" satisfy this 
requirement. Besides, the President intoned, "the appointment 
of a colorless career man" would signal to Berlin that the
102Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 240-241.
1^3Ibid., 289; diary entry, November 23, 1937, Davies, 
Mission to Moscow, 254-255.
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United States had become increasingly dissatisfied with the 
104Nazi regime.
The State Department may also finally have persuaded 
the President that nothing could be accomplished in United 
States-German relations while Dodd occupied the embassy. 
Since at least 19 34, officials in the Department had grown 
tired of Dodd's habitual diplomatic transgressions, however 
genuine his moral outrages over Nazi excesses, and of his 
constant denunciations of the evils of the career service. 
Early in 1936 Undersecretary Phillips pointedly asked FDR: 
"What in the world is the use of having an ambassador who 
refuses to speak to the government to which he is accredit-
Eleven months later, on November 8, Ambassador Bullitt
104Diary entry, December 8, 1937, Davies, Mission to 
Moscow, 255-256. See also Farley, Farley's Story, 112;
Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 241-242. Ambassordor 
Dodd received word on November 30 that Hugh Wilson was to be 
appointed to Berlin. According to Dallek, the State Depart­
ment regarded Wilson as "a colorless, smooth career man" 
who could "get contacts worked up again." Democrat and Diplo­
mat , 314.
Petrov contends that Hull "vetoed" Davies appoint­
ment to Berlin because he "did not want to have there a 
strongly opinionated and unpredictable politician, not sub­
ject to effective State Department control." A Study in 
Diplomacy:- The Story of Arthur Bliss Lane (Chicago: Henry
Regnery, 1971), 96 ftn. 3.
^"^Dallek, Democrat and Diplomat, 271.
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chime d in with a recommendation. A bitter opponent of the 
Soviet regime, Bullitt then sought an improvement in Germany's 
relations with the wastern democracies.
When Dodd leaves Berlin I think you should 
select your man for that post with extreme 
care. As Hitler does not speak anything 
but German any Ambassador of ours there who 
does not speak German perfectly will be use­
less. That qualification rules out most of 
the men who have been mentioned for the post. 
(Incidentally, Joe Davies' German is, I 
understand, lousy). I wish I had someone 
better to suggest, but I can think of no one 
better than Hugh Wilson, who has been for 
many years our Minister to Berne. His German 
is perfect and in spite of the fact that his 
connections are largely Republican and that 
his wife especially is no lover of the Demo­
cratic Party or you or myself, I can not think 
of anyone else who could begin to establish 
the really intimate and confidential relation­
ship we need with the bosses in Berlin, which 
will be essential if we are to accomplish 
anything.106
Whether Bullitt's suggestion affected Roosevelt's eventual 
decision remains a mystery. Perhaps Roosevelt simply consent­
ed to the State Department's choice of Hugh Wilson because his
instincts told him that the chances of a rapprochement with
10 7Germany were negligible.
106Bullitt to FDR, Bullitt, For The President, 181.
107The State Department first urged the selection of Hugh 
Gibson to replace Dodd, a move spurred, perhaps, by FDR's 
intention to replace Gibson, then ambassador to Belgium, with 
Davies. See diary entries, November 23, 19 37, November 30, 
1937, Dodd, Dodd's Diary, 434-435.
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Whatever FDR's inclinations, his appointment of Wilson
signaled no rapprochement with the career diplomats. When
FDR assumed office in 1933, Wilson occupied a high place on
the Roosevelt-Moley "hit list." Only the intercession of
Hull, Phillips, and Norman Davis kept Wilson from being ousted
along with several noncareer State Department officials who
10 8had served under Hoover. ° A member of the old-boy network 
who had been on the Foreign Service Personnel Review Board, 
Wilson became minister to Switzerland in 1927.^^ FDR retain­
ed him in Berne until 1937, when the State Department re­
called him and promoted him to assistant secretary of state.
A polished and steady, if undynamic diplomatist, Wilson 
possessed the qualifications for affecting an amelioration 
in United States relations with Germany were such an improve­
ment a possibility. Welles, undoubtedly, engineered Wilson's 
appointment.
Whatever the Department's expectations, Hitler was 
unamenable. Relations degenerated rapidly. In November 1938—  
less than a year after Wilson received "one of the plum 
posts"— the administration recalled him permanently as a pro-
•̂®®Hull,' Memoirs, I, 182; Eagles, "Ambassador Davies,"
242 ftn. 76; diary entry, March 6, 19 33, Hooker, Moffat 
Papers, 90.
| Q QOn Wilson's career, see Wilson, Education of a Diplo­
mat, 1-7, 10, 97-98; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 75-76, 
137, 196; Offner, American Appeasement, 214-215.
-247-
test over Nazi atrocities.
Davies fared much better in the meantime. He satisfied 
his wife's desires while simultaneously serving his country. 
Barring Berlin, Mrs. Davies had much preferred Paris to 
Belgium. While accredited to Brussels, she and Mr. Davies 
spent most of their time mingling amidst the high society 
of Paris and London.
The envoy Davies replaced in Belgium suffered a less 
fortunate fate. Roosevelt abruptly requested his resignation. 
He dutifully offered it. In the process, the United States 
lost the services of a superb diplomatist.
Hugh Gibson possessed an impressive diplomatic record. 
Educated at the Ecole Libre.des Sciences Politiques in Paris, 
he entered the Diplomatic Service in 1908. During World War I, 
he served as first secretary of the legation in Brussels, 
where he met and became close friends with Herbert Hoover, 
then in charge of United States humanitarian relief efforts 
in Belgium. Gibson's performance as secretary, along with
^•^Offner, American Appeasement, 89-90, 272-273; diary 
entry, November 14, 1938, Hooker, Moffat Papers, 222.
IllEagles, "Ambassador Davies," 2 89.
-248-
the recommendations of Hoover and Colonel Edward M. House, 
convinced President Wilson to appoint him as the first 
American minister to Poland in 1919. At thirty-six years of 
age, Gibson was the youngest chief-of-mission in the Diplo­
matic Service. During the 1920s, Gibson held the minster- 
ships to Switzerland and Belgium and represented the United 
States in international disarmament negotiations. His col­
leagues also designated him as their chief spokesman in 
testifying before Congress on the need for a career foreign
service, a task he performed with charm, wit, and inspired 
112eloquence.
Gibson received high marks from his peers and contempora­
ries. Jay Pierrepont Moffat: observed Gibson while serving 
under him in Poland in 1919;
He had a scintillating mind and a razor­
like wit...tempered by a keen sense of 
fun. He knew Europe as did few Americans; 
he was on terms of intimacy with the key 
men in a dozen foreign offices; his use of 
French was not only fluent, but so accurate 
that he could convey shaded meanings.
- ^ ^ B i o g r a p h i c a l  sketches of Gibson are in Galpin, Hugh 
Gibson, xii-xv; Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 62, 71-72; Werk- 
ing, Master Architects, 159, 16 8; Weil, Pretty Good Club, 21; 
Pearson and Brown, Diplomatic Game, 173-175; Hooker, Moffat 
Papers, 10-11.
113Hooker, Moffat Papers, 11. See also Wilson, Education 
of a Diplomat, 95.
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As one journalist, who more frequently than not criticized
career diplomats, wrote in 1939, Gibson "was not a diplomat
114who needs to defend his credentials."
Gibson maintained a healthy perspective in regard to his 
own career. Unlike many of his colleagues, he possessed no 
great reservoir of independent wealth. Once, with the rumor 
circulating among his peers— a rumor later regarded as a fact 
by journalists and historians— that he had had to refuse an 
appointment to the embassy in Paris because of the vast 
personal expense that post entailed, he wrote a friend: "No,
I did not accept the Embassy in Paris— and one reason which 
helped me a lot to reach that decision was that it wasn't 
offered to me.''^^ Unlike many an amateur diplomat, Gibson 
suffered little from the vice of personal vanity— a necessary 
"failing" given the course his career took under the New Deal.
FDR's ascendance into the White House in 1933 threatened 
Gibson's career more than that of any professional diplomat.
114Bertram D. Hulen, Inside the Department of State 
(N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1939), 77. See also The New York Times
and New York Herald Tribune editorials written upon Gibson's 
death in December 1954 and reprinted in Galpin, Hugh Gibson, 
161-163.
115 .Gibson to Gilchrest B. Stockton, April 20, 1929, 
Galpin, Hugh Gibson, 41.
One, for example, who treats the rumor of Gibson's 
appointment to Paris as a fact is Weil, Pretty Good Club, 21. 
Weil provides no documentation. See also Hulen, Inside the 
Department, 100-101.
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As a close friend of Hoover's, Gibson was regarded as auto­
matically anti-New Deal by Roosevelt and his coterie of loyal 
Democratic advisers.
FDR had not always held Hoover and Gibson in such low 
repute. In 1919 the then Assistant Secretary of the N.avy 
wrote kindly to Gibson about Hoover:
I had some nice talks with Herbert 
Hoover before he went west for Christmas.
He is certainly a wonder, and I wish we 
could make him a President of the United 
States. There could not be a better one.H^
Much had changed in the intervening years. In 19 33, with 
Gibson's association with Hoover clearly in view, FDR tar­
geted the diplomat for an early retirement. There was,
117Moffat recorded, much pressure for Gibson's job.
Phillips and Hull intervened to provide Gibson with a 
reprieve. Cognizant of his liabilities, Gibson wrote to 
Phillips on April 5, 1933, requesting that he be transferred 
to Istanbul in the event that he was removed from Brussels, 
a post he had headed since 19 27. To no avail, Phillips re-
liplayed Gibson's request to FDR.
-i-^Krock, Firing Line, 129-130.
117"I understand," Moffat confided to his diary on March 
6, 1933, "that the pressure for Hugh Gibson's job is very 
serious, and that there had even been some attempts to under­
mine Hugh Wilson." Hooker, Moffat Papers, 90.
118phiiiipS to FDR, April 8, 1933, Nixon, FDR and For-
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The best Phillips and Hull could attain for Gibson was 
the embassy in Brazil. Hull had opposed Gibson's removal 
from Belgium, Moffat wrote Hugh Wilson, "in the highest
119quarters" of the government, "but other views prevailed."
As Allen Dulles informed Gibson, FDR demanded a clean break
with the policies of the past. "I would guess that FDR felt
that you were so closely identified with carrying out Hoover's
policies in European disarmament and other matters that he
120preferred to have you in South America." Gibson had
spent only two of his thirty years in diplomacy in Latin
I O IAmerica. Although he read Portuguese, he could not
speak it. He accepted the new assignment.
The White House had announced Gibson's replacement to 
Belgium without first informing him of his own fate. For
FDR this was a common, if not painless, procedure. On March
\9, five days after the inauguration, iRoOsevelt told Hull 
that David Hennen Morris would be sent to Belgium. An old 
friend of FDR's, Morris, a New York lawyer, was an original 
member of the RBC group. H;e contributed at least $5,000 
to Roosevelt's nomination and election. Deserving of a
eign Affairs, I, 50-51.
■^•^April 19 , 1933, Pratt, Cordell Hull, I, 396 ftn. 17.
120April 20, 1933, Weil, Pretty Good Club, 72.
121State Department Biographic Register, 1937, 190.
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choice post, Morris reportedly refused Berlin in favor of
122Belgium. He'served in Brussels until 1937.
Roosevelt eventually ousted Gibson from the Service 
altogether. For reasons that are obscure, FDR first returned 
Gibson to Belgium in July 1937, about the same time he en­
countered serious difficulties with Dodd and Davies over 
Berlin. From Paris, Ambassador Bullitt expressed great dis­
pleasure with Gibson:
You may or may not remember that it was 
your humble servant who, when everybody 
else wanted Gibson kicked out of the 
Service because he was Hoover's best 
friend, stood up for him and advised 
you to keep (ihim in the Service. I have 
nothing personal against him but it 
seems to me bad ball when an Ambassador 
straight from headquarters does not coop­
erate to the extent of coming in even for 
a conversation. Gibson, of course, loves 
you, myself and all other Democrats in 
the same manner that Mr. Hoover does and I 
think that whoever sold you that baby as 
an ambassador in Europe was not especially 
wise.123
However influential Bullitt's pique, the end for Gibson was
near.
122Overacker, "Campaign Funds," 782; Moley, After Seven 
Years, 37; Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, III, 172; FDR to 
Hull, March 9, 1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 21; 
The New York Times, March 17, May 5, and May 11, 19 33, 15, 7, 
20, respectively.
123Bullitt to FDR, July 23, 1937, Bullitt, For The Presi­
dent, 224.
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FDR announced Davies'appointment to Belgium ten months 
after Gibson arrived in Brussels. Whether Roosevelt consi­
dered the appropriateness of sending the once-divorced-and- 
remarried Davies to the Catholic court of Belgium is doubtful.
Once again, however, Gibson received no advance notifi­
cation. Instead, Gibson simply received a letter informing 
him that his resignation— which he had not tendered— had 
been a c c e p t e d . I n  November 1937, Roosevelt had offered 
Gibson the Berlin post. Gibson had declined— either because 
of his distaste for the Nazis or because of the Nazis distaste
for him. In any case, the Nazi government evidently informed
125the State Department in 1937 that Gibson was unacceptable.
Charles Thayer relates the story of the forced retire­
ment of a career diplomat in the 1930s, a diplomat replaced by 
a New York lawyer. Although Thayer does not identify the 
career diplomat or the New York lawyer, one very logical sus­
pect as the subject of his story is Hugh Gibson. Diplomat, 260. 
Gibson officially resigned on June 30, 193 8, and Joe Davies, 
a New York lawyer, prepared to depart for the Brussels embassy 
on July 5, 19 38. State Department Biographic Register, 1938, 
201; Davies, Mission to Moscow, 374.
125See Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 90; Weil, Pretty 
Goad. Club, 45.
Hull wrote to ■ Dodd in Berlin on November 20, 1937: 
"The President has requested me to inform you that he desires 
to appoint Hugh Gibson, at present, Ambassador to Belgium, to 
succeed you as Ambassador to Germany." Foreign Relations of 
the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1937, II, 383. How-
ever, Gibson's_appointment did not materialize. Ambassador 
Dodd speculated upon the reason why: "While evidence is want­
ing, I believe the German Foreign Office refused to receive 
Gibson. He had been an official in Belgium during the World 
War and had also written a valuable book about German and 
certain German leaders." Diary entry, November 23, 1937, 
Dodd's Diary, 435. Dodd probably was referring to Gibson's
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Secretary of State Hull was powerless to prevent 
Gibson's forced retirement.
Hugh Gibson was another Republican whom 
I kept as long as I could, because of 
his outstanding ability. But eventually 
the President wanted him out— Gibson was 
a close friend of Herbert Hoover, and 
there were bitter feelings between Hoover 
and the President.126
Gibson was fifty-five years old in June 1938 when Joe Davies
succeeded him in Belgium.
In contrast to the tragic-comic drama that enveloped 
the Berlin assignment, light farce characterized FDR's 
efforts to fill the Netherlands legation at The Hague. 
Roosevelt promised the Netherlands' post to two people—  
both of whom believed that they would begin serving in 1933, 
and neither of whom knew anything about the other's claim. 
Filling the post took an inordinately long time, although 
Roosevelt decided at the outset to employ a direct approach 
in resolving his dilemma.
Roosevelt determined to ask one of the claimants to 
The Hague to serve for only one year. On April 20, 1933, he 
wrote to William G. Rice, an old friend and former member of
A Journal From Our Legation in Belgium (Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday, Page, 1917).
^^Memoirs, I, 183.
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the New York State Civil Service Commission:
I would have written you before this in 
regard to Holland but for the fact that 
I have been trying to smooth out a some­
what difficult situation, which I want you 
to know of with perfect frankness. I do 
not need to tell you that I.wanted you to 
go as Minister to The Hague, but it has 
developed that there is another friend of 
mine who is; most anxious to go and who, I 
must tell you quite candidly, has at least 
an equal claim. May I, therefore, ask you 
to searve as Minister to the Netherlands 
with the understanding that you come home after a y e a r ? 1 2 7
Rice replied to the Bresident three days later. He 
insisted on receiving the appointment with no conditions 
attached to it. Born prior to the American Civil War, Rice 
was then a fiesty seventy-seven years old.-*-28
Roosevelt repeated his offer to Rice on June 16.
I know you will understand this is 
written in the spirit of an old friend, 
and also in regard to the exigencies of 
many matters in Washington. The number 
of thoroughly competent men who are 
available for diplomatic service, in­
cluding those who are members of the 
career service, far exceeds the number of 
embassies and legations. In the case of 
everyone of these men there is some very 
definite reason for appointment....
May I also say that in going over these
127.Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 58-59.
128rbid., 59 ftn. 1.
-256-
lists I have eliminated the names of three 
or four people who are actually a good deal 
younger than you are, on account of their 
age, and...I have told a number of those 
already appointed to foreign posts that I 
might possibly or even probably ask them 
to relinquish their post after one year....
I can therefore only invite you to go to 
Holland as our minister on the same under­
standing which I have with many other 
appointees. 29
Once again, thirteen days later, Rice refused to accept 
the President's stipulations. At the same time, Rice insisted 
upon his right to the post.
FDR decided upon one last plea. On July 28, he informed
Ri ce:
I was somewhat surprised and much concerned 
at your letter of June twenty-ninth....I 
fear you have not understood that an ambas­
sador or a minister holds an appointment 
wholly and solely at the pleasure of the 
President....
It was only as a matter of courtesy and 
convenience to you and to a number of other 
gentlemen that, in asking them to go to 
a foreign post, I have told them it was 
entirely possible that at the end of a 
year or later, I might ask them to return 
home....You were the only one, apparently, 
who failed to understand that diplomatic 
appointments are wholly personal with,..., 
the President.
I think that I have made the situation 
wholly clear. If you care to go to The
129Ibid., 242.
130rbid., ftn. 1.
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Hague as Minister...,1 shall be very glad 
to make the appointment immediately, but 
I must ask for an immediate decision.131
Rice resolved FDR's dilemma a week later. He declined
the appointment. He could not, he conveyed to the -president,
see his way clear to agreeing in advance to leaving a diplo-
132matic post at the end of a year .
Roosevelt finally settled upon the selection of a 
minister to the Netherlands with the appointment of Grenville 
T. Emmet nearly a year after his first plea to Rice. A 
former law partner of FDR's, Emmet had hoped for the embassy 
in Rome. Failing that, he had asked for Berlin, Vienna, 
Budapest, or Constantinople. Emmet remained in Holland
13 3until the summer of 19 37 when he transferred to Vienna.
George A. Gordon, a career diplomat then serving as minister 
to Haiti, replaced Emmet.^ 4  jn selecting Gordon, perhaps 
FDR recalled his earlier troubles in trying to satisfy the 
desires of his friends.
131Ibid., 333.
132Ibid., 334 ftn. 2.
13 3Ibid., 59 ftn. 2; II, 52 ftn. 1. See also Roosevelt 
and Brough-,. An Untold Story, 113, 217.
134State Department Biographic Register, 1940, 109.
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The appointment of an ambassador to Rome also presented 
Roosevelt with some problems. Several deserving Democrats 
laid claim to the embassy in Mussolini's Italy in stark con­
trast to the situation FDR confronted in finding a representa­
tive to Hitler's Germany. Before Roosevelt settled upon 
Breckinridge Long for Italy in April 1933, much maneuvering 
occurred among the participants. In the end, a temporary 
meeting of minds between Moley and Phillips resolved the 
issue.
Three Democrats initially vied for the Italian post.
Farley early championed the cause of James W. Gerard, a
faithful Democrat and former ambassador to Germany under
135Woodrow Wilson. Colonel Edward M. House urged the appoint­
ment of James Michael Curley, the colorful mayor of Boston 
who, in Moley's words, "presented unimpeachable claims to
the job in the shape of a record of early, energetic, and
136powerful support of the Roosevelt candidacy." The third
candidate, Clark Howell, publisher of the Atlanta Constitu-
137tion, had long supported FDR. Breck Long was not among
the list of contenders.
135Farley, Farley's Story, 56.
136First New Deal, 243. See also After Seven Years, 132. 
Curley contributed $10,000 to FDR's 1932 campaign. Overacker, 
"Campaign Funds," 77 8.
137Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 361.
Roosevelt never seriously considered Gerard. The
President held a grudge against Gerard that dated from the
1914 New York senatorial primary campaign. Supported by
Tammany Hall, Gerard had opposed Roosevelt and had won,
despite spending most of the campaign in the ambassador's
138chair in Berlin. That Gerard had performed his diplomatic
duties without distinction probably did not influence Roose­
velt' s decision to ignore him. Nor is it likely that Gerard 
received no offer from FDR simply because a friend of the 
President's suggested, in attempting to undercut the former 
Ambassador, that Gerard wanted the post for only one year so 
that he could add the experience to his memoirs. Others 
had been selected on equally flimsy grounds. The best Farley 
ever was able to produce for Gerard— after also pressing FDR 
to appoint him to Paris— was a temporary assignment represent­
ing the United States at the coronation of King George VI in 
1937.139
Roosevelt also held grievances against Curley. Although 
the Boston 'Mayor had performed yeoman work in FDR's campaign, 
he had led FDR into an early defeat. Curley had convinced 
FDR, who was then the Democratic frontrunner, that he could 
beat Al Smith in the 1932 Massachusetts presidential primary.
138Farley, Farley's Story, 56; Gunther, Roosevelt in 
Retrospect, 64, 213, 263.
139Farley, Farley's Story, 56.
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Despite the commitment of considerable resources, Roosevelt
140lost by a 3 to 1 margin, a major setback at the time.
Curley, nevertheless, was the leading contender for the 
Rome embassy. In 1932 he had visions of becoming the secre­
tary of the navy. By early 1933 he had lowered his sights to 
Rome, an ambassadorial post that he believed would increase 
his popularity among Boston's Irish Catholics and enhance 
future political opportunities. Evidently he had received 
assurances from Jimmy Roosevelt that the president would honor 
him with an appointment to either France or Italy. With
Gerard's candidacy no longer a reality, Curley also commanded
141Farley s support.
Breckinridge Long now entered the Rome ambassadorial 
sweepstakes. A life-long Democrat with ancestors whose poli­
tical involvements stretched back to the era of Thomas 
Jefferson, Long was another member of the RBC group who had 
found Washington, D.C., an uninviting place since the Republi­
can takeover in 1920. Under Woodrow Wilson, Long had served 
as an assistant secretary of state, during which he had under­
taken the task of eradicating all Republicans from the Diplo­
matic Service— a role that had not endeared him to William
140Rosen, Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Brain Trust, 19.
141James M. Curley, I'd Do It Again (Englewood Cliffs; 
Prentice-Hall, 1957), 248-250, 302.
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Phi Hips , who also had served in the State Department at 
that time. With the end of the Democratic hiatus in 19 33,
Long anticipated a return to government.
Few Democrats were more deserving than Long. A graduate
of Princeton and a lawyer, he possessed great wealth and a
favorable social and professional position. In 1916 he had
loaned the Wilson presidential reelection committee
$100,000. In 1932 he repeated his performance, contributing
more than $1,000 a month to FDR's preconvention Victory Fund,
and lending the Democratic National Committee $10,000 three
days prior to the November election. With justification,
142Long expected to serve in FDR's cabinet.
Roosevelt had other plans for Long. In February 1933 
the Rresident offered Long his old berth in the State Depart­
ment. Long refused. He would not serve under William 
Phillips, his old antagonist, then the choice for under­
secretary of state. For a moment Long appeared headed for
a life of private pursuits. Then, FDR, having offered Howell 
both Brazil and Argentina, which the newsman rejected, penned
^■^James Francis Watts, Jr., "The Public Life of 
Breckinridge Long, 1916-1944" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Missouri, 1964), 1-20, 37, 68-78; Fred L. Israel, 
ed., The War Diary of Breckinridge Long: Selections From the
Years 1939-1944 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966),
xi-xxv.
143Watts, "Public Life of Long," 72; diary entry,
April 22, 1942, Israel, War Diary of Long, 260.
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a note to Hull and Moley: "Why not cut the Gordian knot in
regard to the Argentinian Ambassador by asking Breck Long 
if he will take it?"'*'44
Long determined to hold firm in hope of a more presti­
gious post. Along with Curley/ he became a major contender 
for Rome. Howell, in the meantime, had declined offers to 
serve in Turkey or Poland. Eventually, Howell, like Gerard, 
accepted a position of representing the United States to the 
coronation of George VI— the only official overseas journey 
he made under the New Deal. '*'4^
Phillips and Moley eventually agreed upon Long. Between 
Curley and Long, Phillips regarded Long as the lesser of 
the evils. Long possessed at least a solid social background, 
whereas Curley, a fellow Bostonian, was tainted by the Irish 
tarbrush. Certain that Roosevelt would not consider a career 
diplomat, Phillips approached Moley. He asked Moley to inter­
cede with Farley to see that Curley was not offered Rome.
Moley consented. He would ask Farley to offer Poland to
14 6Curley if Phillips would agree to support Long for Rome.
■*-44Freidel, Franklin D . Roosevelt , IV, 361.
145Ibid.
■*-4®Moley, First New Deal, 243, and After Seven Years, 
132-133.
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The deal was consummated, Farley concurred, and Long became 
the Ambassador to Italy.
Curley became incensed. Not privy to the negotiations, 
he reacted with characteristic outrage and Irish aplomb 
when FDR offered him Poland. He replied that "since Roose­
velt considered this ministry [Poland] the most important 
in the world," the President should resign and "take the post
himself." Poland, Curley told FDR, was more fit for a
147Republican, than a Democrat.
Long lasted three years in Rome. Upon his arrival, 
he immediately began to forward to FDR and the State Depart­
ment enthusiastic dispatches about Mussolini and the Italian 
fascists. Following the Italian conquest of Ethiopia in
1936, Long urged the New Deal to recognize formally
148Mussolini's triumph. Aware that Long suffered from a
147Curley, I'd Do It Again, 251-252. Prior to that talk,
FDR submitted Curley's name to the U.S. Senate as his nominee 
for the Polish post on April 12, 1933. On April 15, FDR 
withdrew Curley's nomination. Whether FDR had informed 
Curley prior to submitting his nomination to the Senate is 
not readily known. Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs. I, 51 ftn. 3.
148For example, see Long to FDR, June 27, 1933, Nixon,
FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 255-259; Louis M. Howe to FDR,
October 18, 1935, and Long to FDR, June 23, 1936, 
ibid., Ill, 28, 333-334.
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stomach ulcer and dearly missed the excitement of domestic
politics, FDR— who opposed recognition of the Italian
victory— persuaded Long to resign in 1936. FDR later
149appointed Long as an assistant secretary of state.
Roosevelt replaced Long in Italy with William Phillips.
Phillips had long coveted the Rome embassy. His career had
150not yet included a prestigious ambassadorship. Moreover,
Roosevelt knew he could depend upon Phillips to preserve the 
delicate line between United States recognition and non­
recognition of the Italian escapade in Ethiopia, whatever
151the career diplomat's personal preference. Phillips
survived in Rome until the United States declared war on the
Long to FDR, March 13, 1936, Long to FDR, June 15, 
1936, and FDR to Long, June 18 , 1936, ibid., ill, 254-255. 
324-325, 330-331. Long returned to the State Department in 
September 1939 as a special assistant to the secretary.
From 1940 through 1944, he was an assistant secretary of 
state. Israel, War Diary of Long, xxiv.
150pratt, Cordell Hull, I, 17; Schulzinger, Diplomatic 
Mind, 114; Washington Merry-Go-Round, 149; Brice 
Harris, Jr., The United Stares and the Italo-Ethiopian 
Crisis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), 143;
Kottman, "Hoover and Diplomatic Appointments," 297 ftn. 8.
151See Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, III, 325 ftn. 2; 
Phillips, Ventures in' Diplomacy, 178-179; John R. Diggins, 
Mussolini and Fascism: The View From America (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1972), 278.
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Axis powers in 1941.
Next to Rome the embassy in Madrid ranked as the most
important European post along the Mediterranean. Revolution
had punctured Spain's three-hundred year history on countless
occasions. In 1931 the Spanish people overthrew the monarchy
of King Alfonso XIII and installed a liberal, republican
government. Although the Spanish experiment in democracy
began without bloodshed, class discontent, conflict, and
152factionalism loomed near the surface. In selecting an
American representative to the infant republic, Roosevelt 
paid more attention to party patronage than to Spanish 
history.
Spoils politics and high irony marked the selection of
Claude Bowers as ambassador to Spain. A native of Indiana,
a popular historian, and a practicing journalist, Bowers
153also was a staunch Democrat with a national reputation.
For years Bowers had wielded a devastating pen in support of 
Democratic causes. In 1932 he unleased his talents 
upon the Hoover administration. "There was," Bowers confes­
sed, "an embarrassing richness of material" that Depression
•^^Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (N.Y.: Harper &
Row, 1961), 4-5, 21-22.
153National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, LXIV 
(1962), 80-87.
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year. Roosevelt considered Bowers' newspaper columns "a
bulwark of strength." Hoover's staff concurred: Bowers'
editorials, one of them commented, "were the most damaging
154of the campaign." In addition to his credits as a
purveyor of purple prose, Bowers enjoyed a friendship with 
the President-elect.
Bowers wanted a reward for his years of Democratic 
service. Fifty-nine years old in 1933, he hoped to obtain 
a leisurely diplomatic post where he could continue to write 
history. Like William E. Dodd, Bowers was a Jeffersonian- 
Democrat. The author of two works on southern history,
Bowers intended to turn his attention to a study of Jeffer­
son.
Roosevelt and his advisers early agreed to place Bowers 
on the Preferred List. In a meeting late in February, FDR, 
Moley, and Farley discussed where to send Bowers to reward 
him with "his heart's desire"— a serene diplomatic mission. 
They decided upon Belgium.
Undersecretary Phillips was horrified. Bowers combined 
an intensely partisan ideology with an extremely sloppy 
manner of dress. He would cast disparagement upon the diplo­
matic profession in any post, but especially in Belgium.
■^4Bowers, My Life, 249-250.
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Phi Hips expressed his objections to the president.
Roosevelt hesitated for a moment. He. then decided that 
Bowers should be sent to Spain. "Claude is a funny-looking 
fellow," he told Moley and Farley. "T.he Belgium court is 
very fastidious. So let's send him to Spain, where there 
won’t be much to do." As an afterthought, FDR recalled that 
Brand Whitlock "had once sought urbanity, leisure, and 
quiet," and "had wound up in an invaded and devastated" land 
as ambassador to Belgium in 1914. Yes, the President de­
clared, Bowers definitely should journey to Spain instead of
, . 155Belgium.
Three years after Bowers arrived in Madrid, Spain 
erupted into a bloody and cancerous civil war that soon 
engulfed Europe. From 1936 to 1939, Bowers watched and 
reported upon the civil war from an outpost in San Sebastian 
on the northern coast of Spain. He also managed to complete 
one monograph on Jefferson in 1936 and to begin work on
155Moley, First New Deal, 243, and After Seven Years, 
132. Note also, FDR to Hull, March 9, 1933, Nixon, FDR and 
Foreign Affairs, I, 21.
According to Bowers, FDR, in phoning him about his 
nomination, said he was embarrassed by all the people from 
New York he had appointed to posts in the administration.
FDR then asked Bowers, an Indiana native residing in New 
York, to claim residence from some state other than New York 
for the record. My Life , 262.
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another.156
Roosevelt's three appointees to the Irish Free State 
resembled many other New Deal diplomats in at least two 
respects. All were amateurs whose careers had failed to 
touch even the periphery of diplomatic experience. All had 
supported FDR's campaigns. In many other respects, they 
formed a motley group of no great distinction.
The first appointee, however, appeared to be a parti­
cularly inappropriate choice. William W. McDowell was .a 
Baptist of Scotch ancestry. His father, one generation 
removed from Scotland, had served in the Tennessee Senate 
where he had authored that state's first prohibition law.
A wealthy and loyal Democrat, William McDowell migrated to 
Montana near the turn of the century, amassed a considerable 
fortune as a shareholder in the Anaconda Copper Company and 
other mining ventures, and found time to serve two. terms as 
speaker of the Montana House of Representatives and seven 
years as lieutenant governor. His service from 1930 to 1933 
as chairman of the Democratic State Central Committee undoubt­
edly enhanced his opportunity to acquire a diplomatic 
post, along with, perhaps, the aid
^--^Bowers, Jefferson in Power: The Death Struggle of
Federalists (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1936), and The
Spanish Adventures of Washington Irving (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1940).
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of U.S. Senator Burton K. Wheeler. Then sixty-six years 
old, McDowell was in the twilight of his public career.
That Scotchmen were never popular in Ireland appears to 
have escaped Roosevelt. In any event, McDowell's tour ended 
abruptly. One month after his arrival in Dublin, he collaps­
ed, dead from a cardiac arrest, while responding to a toast
offered in his honor at a banquet held by the president of
. 157the Irish Republic.
A contender for the Irish post appeared almost immediate­
ly. On April 11, 1934, two days after McDowell's death, 
Richard Wasburn Child offered himself as a successor. In a 
letter to Roosevelt, Child stated that he was qualified to 
deal with the Irish "on something more than a fox-hunting 
basis."158
Roosevelt had asked Child after the 1932 campaign "if 
there was anything" he "wanted." An amateur ambassador to 
Rome under Harding and Coolidge and a member of the 
establishment-oriented Council on Foreign Relations, Child 
had directed the Republicans For Roosevelt National League in 
1932. Following his victory, FDR had queried Child about his
N̂ational Cyclopaedia of American Biography, XXIX 
(1941) , 152-153; State Department Biographic Register, 1934, 
284.
158Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 650-651 ftn. 1.
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interest in a diplomatic post, mentioning Russia as a possi­
bility. Then, Child had declined to specify a position. 
However, at Roosevelt's suggestion, he had consented to 
investigate economic conditions in Europe as a special
159adviser to Hull, a task he commenced on March 5, 1934.
Now, one month later, he named Ireland as his just reward.
Roosevelt evidently thought well of Child's offer to
head the Irish legation. In a note to Hull accompanying
Child's letter of April 11, FDR wrote: "What do you think
1 GOof this rather happy thought?" What the Secretary of
State thought is unclear.
The President's casual enthusiasm for Child quickly 
waned. FDR never acknowledged the prospect of Child serving 
in Ireland, a slight that clearly miffed Child. On August 30, 
1934, he wrote Roosevelt of his displeasure:
When I returned from Europe on the 
mission [you] inspired I was told by 
your secretaries that you would not be 
able to talk with me. This was an unusual 
decision.... I did not ask for that assign­
ment.
When after the campaign I had con­
scientiously as a Republican enlisted for 
the purpose of urging Republicans to elect 
you, you asked me if there was anything I
159Ibid.; Child to FDR, August 30, 1934, ibid., 
II, 192-193.
160Ibid., I, 651 ftn. 1.
wanted....
You spoke of Russia. Thank God that 
you did not ask me to serve you there.
Your appointment of another without notifica­
tion to me caused me embarrassment, which 
loyalty in me would never have caused you.
To-day [sic] any spirit of loyalty I 
may have is certainly connected with no 
more request for favor than I have ever 
made, except when I suggested that I might 
serve you in Ireland after the death of 
McDowell— that loyalty is somewhat put in­
to confusion.
Unfailingly pompous and arrogant, Child proceeded to ponti­
ficate on his disapproval of many of FDR's advisers and New 
Deal programs. Nevertheless, he was prepared to serve Roose­
velt, if only the President would but respond to his many 
letters.
FDR replied five days later, perhaps with a view to 
the,1936 campaign. In a letter that began "Dear Dick," 
Roosevelt expressed his surprise at Child's letter. "I did 
not know that you had asked to see me." He then congratulat­
ed him on his "very excellent trip" to Europe. He assured
Chiild that he could arrange with "Mr. [Marvin H.] McIntyre,"
162hi/s personal secretary, a date to talk with him anytime.
161Ibid., II, 192-193.
■^^September 4, 1934, ibid., II, 205. Since Child filed 
no written report about his trip, and since he did not talk 
with FDR, it must have been difficult for FDR to decipher that 
Child's trip had been an "excellent" one. Ibid., II, 193 
f tn. 2.
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Roosevelt ignored the subject of Ireland. Instead, he 
noted his own heavy schedule with the Congress. Support for 
FDR's candidacy, afterall, did not qualify everyone for an 
automatic reward, especially one so liberally disparaging of 
the New Deal as Richard Wasburn Child.
Roosevelt next considered appointing a man to Ireland 
who was almost as illogical a choice as McDowell. Anthony J. 
Drexel Biddle, Jr., was a Democrat who richly deserved a 
reward. He reportedly contributed a healthy $.33,700 to 
FDR's 1936 campaign. He was also an Episcopalian, and a
divorced and remarried man.
FDR never announced Biddle's appointment to Ireland. 
Headed by the revolutionary leader Eamon de Valera, the Irish 
government refused to accept Biddle. Ambassador Bullitt
16 3Bendiner, Riddle of the State Department, 133; Kip- 
linger, Washington Is Like That, 260.In’1932, Biddle contributed heavily, in many.way3 "to 
the Pennsylvania Democratic Party...and in 1934 campaigned 
extensively for George H. Earle, the first Democratic gover­
nor of Pennsylvania elected in more than one hundred years." 
Perhaps Earle, FDR's minister to Austria in 1933, suggested 
Biddle to the President. Philip V. Cannistraro, Edward 
Wynot, Jr., and Theodore P . Kovaleff, eds., Poland and the 
Coming of the Second World War: The Diplomatic Papers of
A.J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., United States Ambassador to Poland, 
1937-1939 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1976), 4.
164 . .Cannistraro, et. al., Diplomatic Papers of Biddle,
2-4; National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, LIII (1961) ,
14.
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surmised as much in a letter to the President on April 12, 
1935:
As the appointment of Tony Biddle to 
Dublin has not been announced, .1 assume that 
the difficulty of obtaining the agreement of 
the Irish Government to the appointment of 
a divorced and remarried man proved to be 
insuperable.
Bullitt then suggested that the President consider transfer-
165ring John Cudahy, his minister to Poland, to Ireland.
Cudahy, at least, was of Irish-Catholic descent. A 
second generation Irishman— his father emigrated from Callan 
County— John Cudahy also presented impressive political 
credentials for the Irish post. Nominally a Republican, 
the millionaire playboy and heir to the Cudahy Meat Packing 
Company had become convinced, during a fit of prescience, 
that the Grand Old Party had no chance in 19 32. His conver­
sion to the Democratic Party and his subsequent donation to 
the Roosevelt cause— more than $3,000— earned him the Polish 
embassy in 1933, a post several other candidates had reject-
165Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, II, 478; Bullitt, For The President, 111. Transferring chiefs willy-nilly was common. 
Biddle became the minister to Norway on July 22, 19 35, re­
placing Hoffman Phillip, a career officer appointed by Hoover 
to Oslo’ in 1930. On the same day, Phillip became ambassador 
to Chile, a post he held until his retirement in 1937. State 
Department Biographic Register, 1938, 210.
166E. Wilder Spaulding, Ambassadors Ordinary and Extra­
ordinary (Washington, D.C.?Public Affairs Press, 1961), 222- 
225; Louis Fischer, Men and Politics: An Autobiography
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Cudahy soon pined for his ancestral homeland. He had 
found the atmosphere in Warsaw drab and dreary. He "had 
only one wish in life," he told Bullitt in April 1935, and 
that was "to be appointed Minister to Ireland." Bullitt 
believed, as he wrote the President, that Cudahy "would make 
an admirable Minister to Dublin. He loves to hunt and is a 
very attractive fellow of the type that the Irish like and 
his private life is as blameless as the Pope himself could 
desire.
Roosevelt finally granted Cudahy his "one wish" in May 
1937. When Bullitt related to Cudahy in February 1936 that 
the Irish post would be his after the fall election, the 
Irishman "was in Paradise [sic]." He is eager to return to 
the United States "to campaign and promises 3,000,000 Polish 
votes!" Bullitt wrote the President.
In the interim between McDowell's death and Cudahy's
(London: Jonathan Cape, Ltd., 1941), 275; Thayer, Diplomat,
256; National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, XXXIII 
(1947), 496-497; Kiplinger, Washington Is Like That, 261.
*1 /T 7 April 12, 1935, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, 11,478.
16 8February 22, 1936, ibid., III, 206, and Bullitt, For 
The President, 145.
According to Secretary . ickes— Cudahy's brother- 
in-law— the Irishman soon became bored with Ireland, too. 
Diary entry, September 30, 1938, Secret Diary, II, 481. In 
1940, Cudahy became ambassador to Belgium.
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appointment, Roosevelt bestowed upon Alvin M. Owsley his 
desire to serve anywhere but Bucharest by transferring 
him to Ireland. A Texas Democrat, attorney, and friend of 
Vice President John Nance Garner, Owsley had complained of 
profound unhappiness since his arrival in the Rumanian 
capital in June 1933. Bereft of diplomatic experience,
Owsley had accepted FDR's offer of a ministership in 1933, 
although he initially believed that he was being offered a 
position in a church. He served in Ireland from May 1935 
until July 1937."^^
Several of FDR's other amateur appointees to Western 
Europe were similarly without bold distinction. Herbert 
Claibourne Pell, for example, headed the mission in Portugal 
from 19 37 to 1941. An old next door neighbor of the Presi­
dent's, his friendship with FDR dated to their days together 
at Harvard and spanned nearly twenty years of active parti­
cipation in New York politics. Pell's service as a congress­
man, state Democratic party chief, and vice chairman of the 
Democratic campaign committee to reelect Roosevelt in 19 36 
added to his claim on a diplomatic post.^^
169FDR to Bullitt, April 26, 1935, Bullitt, For The Presi­
dent, 114. Thayer tells the story of an appointee, who fits 
Owsley's description, who thought he was being offered the 
ministership of a church. Diplomat, 250.
170Roosevelt and Brough, Untold Story, 150; Schlesinger, 
Age of Roosevelt, III, 92; State Department Biographic 
Register, 1940, 66.
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Expediency appeared to dictate FDR's third selection to 
Canada. Two professional diplomats.--War.ren Delano Robbins 
and Norman Armour— had held the Canadian p o s t . S i n c e  the 
latter's transfer to Chile in January 1938/ however, no 
chief-of-mission represented the United States in Ottawa 
until the arrival of Daniel C. Roper in May 1939. The delay 
in nominating a successor to Armour is inexplicable. However, 
when FDR learned in April 1939 that the King and Queen of 
England would visit Canada shortly, he hastily began looking 
for an envoy.
Roper's appointment surprised him. He recently had 
retired as secretary of commerce, in part because of the 
President's executive reorganization plan, which took some 
responsibilities away from his department. He was available, 
however.
After leaving the President's official 
family [Roper recalled], I had no idea 
that I would ever again hold an official 
position. Then, on April 26, 1939, came 
one of the great surprises in my life.
It began with a telephone call from the 
State Department. 'The Secretary wishes 
to see you,' I was told. Within an hour 
I was in conversation with Secretary Hull, 
my friend of many years. 'I've just had a 
long-distance conversation with the President 
at Hyde Park.' He informed me that he would
171Robbins was a first cousin to FDR. He died in 1936. 
Moley, First New Deal, 27, 433. On Armour, see State Depart­
ment Biographic Register, 1940, 56.
like for you to accept the position of 
Minister to Canada for a period of about 
two months— the period, in other words, 
of the visit of the King and Queen of 
England.1
He went on to say that their Britannis 
Majesties would arrivsin about ten days. 
Would I accept, and would Mrs. Roper and 
I proceed to the post immediately upon 
confirmation so that we might reach 
Canada in advance of the royal couple?....
Without hesitation, I told the Secre­
tary... that we would accept, and proceed 
to Ottawa immediately.
Roper thought that Roosevelt had chosen him because, as the
President informed him, he possessed a fine sense of pro- 
172priety.
Roosevelt was not particularly fond of Roper, however.
Roper's appointment as secretary of commerce in 19 33 had
caused the President considerable embarrassment-— he had
promised that cabinet post to Jesse Straus. Moreover, FDR
had suggested earlier to Farley that Roper might be persuaded
to resign his cabinet seat— to which Roosevelt eventually
appointed Harry Hopkins— in return for a diplomatic m i s s i o n . -*-73 
Furthermore, Roper confessed that he lacked ceremonial
acumen, and that he received invaluable instruction in pro-
172Roper, Fifty Years, 351. Roper contributed $1,000 to 
FDR's 1932 campaign. Overacker, "Campaign Funds," 781.
173Farley, Farley's Story, 114. See also 126, 134-135,
157.
174tocol from his legation counselor in Canada.
Perhaps FDR experienced a spell of guilt over his 
earlier treatment of Roper. Or perhaps he required Roper's 
support, if not silence, for the 1940 presidential campaign.
In any case, Roper was a sound politician with a distinguished 
record of public service, and he was available immediately.
The mission at Berne, Switzerland/ was the only diplo­
matic post in Western Europe commanded by career officers 
for the entire period of FDR's first two terms. A pleasant, 
serene place, surrounded by majestic scenery, Berne also was 
the headquarters of the League of Nations. The role of the 
U.S. chief-of-mission at Berne as an observer and unofficial, 
participant in the deliberations of the Council of the League 
required the presence of a proper and delicate diplomatist 
who would not embarrass or commit the United States to any 
European entanglements.
That Roosevelt selected Hugh Wilson and Leland 
Harrison, both distinguished and sober diplomats, to occupy 
the Swiss legation, respectively, was thus unextraordinary.-*-̂5
174Roper, Fifty Years, 353.
175Of Wilson, Hull stated: "I formed a high opinion of
him then and in later years as an experienced and capable, 
though not necessarily a model, diplomat." Memoirs, I, 182.
On Harrison, see Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 38, 119-120; 
Villard, Affairs at State, 199.
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Nor did it presage a change in FDR's view of professional
diplomats. From 1920, when the League of Nations established
its headquarters in Berne, until 1951, when the United Nations
headquarters in New York was completed, no amateur headed
the Swiss mission. Since 1951, only one professional diplo-
176mat has held the post, and then for only four years.
II
The selection of chiefs-of-mission to Scandinavia 
differed little from the appointment of envoys to Western 
Europe. Political loyalties and presidential whimsy were 
the dominant criteria. Diplomatic qualifications and ex­
perience in foreign affairs were secondary considerations, 
when they intruded into the selection process at all.
The first minister appointed to the attractive legation
in Stockholm, Sweden, possessed solid political and social
credentials. Born into a prominent New York Jewish family
with a long tradition of membership in the state Democratic
organization, Laurence A. Steinhardt moved comfortably in
177the highest social circles. Wealthy and cultured, a
United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1973, 14 8.
177Stackman, "New Deal Diplomat," 2-26; David J. Alvarez, 
"The Embassy of Laurence A. Steinhardt: Aspects of Allied-
Turkish Relations, 1942-1945," East European Quarterly, 9 
(Spring 1975) , 39.
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corporate lawyer by training and profession, Steinhardt was
an early member of the "Roosevelt-Before-Chicago" group. His
contributions to FDR's bid for the Democratic nomination
178totaled a tidy $7,500.
Steinhardt expected his financial largesse to secure him 
a diplomatic assignment. Prior to the November election, 
Roosevelt had not allowed Steinhardt any indication that he 
contemplated a position for him in the administration. How­
ever, Steinhardt had overheard FDR remark that, if he won, 
he would count each dollar contributed toward his nomination 
tenfold. From his uncle, Samuel Untermyer, who wielded 
considerable influence in Democratic circles, and from
administration insiders, Steinhardt also knew that he rank-
179ed high on the President's Preferred List.
In February 1933 Steinhardt learned that he might receive 
the legation in Switzerland or Sweden. Roosevelt's intimates, 
Steinhardt wrote his uncle, "agreed that Switzerland was :by 
far the more important post, but this was held by a career 
diplomat, Hugh Wilson. And" the President, Steinhardt noted, 
"had not yet decided how to handle the career situtation."
Steinhardt requested that his uncle refrain from apply-
■*-^Stackman, "New Deal Diplomat," 27-28. See also Farley, 
Farley's Story, 10; Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, III, 172.
179Stackman, "New Deal Diplomat," 33. See also Pearson 
and Brown, Diplomatic Game, 344-345.
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ing pressure to accelerate his entry into the administration.
The President-elect, Steinhardt informed his uncle, hated
being coerced into making an appointment, and besides,
Raymond Moley, who had expressed bitter opposition to the
180career boys, might prove influential.
Roosevelt evidently considered Steinhardt for the Swiss
post. The New York lawyer heard that he might be asked to
serve one year as an assistant secretary of state before
transferring to Berne. At one point FDR penned a longhand
note to Hull concerning Steinhardt.* "I have the man for you
for Assit. Scry in charge of legal work— ...excellent lawyer—
knows a lot about world affairs— I think this is the best 
181choice." Instead, Steinhardt became the Minister to
Sweden.
His appointment to Stockholm delighted Steinhardt. The 
Swedish assignment, he wrote his sister, would provide an 
opportunity to relax and to regain the health lost in the 
past years of constant travel and difficult work. United 
States relations with Sweden were excellent. Moreover, his 
tour would be short— no longer than two years— and he anti­
cipated that a diplomatic tour would enhance his corporate
■'■^^Stackman, "New Deal Diplomat," 35-36.
181Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 362.
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law practice. He had no intention of making diplomacy a 
182career.
Steinhardt, however, soon adopted the Foreign Service
as a career. Although not ordained by training or experience,
Steinhardt immersed himself in the challenge of diplomacy
18 3and quickly earned the respect of his colleagues. He
became a well-traveled chief-of-mission, the only political
appointee to serve in that capacity throughout the entire
184Roosevelt presidency.
Prior to disembarking at Stockholm in the summer of 
19 33, Steinhardt attended the World Economic Conference in 
London at Roosevelt's request. There he noted that the Presi­
dent's policy was one of constantly shifting and changing his 
representatives. This policy, Steinhardt thought, was 
"borrowed more or less from the football field," an apt 
commentary that Steinhardt could later apply to his own New
182Stackman, "New Deal Diplomat," 38.
18 3Amateur and career diplomats alike formed a strong 
respect for Steinhardt. See Hull, Memoirs, I, 603-604;
Israel, War Diary of Long, 225; Alvarez, "Embassy of Stein­
hardt," 40; Stackman, "New Deal Diplomat," 380-389.
184Steinhardt served m  Sweden (1933-1937), Peru (1937- 
1939), the Soviet Union (1939-1941), and Turkey (1942-1945).
In addition, he served in Czechoslovakia (1945-1948) and 
Canada (1948-1950) under Truman.
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Deal career, which included four assignments in twelve 
185years.
Three years proved long enough for Steinhardt in Sweden.
Bored and seeking more responsibility, he told FDR in 19 36
that he might resign from the diplomatic service unless
186granted a more important post. Looking around, Roosevelt
eyed Peru, the stage for an upcoming Pan American Conference, 
as an assignment likely to satisfy Steinhardt's ambitions. 
Without much fanfare, FDR sent Steinhardt to Peru and Fred 
Dearihg, a career diplomat then serving in that post, to 
Stockholm.
The simple switching of two diplomatic quarterbacks 
reflected more FDR's desire to accommodate Steinhardt than 
his wish to assign a professional diplomat to Sweden. A 
member of the first generation of professional diplomats, as 
well as of the old-boy network, Dearing had spent twenty-three 
of his twenty-six years in diplomacy in Spanish-speaking 
countries. Appointed to Peru by Hoover in 1930, Dearing*s 
transfer to Sweden represented a demotion of sorts. While 
Peru was an embassy, Sweden held only the status of a lega­
tion. In 1938, a year after his arrival in Stockholm, Dearing
185Stackman, "New Deal Diplomat," 46.
186Ibid., 93-95. Steinhardt enhanced his credentials 
with FDR by returning to the U.S. in 1936 and campaigning 
for the President's reelection.
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187retired from the Foreign Service.
Another career officer, Frederick A. Sterling, replaced 
Dearing in Sweden. Prior to entering the Diplomatic Service 
in 1911, Sterling earned an A.B. at Harvard, attended law 
school, and managed a cattle ranch. His diplomatic experience 
included a five-year tour as FDR's minister to Bulgaria. 
Initially slated to head the mission in Latvia in 19 38,
Sterling proceeded instead to Stockholm upon Dearing's
4. 188 retirement.
Sterling held high marks as a solid diplomat from pro­
fessionals and amateurs alike. Florence "Daisy" Jaffrey 
Harriman, one of two women chiefs-of-mission appointed by FDR, 
wrote that Sterling knew the "intricacies of professional
an "amazingdiplomacy," kept an open mind,\maintained! 
patience, and commanded the complete devotion of his staff.
Herself an amateur, she constantly called upon Sterling for
1 189advice. She knew "no better exlample of a career diplomat."
j j
Few better examples of FDR's often/haphazard method of 
selecting envoys exist than his appointment of "Daisy"
18 7Stackman, "New Deal Diplomat," 96-105, 111; State 
Department Biographic Register, 1938, 208.
1 go State Department Biographic Register/ 1940, 188-189.
Florence Jaffray Harriman, Mission to the North 
(Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1941), 271-272.
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Harriman either. The announcement of her appointment as
minister to Norway in 19 37 completely stunned her. A wealthy
Washington socialite, born into the high society of New York's
Fifth Avenue, and husband to J. Borden Harriman, a first
cousin to the Harriman of railroad empire, fame, Mrs. Harriman
counted among her friends the very rich and the very famous.
Known as "the godmother" of the Democratic party, she had
campaigned for Roosevelt in 1936 and had hosted a celebrated
190"denounce-the-Republican" dinner. Although she was know­
ledgeable in foreign affairs, her diplomatic experience 
hardly extended past the entertaining of diplomats in 
Washington. Nor was she a particularly avid, supporter of FDR's 
domestic policies.
How and why she received a diplomatic appointment 
mystified her. "My Mission to the North, my appointment as 
United States Minister to Norway," she wrote, "was utterly
unexpected. I read of it in the newspapers and only found
190Florence Jaffray Harriman, From Pinafores to' Politics 
(N.Y.: Henry Holt, 1932), 1, 8, 10-16, 22, 34, 61, 72-97,
112-116, 123, 159-161, 288-301, 342; "Women," Time (July 12, 
1937) , 21; . Washington Merry-Go-Round, 27; Spaulding,
Ambassadors Ordinary and Extraordinary, 184-188.
191In 19 32, Harriman informed FDR that she intended to 
be neutral at the Democratic convention in her capacity as 
the Democratic national committeewoman from the District of 
Columbia. At the convention, she held out for Newton D, Baker 
or Melvin Traylor, two of FDR's rivals. Harriman, Mission to 
the North, 28; "Women," 21.
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192out that it was true by investigating the rumors."
A visit to the State Department confirmed the newspaper 
reports.
I was immensely heartened to think the 
President had considered me for such a 
responsible position. That is, if he 
had...[sic]. The next morning I went 
to the State Department, and laid my 
dilemma before an old friend, Sumner 
Welles. I couldn't, could I, go on 
considering myself a prospective 
Minister when no such job had ever 
been offered to me, I said. At which 
he laughed, 'That ±s_ funny. Do you 
mean to tell me all the news you've 
had of this has been through the 
papers?' Then he assured me that all the 
preliminary steps were over. I had only 
to say 'yes' or 'no.'
Hesitant and uncertain about her qualifications, Mrs. Harri­
man visited with several State Department officials "to find
out what I could about the Norwegian post" before finally
193consenting to serve.
Harriman suspected that her appointment was related to
her. availability and her sex. She noted that she was not "a
'first' in the Department's experience for, after all, Ruth
194Bryan Owen had broken the ice, four years before." Mrs.
192Harriman, Mission to the North, 14.. See also Patter- 
son, Duty and Diversion, 22 0.
193Harriman, Mission to the North, 37.
194Ibid. Harriman's influential friends and acquaint­
ances, which included Secretary of Labor Francis Perkins and 
Eleanor Roosevelt, probably also eased her appointment. More
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Harriman, a member of the women's suffrage movement since the 
turn of the century, might have been correct.
No woman had held the position of chief-of-mission in 
the American Foreign Service before Ruth Bryan Owen reached 
Copenhagen, Denmark, in 1933. Like most male-dominated organi­
zations of its day, the Foreign Service was a bastion of male 
chauvinism. No friend of the Foreign Service, FDR may well 
have taken great delight in placing a woman into the top ranks 
of the old-boys club. He was not immune, either, to the symbol­
ism inherent in establishing an historic precedent.
Happenstance also played a large role in Owen's appoint­
ment. The daughter of William Jennings Bryan, himself a 
three-time Democratic presidential candidate and a secretary 
of state under Woodrow Wilson, Ruth Owen grew up in the 
middle west and attended the University of Nebraska. In 1925 
she joined the faculty of the University of Miami, where she 
also served on the board of regents. Three years later the 
fourth district in Florida elected Owen to Congress. She
over, she apparently had served creditably as the only woman 
appointee to the Federal Industrial Relations Commission under 
Woodrow Wilson.
Contrary to E. Wilder Spaulding, it is unlikely that 
"the friendly support of...Senator Tom Walsh of Montana... 
sufficed for the [Harriman] appointment to Norway." Although 
Walsh was influential with FDR— the President slated him for 
the cabinet slot of attorney general— he died prior to the 
inauguration in 1933. Harriman was appointed in 1937. 
Ambassadors Ordinary and Extraordinary, 186. On Walsh's 
death, see Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 158.
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serve d two terms in the U.S. House before suffering defeat 
at the polls in the 19 32 primary race, after which she cam­
paigned vigorously for her fellow Democrat and family friend,
19 EFranklin D. Roosevelt.
Owen became a prime candidate for a position in the New
Deal administration following FDR's victory in November. The
Ttesident-elect first mentioned Owen to his advisers as a
possibility for his cabinet early in 1933. He wanted to be
the first U.S. chief-of-state to appoint a member of the
196female sex to a cabinet post. Moreover, his wife Eleanor
and Mary W. Dewson, both stalwarts in the Democratic party,
exerted pressure upon the President to appoint more women to
197important positions. However, the selection of Francis
Perkins, FDR's commissioner of labor in New York, to head the
Department of Labor satisfied Roosevelt's quota of women
cabinet members. When Secretary of Interior Harold L. Ickes,
the "old curmudgeon," objected to appointing Owen, or any
other woman, as his assistant, the diplomatic corps became a
198not unlikely refuge for the great orator's daughter.
195spaulding, Ambassadors Ordinary and Extraordinary, 
180-184; Washington Merry-Go-Hound,~21-29♦~
196Moley, After Seven Years, 111, and First New Deal, 73.
197Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, 387-390.
198Diary entries, March 11 and 13, 1933, Ickes, Secret 
Diary, I, 5-6.
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Owen approached Raymond Moley for assistance in pro­
curing a State Department position in March 1933. She 
informed Moley, possibly with FDR's blessing, that she enter­
tained the ambition of becoming an assistant secretary of 
state. She impressed Moley: He described her as "an extra­
ordinarily attractive woman," noted his idolization of her 
father, and pledged to assist her. Like Ickes, however, 
Secretary Hull was less than receptive to the idea of a woman
assistant, particularly one whose reputed oratorical talents
199equalled those of her father's.
Soon thereafter she received the appointment to Denmark. 
Besides being the first of the female species to attain the 
diplomatic status of minister, she possessed solid political 
credentials. She was the daughter of a famous Democratic 
politician, a firm supporter of the New Deal, and a defeated 
congresswoman seeking government employment. In appointing 
Owen to the Danish legation, FDR established a precedent., 
but more by accident than by design. Owen resigned from her 
post in 1936 following her marriage to a Danish military
200officer and subsequent acquisition of Danish citizenship.
Roosevelt seemed to. choose equally and haphazardly be­
199Moley, First New Deal, 73.
200Spaulding, Ambassadors Ordinary and Extraordinary,
183-184.
tween amateurs and professionals in selecting envoys to the
other Scandinavian posts. Alvin Owsley./ a Texas Democrat who
had served earlier in Rumania and Ireland, succeeded Owen in
201Copenhagen in 1936. When he resigned on the eve of World
War II, Ray Atherton, a career diplomat of twenty-four years,
replaced■him. As consul general to the London embassy,
Atherton had earned the pique of Ambassador Bullitt who
202described him to FDR as an "imitation Englishman." What­
ever Roosevelt's thoughts, Atherton enjoyed the respect of 
William Phillips and other Foreign Service insiders.
Sandwiched between his appointment to Denmark were tours as
203chief-of-mission to Bulgaria and Canada.
Roosevelt retained another career diplomat, Hoffman 
Phillip, in Oslo, NorwayJ until July 19 36, when he transferred 
him to Chile. Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., succeeded
OK • 1 -I ■ • AT 204Phillip m  Norway.
201 FDR to Bullitt, April 26, 1935, Bullitt, For The Presi­
dent, 114; State Department Biographic Register, 19 39, 224.
^^Bullitt to FDR, March 4, 1936, Nixon, FDR and Foreign 
Affairs, III, 233. See also R. Walton Moore to FDR, November
25, 1936, ibid., 507.
20 3Weil, Pretty Good Club, 203; State Department Bio­
graphic Register, 1940, 56.
204State Department Biographic Register, 1938, 210.
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FDR initially encountered difficulty in finding a 
suitable diplomatic mission for Tony Biddle. Few political 
appointees were more deserving than Tony. A descendant of 
the wealthy Biddle banking-house family of Philadelphia, Tony 
Biddle presented a charming, athletic, and socially prominent 
appearance. He also was an eager, intelligent, and active 
Democrat. However, in addition, he was divorced, a fact 
that disturbed his family and caused the Irish government to 
refuse to accept him as FDR's choice for the Dublin legation 
in 1934. With the transfer of Hoffman Phillip to Chile in 
1935, a move made possible by the resignation of Hal H. Sevier, 
a political protege of Vice President Garner and then
ambassador to Chile, Roosevelt sent Biddle to Norway. Eigbr
205teen months.later, FDR shifted Biddle to Poland.
To Helsinki, Finland, FDR first sent an amateur and later 
a professional diplomat. Edward Albright, a former U.S. 
marshal and Tennessee newspaper owner, devoid of diplomatic
experience, received the Finnish post in 1933. He died one
206month after his transfer to Costa Rica m  19 37.
H.F. Arthur Schoenfeld replaced Albright in Helsinki. A 
diplomatist for twenty years, Schoenfeld had resigned from the
205FDR to Bullitt, April 21, 1936, Bullitt, For The 
President, 113.
206State Department Biographic Register, 19 37, 311.
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Service in 1930 after Hoover had canceled two of his mini­
sterial appointments. Reinstated in 1931 as minister to the
Dominican Republic, he remained there until the New Deal
207administration shifted him to Finland in 1937.
Ill
The twelve countries of Central and Eastern Europe in­
cluded some of the most politically sensitive and significant 
diplomatic missions in the world. Marked historically by a 
melange of antagonistic ethnic and racial groups, Central and
Eastern Europe had proven a staging ground for events leading
2 08to World War I. They came to reoccupy that ground during 
the 19 30s as the Nazis sought advantage for their militaristic 
aims by encouraging divisiveness among the diverse national­
istic elements that comprised many of the Central and Eastern 
European nations.
Roosevelt filled more Central and Eastern European posts 
from the ranks of the Foreign Service than he had in Western 
Europe and Scandinavia. That professionals outnumbered 
amateurs reflected less FDR's sensitivity to the importance of
207Ibid., 1940, 179.
208Two superbly written accounts of the events leading to 
World War I are Laurence LaFore, The Long Fuse, An interpre­
tation of the Origins of World War I (Philadelphia: J.B.
Lippincott, 1965), and Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August 
(N.Y.: Macmillan, 1962).
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these missions than the unattractiveness of most Central and 
Eastern European capitals to amateurs.
Central and Eastern Europe often have appeared too drab, 
too desolate, and too unglamorous to amateurs. For instance, 
neither Bucharest, Rumania— located near the Black Sea— nor 
Prague, Czechoslovakia— an industrial hub city on the banks 
of the Ultava River— have excited the campaign contributor 
seeking a diplomatic post as a just reward. Between 1915 
and 1971, only eight amateurs accepted appointments to these 
cities. During the same period, by comparison, thirteen 
amateurs and three career officers served in Paris, France, 
while seventeen amateurs and no career diplomats headed the 
London embassy.^09
One of the most important missions in Eastern Europe 
during the 19 30s was Moscow. Following United States recog­
nition of the Soviet Union in 19 33, Roosevelt dispatched two 
amateurs— first, William C. Bullitt and, then, Joseph E.
Davies— to represent the United States with the Soviets.
Davies departed for the Belgian court in June 1938. Not 
until March 23, 1939, did Roosevelt select his third ambass­
ador to Russia, who was also an amateur.
Neither the President nor the State Department displayed
209The statistics are from materials supplied to the author 
in a letter from Frederick Aandahl, Director, Operations Staff, 
Office of the Historian, Department of State, March 2, 1979.
See also United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-197,3, passim.
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any urgency in seeking a successor to Joseph Davies. Upon 
departing for his new assignment in Belgium/ Davies suggested 
that Roosevelt appoint Sidney Weinberg, a New York lawyer and 
colleague, to Moscow. Roosevelt apparently concurred, and
offered the post to Weinberg, who declined for personal
210reasons. In the meantime, the State Department worked to
discourage other amateur applicants for the embassy. One 
aspiring candidate, Pierrepont B. Noyes, president of Oneida, 
Ltd., wrote the Department to inquire about the expenses of 
an ambassador to Moscow. Not content to rely upon a written 
response alone, a Department official undertook to dissuade
Noyes over lunch. Noyes evinced no further interest in the
^  211 post.
The President and the State Department likely had 
different reasons for moving slowly to fill the Moscow 
embassy. The President's motivations probably reflected 
domestic considerations; the State Department's a desire to 
control foreign policy with the Soviets. Increasingly cog­
nizant and wary of an isolationist Congress/ Roosevelt may 
have reasoned that it was best not to arouse Congress, that 
it was best not to risk the immediate appointment of someone 
like a Bullitt or a Davies who might too eagerly espouse
210Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 284-285.
2 1 1 Ibid., 285 ftn. 58.
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internationalist sentiments and who would have to pass U.S. 
Senate scrutiny in confirmation hearings. Or Roosevelt may 
simply not have thought about it at all, preferring to 
allow events to dictate an outcome. On the other hand, 
officers within the State Department, especially the "old” 
Russian hands who held a deep and abiding distrust of the 
Soviet leadership, were content to leave the Moscow embassy 
to Loy Henderson, the charge d'affaires, until they could 
exert influence in appointing the next ambassador. Henderson, 
a professional diplomat, shared the State Department's 
suspicions of the Soviet regime; his reports reflected that
212perspective in marked contrast to those Davies had propagated.
The President and the State Department eventually agreed
upon Laurence Steinhardt. As ambassador to Peru, Steinhardt
had concluded early in 1939 that he deserved a more important
diplomatic assignment. The physical conditions of the Peruvian
213embassy were deplorable, and he was bored. Certainly Roose­
velt would not want Steinhardt, a member of a prominent New 
York Democratic family, to become disenchanted. At the same
212For instance, see Thomas R. Maddux, "American Relations 
With the Soviet Union, 1933-1941" (unpublished Ph.D. disserta­
tion, University of Michigan, 1969), 210-211, 255-^256, 258; 
Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 358-359; Kennan, Memoirs, 61, 81-83. 
Born in 1892, Henderson entered the Diplomatic Service in 1922.
He served as secretary of embassy at Moscow from 1934 to 1938.
213Stackman, "New Deal Diplomat," 156.
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time, Steinhardt had become a highly respectable diplomat by
State Department standards. Speaking for his colleagues,
Hull noted that he had "always found Steinhardt to be alert
and very efficient as a diplomatic reporter, especially during
214perilous times." Besides, it may have been apparent that
Steinhardt, unlike Davies, shared the hard-line views of the 
Soviet specialists in the State Department.
The president and the State Department welcomed Stein­
hardt' s appointment. Hull recalled that he "suggested to 
the President that" Steinhardt "be transferred" from Peru "to
the higher and more responsible post at Moscow, to which Mr.
215Roosevelt agreed." Departing for Moscow in August 1939,
Steinhardt arrived in time to witness the conclusion of the 
Nazi-Soviet Pact and the commencement of World War II.
Pior to the establishment of United States diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union in 1933, the legation in 
Riga, Latvia^ served as an important western window on the 
Soviet border. After 1933 its importance diminished. Even 
though the minister to Latvia also held accreditation to
9 1 4 Hull, Memoirs, I, 603-604.
2 1 5 Ibid., 60 3.
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Estonia and Lithuania, the legation's activities were
limited: Few Americans whose interests required government
protection lived in the area, and the passage of the Johnson
Act by Congress in 1934 all but ended the meac^r commercial
216relations that existed. Moreover, as the wife of one Foreign
Service officer said, Riga was a cold, dreary, and lonely
217place "where amusements were scarce."
Riga provoked little excitement among campaign contribu­
tors seeking their entitlements. Between 1922 and the absorp­
tion of Latvia into the Soviet Union as a constituent republic
in 1940, only one noncareer diplomat received the honor of
218representing the United States at Riga.
Named after Senator Hiram Johnson of California, the 
Johnson Act provided prohibitions against loans to countries 
that were in debt to the U.S. government. The act was aimed 
at punishing those nations that had defaulted on loans made by 
the U.S. during World War I. See Dallek, Roosevelt and Ameri­
can Foreign Policy, 74.
217Irena Wiley, Around the Globe in Twenty Years, (N.Y.: 
David McKay, 1962), 92-93. See also Kennan, Memoirs, 28-31; 
Petrov, Study in Diplomacy, 84.
218Frederick W.B. Coleman of Minnesota, a noncareer diplo­
mat, served at Riga from 1922 to 1931. From 1931 to. 1933, he 
headed the mission in Denmark. United States Chiefs of Mission, 
1778-1973, 41, 91.
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Three professional diplomats served Successively in 
Latvia under FDR. All three possessed solid diplomatic back­
grounds. All had followed well-worn paths to careers in diplo­
macy.
The first, John V.A. MacMurray, held degrees from
Princeton and Columbia. He was a scholar and a veteran of
twenty-five years experience in Far Eastern Affairs, including
tours as chief of the State Department's Far Eastern Affairs
Division and as minister to China. Dissatisfied with the
direction of U.S. Far Eastern policy under Secretary of State Henry
Stimson, MacMurray resigned from the Service in 1929 to direct
the new Page School of International Relations at Johns Hopkins'
2 19University. Prompted by friends in the Department, who
hoped to arrange his appointment as the first United States 
ambassador to the Soviet Union, MacMurray reentered the Service 
in 1933 to accept the assignment to Latvia, presumably the 
first leg on the journey to Moscow. He never saw service in 
Moscow, although he held the ambassadorship to Turkey from 
1936 to 1942.220
219Buckley, "Diplomacy of an American Mandarin," 27-48.
220The importance of the Far East in Soviet foreign 
policy calculations and MacMurray's experience in the Far East 
also made him a logical candidate for the Moscow embassy. See 
Phillips to FDR, April 8, 1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs,I, 50-51., and The New Dealers, 386.
-303-
Arthur Bliss Lane succeeded MacMurray in Latvia. Prior
to entering the Diplomatic Service in 1917., Lane tyas graduated
from Yale and studied abroad at the Ecole de L'lle de France.
During the New Deal, he became one of FDR's, most-widely
traveled diplomats. Bright, active, and sometimes impetuous,
Lane was in 19 33, at the age of thirty-nine, the youngest
chief-of-mission in the Service. Sandwiched around his stint
in Latvia were tours as minister to Nicaragua and Yugoslavia,
221all engineered by the State Department.
John C. Wiley followed Lane in Latvia in 1938. Born in 
France of American parents, he attended Georgetown University 
Law School prior to enrolling in the Service in 1915. As a 
young diplomat, Wiley received high praise for his work as 
consul to the embassies in Moscow and Vienna. His appoint­
ment to Riga represented a just promotion in the eyes of his 
222colleagues.
One amateur diplomat did serve a tour as minister to 
Lithuania under FDR. He achieved the distinction of being the 
only American envoy ever to serve solely as the minister to 
that country, his predecessors having been accredited also to 
Estonia and Latvia while residing at Riga.
221Petrov, Study in Diplomacy, 1-10, 8 3-85, 97. Lane
resigned from the Foreign Service in 194 7.
222For instance, see R. Walton Moore to FDR, November 25,
1936, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, III, 508.
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Owen J.C. Norem, a Lutheran pastor and resident of
Montana, proceeded to Kaunas, Lithuanians minister in 1937.
He remained there until the U.S.S.R. annexed Lithuania in
194 0. Although the reason for his appointment is obscure,
Senator James E. Murray of Montana may have been instrumental
in securing his nomination. A Democrat and avid supporter of
the New Deal, Murray later penned a brief forward to a book
authored by Norem, Timeless Lithuania, in which he lauded the
223Montanan's accomplishments.
No mystery enshrines FDR's appointment of two amateurs 
to the embassy in Warsaw, Poland. John Cudahy, who served in 
Poland from 1933 to 1937 prior to obtaining the Irish post, 
and Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., who served from 19 37 to 
19 39 following a tour in Norway, were generous campaign contri­
butors. Cudahy's donations totaled more than $10,000, while
Biddle's reached $33,700, both sums worthy of especial 
224notoriety.
Little sense can be gleaned from FDR's selection of 
envoys to the legation in Prague, Czechoslovakia. The first 
two men to head the post in Czechoslovakia— a highly industria­
lized nation located strategically in East-Central Europe—
22 3Timeless Lithuania (Chicago: Amerlith Press, 1943).
224Kiplinger, Washington Is Like That, 260-261.
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possessed extensive diplomatic experience in Latin American 
affairs. The third, while also a career officer, had never 
held a diplomatic post outside of Washington, D.C.
Francis White occupied the Czech legation from June to
November 1933, when he resigned from the Service. A Yale
Ph.D., White entered the Service in 1915. Twelve of his
seventeen years in the Service, prior to Roosevelt's election,
225were spent in dealing with Latin American relations. White
was highly regarded as a Latin American specialist. As harsh
a critic of the Foreign Service as Fobert S. Allen described
226White as "a peacemaker in Latin American disputes."
As minister to Czechoslovakia, White also impressed William E.
Dodd, the ambassador to Germany, who usually found little to
like about career officers. Dodd wrote that White was "a
loyal, industrious official" who, however, was "not well-
227informed about Europe m  any way."
White initially balked at the prospect of an appointment 
to Czechoslovakia. Although the State Department regarded 
Prague as one of the more important posts in Europe, White
225State Department Biographic Register,19 34, 2 74; 
Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 95; Pearson and' Brown,-' Diplomatic 
Game, 288-290.
226Washington Merry-Go-Round, 155.
^^Diary entry, September 22, 1933, Dodd, Dodd's Diary,
40.
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feared for the health of his children, he told Undersecretary
Phillips, "on account of the climatic conditions and the
apparent impossibility of living in the legation, which is in
228an almost impossible condition." To no avail, Phillips
suggested that FDR consider sending White to Hungary, which 
presumably offered better living accommodations.
Why the New Deal administration failed to slate White 
for a post in Latin America is uncertain. Perhaps Sumner 
Welles, intent upon sidetracking a potential rival for 
supremacy in U.S.-Latin American relations, engineered 
White's exile to Eastern Europe. The careers of Welles and 
White contained elements that hint at rivalry. Welles 
was graduated from Harvard, and White- from Yale.
Both entered the Service together in 1915. Both quickly 
attained solid reputations in Latin American affairs. Both 
weie only forty-one years old in 19 33. At the time of his 
commission to Czechoslovakia, White was the Assistant Secre­
tary of State for Latin American Affairs. When Welles 
assumed that responsibility in April 1933, another 
position had to be found for White. That Welles could have 
employed his considerable influence with the President to 
find White a suitable post in Latin America, instead of 
Eastern Europe, appears plausible enough. That he did not
22 8Phillips to FDR, April 8, 19 33, Nixon, FDR and Foreign 
Affairs, I, 50. See also Weil, Pretty Good Club, 83.
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suggests that Welles may have played a role in White's 
transfer to Eastern Europe.
On the other hand, the White House regarded White as a
Republican. Jay Pierrepont Moffat, then chief of the Division
of Western European Affairs, wrote to Hugh Wilson on April 19,
1933, that White, as well as Hugh Gibson, probably would be
transferred because, as a prominent Democrat revealed to
him, "they have both been too intimately tied up as exponents
229of the previous administration in their particular fields." 
Soon thereafter, White, a Latin American expert, sailed for 
Prague, while Gibson, a European specialist, went to Rio de 
Janerio.
Joshua Butler Wright succeeded White in Prague in 1934.
\Then minister to Uruguay, Wright entered the diplomatic corps
in 1909 following graduation from Princeton land brief careers
230in banking and cattle ranching. , A diplomat of the old\ j
school, described by a colleague alb "handsome, charming, 
debonair...a model of manly eleganjce," who /"talked to all 
classes of people," Wright's expertise was' principally in
229Pratt, Cordell Hull, I, 23.
White left the Service on November 30, 1933. He 
later returned and served, in among other positions, as 
President Eisenhower's ambassador to Mexico and Sweden. 
United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1973, 227.
2 30State Department Biographic Register, 1940, 228; Vfeshington Merry-Go-Round, i4>>.
2 31Latin American affairs. In 1937 he became FDR's ambassador
to Cuba, a post he held until his death two years later.
Wright's transfer from Czechoslovakia to Cuba occurred
2 32amidst a major shifting of United States envoys abroad.
Between April and August 1937, 30 of the 55 American 
embassies and legations opened their doors to new chiefs-of- 
mission, ten on July 13 alone. With the exception of the 
early months of FDR's first administration, when the Presi­
dent made 31 changes in the missions overseas, this period 
saw the largest single turnover of posts abroad prior to 
World War II. Not surprisingly, this period also coincided 
with the advent of Roosevelt's second term.
Somewhat surprising, however, was the announcement on 
July jl3, 19 37, that Wilbur J. Carr would succeed Wright in 
Czechoslovakia. Carr had labored for forty-five years in the 
bureaucratic labyrinth of the State Department. As the chief
architect of the professional Foreign Service, he was legendary
i 2 3 3xn the consciousness of every career officer. Carr was
also sixty-seven years old in 1937, planned to retire shortly,
2 31Beaulac, Career Ambassador, 147-148. See also 
Villard, Affairs at State, 138.
2 32See Ickes, Secret Diary, II, 102; Heinrichs, "Bureau­
cracy," 197.
233Kennan, Memoirs, 89.
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and possessed no overseas diplomatic experience.
The volatile confrontation brewing between Nazi Germany
and Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1937, moreover, appeared
to dictate the need for a first-rate, experienced diplomat
in Prague. From France, Ambassador Bullitt advised Roosevelt
on May 5 that "Czechoslovakia will be a post of the most vital
importance during the next twelve months." The United States,
Bullitt stated, "shall need at Prague a man who knows Germany
, 234and Czechoslovakia intimately and has guts.
The administration evidently paid little heed to Bul­
litt's warning. In June Roosevelt directed Hull to inform
2 35Carr that "the President wants you to go to Prague."
Once before, in November 1933, FDR had suggested the Prague 
post for Carr, if Carr wanted it. Then, Carr, who did not 
want the appointment, asked Phillips whether the President 
definitely wanted him to go. Phillips replied, "no," and
informed Roosevelt that Carr "could not be spared" from the
—. . i . 2 36 Department.
Once again Carr hesitated to accept the Czech assignment.
23^Bullitt, For The President, 212.
235Crane, Mr. Carr, 329.
236Ibid., 325.
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He had no desire to be a chief-of-mission at this late date 
in his career. Concerned about his own lack of qualifcations 
for the job, Carr confided to his diary that "I do not know 
the language and have little knowledge of world affairs."
Many of his friends, moreover, urged him to decline the 
appointment, arguing that it represented no promotion for a 
man who had led the Foreign Service establishment.
Carr eventually accepted, however. He always had placed
237loyalty to his government ahead of personal considerations.
Besides, Carr assumed that Roosevelt, in appointing him,
believed that the Germans would arrive in Prague before he
did, thus forcing him into a belated and well-deserved retire- 
238ment. However, Carr was to serve m  the explosive Prague
environment for nearly twenty months, until the.Nazi takeover 
of Czechoslovakia in March 19 39', at which time he retired 
from the Service.
State Department officials may have directed Carr's 
appointment. According to George F. Kennan, then a secretary 
at the Prague post, the staff at the legation strongly sus­
pected that Carr's superiors had engineered his appointment 
to Czechoslovakia "as a well-deserved tribute to a long life
237 .Ibid., 329.
2 38Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 184-185.
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of unassuming service, and as a suitable way of rounding it
O ■3Qoff.' Less than enthusiastic about having to reconcile
the demands of contributors and professionals for chief-of- 
mission assignments, Roosevelt simply may have acceded to 
the wishes of the Department in Carr’s case.
Less laudatory motivations also may have played a part 
in the Department's "tribute" to Carr. During the mid-1930s, 
the organization of the Foreign Service began to evolve along 
lines incompatible with Carr's methodical bureaucratic 
administration. The younger, post-Rogers Act officers com­
plained that Carr's administrative methods were too rigid, 
too unimaginative, and too unresponsive. They actively urged 
a restructuring of the Service that would be more responsive 
to professional abilities and less reliant upon compliance 
with bureaucratic rules. The movement for change and the 
often thinly-veiled criticisms of his out-dated methods hurt
Carr's feelings and may have compelled him to intensify his
240 v"bureaupathic behavior."
Compounding Carr's difficulties was Roosevelt's penchant 
239Memoirs, 89. .As the- situation :in Prague became more acute xn
September 1938, Moffat recorded in his diary that "poor old 
Mr. Carr who was supposed to be having a quiet post in which 
to pass his declining years certainly seems to have been 
forced into the thick of it." Hooker, Moffat Papers, 201.
240Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 185.
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for encouraging loose and even chaotic administrative habits 
among his subordinates. For Carr, guiding the Foreign Ser­
vice under FDR was unpleasant at best and humiliating at 
worst. The "tribute" thus conferred upon the old man by his 
colleagues may have been recognition of his right to chief- 
of-mission distinction as well as recognition of the end of 
his usefulness as the venerable Father of the Foreign Service.
In any event, the precise reasons for Carr's appoint­
ment remain entombed with President Roosevelt. Unlike many 
a political appointee, however, Carr could be expected to 
rely upon the counsel of his subordinates in the legation—  
all career officers— in reporting upon events and in advising 
his government.
The same could not be said for FDR's first appointment
to the important post in Vienna, Austria. George H. Earle,
III, had little to commend him to diplomacy. Scion of a
wealthy Main Line Pennsylvania Republican clan with large
holdings in the sugar business, Earle joined the Democratic
party in 1932 and contributed substantially to Roosevelt's
241campaign coffers. Rewarded with the legation in Austria,
he soon earned the reputation among State Department officials
241State Department Biographic Register, 1940, 95;
"Mi 1 estones," Time (January 13, 1975) , TE~.
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as "a master of indiscretion and inaccurate statements."
In March 1934 Earle solved the problem of how to ease his 
retirement from diplomacy by resigning to run successfully 
for governor of Pennsylvania.
Earle's resignation coincided well with the aspirations 
of George S. Messersmith. Following fourteen years as an 
instructor and administrator in the Delaware public school 
system, Messersmith had entered the Consular Service in 1914. 
Newly-wed in 1913 he had feared that his career in education 
would not satisfy his financial needs or the interests of 
his bride. By the mid-1920s he had attained the rank of 
consul general and was recognized by his colleagues as the 
dean of the consular branch of the Foreign Service. By late 
1933 Messersmith longed for an appointment as a chief-of- 
mission. Such an appointment would secure his transfer to 
the diplomatic wing of the Service and ease his advance to
242Moss, "Bureaucrat as Diplomat," 102.Others found Earle similarly unimpressive. Dodd,
for instance, described Earle as "one of the rich men appoint­
ed to foreign posts who know little history of their own or 
any other country." Diary entry, January 16, 1934, Dodd's 
Diary, 71-72.
243When, in 1939, Earle was once again looking for 
employment, Bullitt urged FDR to find a position for him.
FDR to Bullitt, May 16, 1939, Bullitt, For The President, 353. 
Earle subsequently served as minister to Bulgaria (1940-1941), 
and as U.S. naval attache' in Istanbul where he reportedly 
romanced a woman in the employ of the Nazi intelligence 
services. Petrov, Study in Diplomacy, 141.
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244higher posts in the State Department.
Messersmith held impressive credentials that supported 
his ambitions for promotion. Often described by contempora­
ries as a diplomat who demonstrated a cool temper, grasp of 
details, logical exposition, and analytical insight, he
commanded respect from Foreign Service insiders and out- 
245siders. As consul general in Berlin in 19 33, Messersmith
was the first officer to warn the State Department, with 
prophetic lenses, that Hitler had no desire for peace unless 
it was a peace that would be at the expense of complete 
compliance with German demands. A trusted reporter from his 
vantage point in Berlin, he believed his record made him an 
eligible candidate for a ministership. He also encouraged 
his colleagues and friends to lobby the State Department and 
the President on his b e h a l f . \  1
His promotion to head the Austrian legation? in 1934 was 
largely the work of State Department officials, jOn March 19 
Roosevelt nominated Messersmith for the position] of minis,/ter
i244Kenneth Moss, "George S. Messersmith: An American
Diplomat and Nazi Germany," Delaware Hi story, 27 (Fall-Winter 
1977), 236-237, and Moss, "Bureaucrat as Diplomat," 1-99, 101. 
See also Dallek, "Beyond Tradition," 233-244.
245Traina, Diplomacy and Civil War, 124. See also 
Beaulac, Career Ambassador, 148-149.
246Moss, "Bureaucrat as Diplomat," 5 5-120.
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to Uruguay. Although Messersmith would have preferred a
mission closer to events in Europe, he had spent most of his
consular career in Latin America and the prospective promo-
2 4 7tion pleased him. With the resignation of Earle on
March 25, another opportunity presented itself. Among others, 
Undersecretary Phillips persuaded the President that Messer­
smith 's intimate knowledge of Nazi psychology could better
24be employed from the helm m  Vienna. FDR readily concurred.
Whether Roosevelt fully appreciated Messersmith1s 
qualifications is uncertain. The idea of Messersmith as a
minister delighted Roosevelt— but less it seemed from a
recognition of Messersmith's abilities than from the Presi­
dent's own disdain of professional diplomats. As John 
Gunther, then a European correspondent for. the Chicago Daily 
News, recalled from an interview with the President in 1934, 
Roosevelt had asked him whether he knew Messersmith. Gunther 
had replied, "yes." Roosevelt broke out laughing. "That was 
a good joke on the State Department, wasn't it! Just think
what the career boys will say! I've put a lonely consul into
249a diplomatic post."
247Diary entry, March 10, 19 34, Dodd, Dodd's Diary, 92.
248Moss, Bureaucrat as Diplomat," 102-103.
249Gunther, Roosevelt in Retrospect, 23.
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A few members of the old-boys club evidently believed
that it was unjust of FDR to bypass diplomatic personnel in
favor of a consul. Most State Department officials, however,
agreed that Messersmith's appointment was wise. Moffat, for
instance, thought that Messersmith was the right man for a
250"frightfully complicated situation." Indeed, so highly
were Messersmith's talents regarded that the Department 
recalled him in 1937 because it believed his great knowledge 
of Central European affairs would be of more value in Washing­
ton. He subsequently became the Assistant Secretary of State
for departmental administration, replacing Carr, while also
251retaining a strong voice in policy matters.
In Messersmith's stead to Vienna Roosevelt sent Gren­
ville Emmet. A former law partner of the President's, then 
fifty-six years old and minister to the Netherlands, Emmet 
evidently desired a change. An amateur, he possessed little 
or no expertise in Central European affairs. Perhaps FDR 
determined that nothing could be accomplished in Vienna to
turn the tide against war. In any event, Emmet died three
252months after his arrival and was not replaced.
250Moss, "Bureaucrat as Diplomat," 103.
251Ibid., 155-158; Langer and Gleason, Challenge to 
Isolation, 21.
252See Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 59 ftn. 2, and
II, 52 ftn. 1.
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The least important country in Eastern Europe was 
Albania. Prior to 1922 the United States had no formal 
diplomatic relations with Albania. A country of mild summers 
and harsh winters, isolated from the main currents of European 
affairs, and industrially primitive, Albania forbode an 
unpleasant tour of duty for any appointee. Albania was an 
ideal place for exiling a disliked colleague or a troublesome 
politico. Since no campaign contributor stepped forward to 
claim Albania, Roosevelt allowed the State Department to 
exercise the perogative in selecting a minister.
The State Department chose to send Post Wheeler, one of
253its own, to Albania. A career officer, Wheeler was then
minister to Paraguay, a post he had held since late 1929.
Mutual disesteem and hostility characterized the relation­
ship between Wheeler and his superiors in the Department. In 
1955 Wheeler and his wife publicly revealed their animosity 
toward the Department and the Foreign Service in a then 
controversial memoir:
Much of our thought [Mrs. Wheeler stated] 
since he retired from the Foreign Service 
at the statutory age limit [in 1934] had 
been given to the story of that Service.
Not as we had once in our ignorance imagined 
it, nor as its apologists have described, 
but as we ourselves had found it in three
National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, LXII 
(1958), 379.
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decades of unbroken experience. That 
story needed telling.It should be written in cold blood....
And over-weighing all other considera­
tions was the belief that the story must 
bring both the State Department and 
Foreign Service into disrepute....we 
told ourselves that a Hercules must 
appear to cleanse the Augean stables.
The failure of their friend, Senator Joseph McCarthy, to
substantiate his charges against the Department and the
Foreign Service in the early 1950s had convinced the Wheelers
254to publish their "expose."
The antagonism between Wheeler and the Department
evolved over many years. Prior to entering the Diplomatic
Service in 1906, Wheeler received an A.B. at Princeton and
taught briefly as an English instructor. By inclination and
profession, he considered himself a poet, but had an "itch,"
his wife recalled, "for seeing what made government wheels go
round." In embarking upon a diplomatic career, Wheeler was
the first candidate to ever take an entrance examination. He
subsequently described himself as "the first 'career diplomat1
of the American Foreign Service." Wheeler was "satisfied that
no Princeton, Yale, or Harvard senior could have passed it with
255a grade over 65." In fact, only two of 25 who took the
254Post Wheeler and Hallie Erminie Rives (Mrs. Post 
Wheeler) , Dome of Many-Coloured Glass (Garden City, N.Y.: Double­
day, 1955), 1-2.
255 Ibid., 200-205.
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256exam between 1906 and 1909 received less than 70.
The examination, however, failed to gain Wheeler 
admission to the Diplomatic Service. As Mrs. Wheeler candidly 
revealed, she approached her cousin, the powerful Speaker of 
the U.S. House of Representatives, Joseph Cannon, who succeed­
ed in persuading President Theodore Roosevelt to arrange a
257diplomatic appointment for her husband.
By 1916 Post Wheeler had come to regard the State
Department and those who controlled its upper reaches with
profound disfavor. Blessed with an abundance of arrogance
and paranoia, Wheeler had not attained the high rank in the
258Service that he believed his talents warranted.
Mrs. Wheeler recalled her husband's transfer to the 
Albanian legation in 1933 with much bitterness. A phone call 
came from Undersecretary Phillips in the spring of 1933:
I came from the bedroom as Wheeler took 
up the receiver....He beckoned me close 
so that cheek to cheek I got the whole 
message: 'This is to advise you that
your transfer to another legation has 
been decided upon.'
'Not an Embassy?' [Wheeler replied.]
256Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 91-92.
257Ibid., 89; Wheeler, Dome of Glass, 203.
258Wheeler, Dome of Glass, 5 73.
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11 offer you the ministership to 
Albania.1 Phillips stated.
'The smallest and least important 
country in Europe,' mused Wheeler,
'the world's only country without a 
rod of railroad....'
'Will you take it?'
'A famous Latin line comes to mind,' 
said Wheeler. 'But perhaps, Mr. Phillips, 
your studies at Harvard did not embrace 
that language of culture?.... I will trans­
literate it for you. My mountainous 
labors of twenty-five years bring forth 
a ludicrous mouse.'
'Do you take it?' The voice at the other 
end had a sudden edge.
'While I remain in the Service I carry out my orders.'259
A year later Wheeler retired from the Service at the manda­
tory retirement age of sixty-five.
The State Department also may have arranged the appoint­
ment of Wheeler's successor to Albania. Hugh G. Grant 
served there from 1935 until the fall of 1939 when Italian 
forces invaded and annexed thatnation. A native of Birming­
ham, Alabama, a graduate of Harvard and George Washington, 
Grant was a veteran political journalist for southern news­
papers as well as an instructor of history. From 1927 to 
1933, he worked as a private secretary for a U.S. senator, 
who may have helped secure him, with Moley's assistance, a
position as a divisional assistant in the State Department
26 0during FDR's first year in office. As a "tribute" to
259Ibid., 807.
260State Department Biographic Register, 1940, 110; 
Moley, After Seven Years, 134-135.
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Moley, who had left the Department in August 19 33, Department 
officials, many of whom held Moley in low repute, may have 
determined to exile Grant. In any event, the Albanian post 
attracted few eager adherents.
Two amateur political appointees, on the other hand,
elected to make Greece and Hungary their permanent homes
from 1933 to 1941. Both were friends of and contributors to
FDR's campaigns. Among the political friends FDR conferred
ambassadorial status upon, Lincoln MacVeagh, who served in
Athens, was unusual. Besides graduating magna cum laude
from Harvard in 1913, he was proficient in six languages,
261including Greek. John Flournoy Montgomery, who went to
Budapest, was more typical. Chairman of the International
Milk Company, he had been promised the post in Switserland
for his campaign efforts by William Gibbs McAdoo, then a
New Deal U.S. senator from California. When the Foreign
Service managed to retain a hold on the Berne post for pro-
262fessionals, Montgomery settled for Hungary.
Six professionals and one amateur split tours to the
261Current Biography; Who's News and Why (N.Y.: A.M.
Wilson, 1952), 75. For indications of the FDR-MacVeagh 
friendship, see Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, II, 6, 94, 
301-302.
Roosevelt Press Conference, June 9, 1933, Nixon, 
FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 219, 220 ftn. 2. See also 
Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 138.
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missions in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Five of the
six career officers had served as chiefs-of-mission during
the 1920s; four saw duty in more than one country during
26 3FDR's first two administrations. The amateur, Alvin Owsley,
also headed the missions in Ireland and Denmark. Of the 
seven appointees, the case of Ray Atherton reveals the most 
about the give-and-take between the White House and the State 
Department over appointments.
Atherton was a solid and polished diplomat typical of his
generation. A native of Brookline, Massachusetts, and a
Harvard graduate, he entered the diplomatic ranks in 1917
following ten years in the banking and architectural busines- 
264ses. As consul of the embassy in London in 1936,
Atherton incurred Roosevelt's ire when Ambassador Bullitt 
related to the P resident a remark b 
"(appropos of Atherton) about his w
i
sented in London by Americans, notjFDR subsequently informed;Assistant Secretary of State R.I ■. / 266Walton Moore that he wanted Atherton transferred from London.
the King of England
ish to see America repre-
265imitation Englishmen."
263See Appendices infra.
264State Department Biographic Register, 1940, 56.
y /r  c Bullitt to FDR, March 14, 1936, Nixon, FDR and Foreign 
Affairs, III, 234.
^^Moore to FDR, November 25, 19 36 , ibid., 507.
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A member of the old-boys club and a friend of Undersecretary 
Phillips, Atherton found himself minister to Bulgaria ten 
months later. Roosevelt succeeded in removing Atherton from 
London, but the consul's friends in the Department also 
succeeded in seeing that he received a promotion in the 
process. Two years later, Atherton became the Minister to 
Denmark.
IV
Nearly another world removed from Europe were two diplo­
matic missions of immense importance and concern to Washing­
ton officials. Although American statesmen traditionally 
have viewed an Atlantic-first strategy as the key to national
security, events simmering across the Pacific would precipi-
267tate United States entry into World War II. When FDR
assumed office in 1933, the diplomatic crisis spawned by
Japan's invasion of the northeastern Chinese province of
268Manchuria in 1931 commanded world-wide attention.
The delicate and potentially explosive situation in the 
267On America's historical Atlantic-first strategy, see 
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Paths to the Present (N.Y.: Macmillan,
1949), 149-173.
2 6 RSee Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far 
Eastern Crisis of 19 33-1938; From the Manchurian Incident 
Through the Initial Stage of the Undeclared Sino-Japanese War
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).
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Far East dictated the appointment of experienced and know­
ledgeable individuals to Peking and Tokyo. Forced to confront 
the economic depression at home, Roosevelt, not entirely 
unexpectedly, elected to recommission two highly-regarded 
career diplomats and Hoover appointees— Nelson T. Johnson to 
China and Joseph C. Grew to Japan.
That few, if any, deserving Democrats rushed forward to 
claim either post only made FDR's decision easier. In addi­
tion, FDR respected Henry L. Stimson, Hoover's secretary of 
state, under whom Johnson and Grew first served as envoys to 
China and Japan, and who encouraged the President to retain 
them. Roosevelt also retained several other Stimson subordi­
nates in the State Department, including Stanley K. Hornbeck
269as chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs. Finally,
both Johnson and Grew held superb diplomatic qualifications.
By 19 33 Johnson had behind him over twenty years of ex­
perience in Chinese affairs. Born of parents who pioneered 
in Indiana and Oklahoma, Johnson ;was graduated frcm high school 
in 1905. He aspired to attend Yale, but insufficient finances 
forced him to enter George Washington University. While in 
his first yearj he passed the entrance examination to 
the Consular Service and never returned to school. He began
269See Richard Dean Burns, "Stanley K. Hornbeck: The
Diplomacy of the Open Door," in Burns and Bennett, Diplomats 
in Crisis, 91-117.
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his diplomatic career in 1907 as a student interpreter in the 
Chinese capital of Peking. Assigned as consul in cities from 
Hankow to Chungking, Johnson rose to become chief of the 
Division of Far Eastern Affairs in 1925.
During his years as divisional chief Johnson played a 
large role in the formulation of United States Far Eastern 
policy. His conciliatory attitude toward China's demands 
for greater national sovereignty accorded well with the views 
of Secretaries of State Frank Kellogg and Henry Stimson. In 
November 1929, President Hoover appointed Johnson to succeed 
John V.A. MacMurray as minister to China.
Johnson possessed impressive qualifications for the 
Chinese post. Widely read in history, the classics, and 
geography, he knew China well, and he spoke the language 
fluently. He combined a friendly manner and quick wit, with 
the patience necessary to conduct diplomacy in China. The 
Chinese who had known Johnson during his days as a consular 
officer respected him.^^
270Russell D. Buhite, Nelson T. Johnson and American 
Policy Toward China, 1925-1941 (East Lansing: Michigan Uni­
versity Press, 1968), 4-10, 22, 35-37, 46-47; Herbert J. Wood, 
"Nelson Trusler Johnson: The Diplomacy of Benevolent Prag­
matism," in Burns and Bennett, Diplomats in Crisis, 7-24; 
Barbara W. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in 
China, 1911-1945 (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1971), 148; '
Washington Merry-Go-Round, 157-158.
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Johnson viewed his appointment within the context of
)the complex difficulties facing the Chinese. He did not 
exaggerate his own self-importance in solving their problems. 
"I feel confident," he wrote a friend before departing for 
China, "that when my tour of duty is ended I shall leave my 
successor as many problems as I shall find when I reach my 
desk in Peiping, "271
President Roosevelt never seriously considered replacing 
Johnson in 1933.2 In May 19 35, the legation in Peking was 
raised to embassy status, and Johnson assumed the rank of 
ambassador. In 1937, however, FDR urged John V.A. MacMurray 
to return to China as ambassador. MacMurray preferred to 
remain in Turkey; he informed the President that,he would 
scarcely be persona grata to Chiang Kai-shek and his advisers. 
Roosevelt quickly dropped the idea.
Only FDR, if even he, knew why he contemplated a shift
in envoys to China. That he considered a radical change in
United States China policy is doubtful, and he never informed
273Secretary Hull of any intention to replace Johnson.
271Johnson to Nicholas Roosevelt, November 15, 1929, 
Buhite, Nelson T. Johnson, 146.
2”̂2See FDR to Hull, March 9, 19 33, Nixon, FDR and Foreign 
Affairs, I, 21.
273Borg, United States and the Far Eastern Crisis, 590 
ftn. 112.
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More than any other man of his era, Joseph C. Grew 
exemplified and symbolized the best qualities of the American 
diplomat who attained professional status during the formative 
years of the Foreign Service. Besides possessing the social 
requisites for a career in diplomacy— economic substance,
New England ancestry, a Groton and Harvard education— Grew 
entered the old Diplomatic Service in 1904 "without examina­
tion, one of the last of the amateurs." Advancing steadily 
through the diplomatic ranks, he grasped every opportunity 
to learn the craft of diplomacy. In 1920 he achieved chief- 
of-mission status. By 1924 he was among those who were 
"chiefly responsible for inaugurating the nation's first 
fully professionalized Foreign Service." Symbolic of his 
involvement in the development of the career Service was his 
marriage to Alice Perry, a direct descendant of Benjamin 
Franklin and Commodore Oliver Perry: Their union produced
four daughters, three of whom married Foreign Service 
officers.
Grew's diplomatic career spanned nearly five decades.
He had the distinction to superintend the closing of the 
embassies in Vienna and Berlin when the United States entered 
World War I in 1917, just as he later would supervise the 
closing of the embassy in Tokyo when the United States 
entered World War II. Following tours as head of the missions 
in Denmark and Switzerland, Grew returned to Washington in
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1924 to serve as undersecretary of state, a position he held 
until 192 7 and through which he exercised special care in 
implementing the reforms outlined in the Rogers Act. From 
1927 to 1932, Grew held sway as the Aunbassador to Turkey.
Grew firmly cemented his reputation as a diplomatist 
while in Turkey. Popular with the Turks, he formed a lasting 
friendship with Mustapha Kemal, Turkey's reformist president, 
and he negotiated two treaties of historical significance in 
United States-Turkish relations. By 1932 Grew possessed a 
wide range of experiences in nearly every facet of diplomacy. 
Unabashedly, he considered diplomacy the "most splendid, the 
most exhilerating, the most stimulating, the most satisfying 
and withal the most useful form of service."
Nevertheless, Grew required more than experience and 
ability to survive the "quadrennial roulette of diplomatic 
assignments through eight administrations and forty years."
He worked hard to avoid displacement. He lobbied in the 
right places. He also was a charter member of the old-boys 
club, and the club always exerted special care in taking care 
of its own.
Grew's appointment to Japan in 1931 was a case in point. 
In November 1931, Assistant Secretary of State William R. 
Castle— a close friend of Grew's, a former ambassador himself 
to Japan, and a man of considerable influence in the Republi-
can administrations of the 1920s— asked Grew whether he would
like to be considered for the ambassadorship to Japan. The 
present A.mbassador, W. Cameron Forbes, a good-natured but 
absent-minded appointee, would soon be leaving. With his work 
in Turkey completed, Grew jumped at this "chance of a life-­
time." Three months later Castle arranged for Grew’s nomina­
tion to Tokyo.
Fortune had smiled upon Grew. When the Democrats 
assumed power in 1933, Grew was the new Ambassador to Japan 
instead of the old Ambassador to Turkey. He also had the 
fortuitous luck to have as President a man who shared with 
him Groton, Fly Club, and Harvard Crimson experiences. More­
over, Grew's old friend Billy Phillips was Undersecretary of
Following Roosevelt's victory, Grew waged a campaign to 
hold his post in Japan. He reminded the President-elect of 
their common social and educational background, and subtly
7 74Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 8-9, 17, 92-108, 110- 
120, 125, 132-154, 189-190, 358. See also Edward M. Bennett, 
"Joseph C. Grew: The Diplomacy of Pacification," in Burns and
Bennett, Diplomats in Crisis, 65-87; Charles E. Martin, "Jo­
seph Clark Grew: 'Decade of Infamy,'" in J.T. Salter, ed.,
Public Men In and Out of Office (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press), 36-52; Akira Iriya, "The Role of the 
United States Embassy in Tokyo," in Dorothy Borg and Sumpei 
Okamoto, eds., Pearl Harbor and History: Japanese-American
Relations, 1931-1941 (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1973),
107-126. On W. Cameron Forbes, Grew's predecessor, see 
Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Depression, 136-137, 281.
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but clearly conveyed his qualifications, wishes and loyalty
to the new administration. He also advised Billy Phillips
and several prominent Democrats of his desires. He did not
want to retire in his early fifties. He believed that he
needed time in Tokyo to develop friendships and acquaintances
in order to be able to interpret Japan to the United States
2 75and the United States to Japan.
Grew had little cause for concern. Moffat judged Grew
276the "safest" of all the career officers. Phillips, who
had recommended Grew for undersecretary of state in 1924, 
again mentioned his esteem and confidence in the Ambassador's 
ability. And former Secretary of State Henry Stimson added 
his praise.
Tokyo was never an open mission. Late in March 1933,
Grew received a telegram from Secretary Hull informing him 
that the President was satisfied with his work in Japan and 
wanted him to continue. Grew confided to his diary that he 
had not "expected such a message....This is really tantamount 
to a definite appointment under the new administration and it
2 75Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 188-189.
2 7 cDiary entry, March 6, 1933, Hooker, Moffat Papers, 90. 
About Grew, Hugh Wilson remarked that "I have never heard the 
rightness of one of his appointments questioned." Education 
of a Diplomat, 165.
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makes us very happy to know definitely that we are to carry
,,277 on."
Like his colleague in China, Grew was emminently quali­
fied. Although almost totally deaf, and unfamiliar with the 
Japanese language, Grew knew several languages fluently. He 
had acquired a complete command of diplomatic protocol. He 
regarded patience and integrity as the essential ingredients 
of sound diplomacy. As important, Grew understood that a 
diplomat might be operating under intelligent instructions 
and favorable conditions, but unless he could inspire confi­
dence and respect, his success was in doubt.
Only time could demonstrate the value of Grew's diplo­
macy. Grew had spent much of his career in posts where
278stability and order were the norms of experience. All
indications were that he would perform splendidly in the 
increasingly volatile world of Far Eastern diplomacy.
The other six missions in the Far East and Africa paled 
in significance alongside Peking and Tokyo. To them, Roose-
277Diary entry, March 23, 1933, Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years 
in Japan: A Contemporary Record Drawn from the Diaries and
Papers of Joseph C. Grew, United States Ambassador to Japan,
1932-1942 (N.Y. : Simon and Schuster, 1944) , 8 3.. See also
Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 189-190; FDR to Hull, March 9, 
1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 21.
2 78Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 147, 155-157, 161, 165.
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velt dispatched six Foreign Service officers and four 
279amateurs.
Typical of the amateur appointees was Bert Fish. A 
native of Indiana who taught in public schools prior to 
obtaining a law degree, Fish served without distinction as 
a Florida county criminal court judge from 1910 to 1917 and 
from 1931 to 193 3. In between he traveled extensively and 
invested heavily and successfully in the citrus grove 
business. Besides contributing to FDR's election, Fish's 
greatest qualification was his service as the financial dir­
ector of the Democratic National Committee. As his reward,
280he received the post in Cairo, Egypt.
Typical of the career appointees was Leo J. Keena who 
served as minister to the Union of South Africa from 1937 to 
1942. A native of the midwest, he attended the University of 
Michigan prior to joining the old Consular Service in 1909. 
Still mired in the consular wing of the Foreign Service in 
1934, then as consul general in Paris, Keena impressed
281Ambassador Straus, who recommended him to FDR for promotion.
279See Appendices infra.
2 80Childs, Foreign Service Farewell, 67; Kennan, Memoirs, 
143-145; State Department Biographic Register, 1940, 100.
2 81State Department Biographic Register, 1940, 131;
Straus to FDR, April 9, 19 35, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, 
II, 465-467.
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In 1935 Roosevelt responded by appointing Keena as minister 
to Honduras, the latter's first chief-of-mission post.
V
The Roosevelt administration appointed substantially
more career diplomats than political appointees to missions
in Latin America. Within the administration, Secretary of
State Hull and Assistant Secretary of State Welles were
particularly active in shaping United States Pan American 
282policy. Although cool cordiality characterized the Hull-
Welles relationship, they agreed upon the necessity of 
installing competent professionals in Latin American posts, 
and they played a large role in the placement of chiefs-of- ■ 
mission to the Southern Hemisphere. Even then, however, the 
apparent haphazardness with which FDR chose amateurs to some 
posts more than matched the relatively routine selection of 
career officers.
The manner in which FDR selected an ambassador to Mexico 
City, for instance, more than equaled the impulsive and un­
predictable manner in which he chose Jesse Straus to head the 
embassy in Paris. After promising the Mexican post to one 
political supporter, Roosevelt abruptly chose another. In 
selecting Josephus Daniels, Roosevelt also ignored the sensi-
282See Robert T. Beck, "Cordell Hull and Latin America,
1933-1939" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Temple University, 
1977) .
bill ties- of the Mexican populus and the attendant appre­
hension of the Mexican government. As much as any other 
factor, a multiple lapse of memory by FDR determined the 
appointment of America's representative to Mexico.
Josephus Daniels and Franklin Roosevelt formed a strong 
friendship dating to their days together in the Wilson admi­
nistration. Few men who became close friends, however, were 
as different as Daniels and Roosevelt.
Daniels was seventy-one years old in 1933 and FDR's 
senior by twenty-one years. He had spent much of his life 
in rural North Carolina as owner and publisher of the Raleigh 
News and Observer, consistently attacking corporate interests-- 
especially northern, Yankee capitalism— -in his editorials.
As a feisty populist crusader, Daniels supported the left- 
wing of the Democratic party and vigorously campaigned for 
Woodrow Wilson in 1912. Wilson rewarded Daniels by appointing 
him secretary of the navy. As his assistant, Daniels chose a 
young man, Franklin D. Roosevelt, whom he had met only a few 
months earlier. During their eight years together in the 
Navy Department, the patrician Roosevelt came to regard 
Daniels, whom he had first described as "the funniest looking 
hillbilly I had ever seen," with great affection. Then, and 
later as President, FDR always referred to Daniels as "Chief," 
and Daniels was one of the few who called Roosevelt "Franklin"
-335-
with the latter's blessing. Naturally, Daniels was among
283FDR's earliest and staunchest supporters in 1932.
Daniels anticipated an opportunity to return to his old 
berth as secretary of the navy under the New Deal administra­
tion. His friendship with -the President-elect, his previous 
experience in the Wilson administration, and his support of 
FDR's candidacy made him a logical choice for the navy post.
Roosevelt had other plans, however. A naval enthusiast, 
himself, he considered Daniels too independent for the navy 
job. Their relationship, moreover, was too paternalistic—  
FDR being the patronizer— for the President to allow Daniels 
a seat in the cabinet. Instead, Roosevelt slated Senator 
Claude A. Swanson of Virginia for the navy secretaryship. A
reliable, non-reform-minded party\ wheelhorse, Swanson had
\ j 284staunchly supported the Navy Department in Congress.
To Daniels the President offelred the minor position of
J
chairman of the U.S. Shipping Boaifd. Without hesitation, 
Daniels declined that post. Skeptical Of independent agencies
28 3Carroll Kilpatrick, ed., Roosevelt and Daniels; A 
Friendship in Politics (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1952), vii, xi-xii; E. David Cronon, Josephus 
Daniels in Mexico (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1960), 4-6; Joseph L. Morrison, Josephus Daniels: The Sitiall-
d Democrat (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1966), 44-45, 49, 163-166.
^ ^ N e w  Dealers, 295-300.
-336-
and opposed to government subsidies to big business,
Daniels characteristically responded to FDR's offer by
285recommending that the shipping board be abolished.
Roosevelt then assured his old boss that another position 
would be found. In the meantime, Daniels— realizing that a 
cabinet slot was unavailable— advised his friend and Secre­
tary of Cbmmerce, Daniel C. Roper, that he preferred Mexico 
to any other diplomatic mission. Roper dutifully carried 
that message to Roosevelt . Soon thereafter, and without
advance warning, FDR announced from the White House his
2 86nomination of Daniels to the Mexican embassy.
The announcement of Daniels' appointment startled and
28 7bewildered Vice President Garner and Jim Farley. At
Garner's urging and with the President's concurrence, Farley 
had promised the Mexican post to Ralph W. Morrison. A 
wealthy San Antonio Democrat, utility magnate, and retired 
banker, Morrison held sterling credentials. He had bank­
rolled Garner's unsuccessful bid for the presidential nomina-
ation in 1932, and later had contributed $25,000 to FDR's _
Kilpatrick, Roosevelt and Daniels, 129-130; Cronon, 
Daniels in Mexico, 6-7.
2 86Morrison, Sma'll'-d Democrat, 168-169; Cronon, Daniels 
in Mexico, 8; Moley, After Seven Years, 110.
2 87Farley, Farley's Story, 97-98.
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, .. 288 election.
No one had bothered to inform Garner or Farley of the 
switch in FDR's intentions. No one had known but the presi­
dent, and he had decided upon Daniels only suddenly.
Roosevelt had completely forgotten the promise to 
Morrison. He apologized to Gamer and Farley. He had deter­
mined, he said, that Mexico would be a fine tribute to
Daniels, who wanted the post and whose work for the country
289and the party they all knew about. Later, Roosevelt
wrote a friend that he had selected Daniels because he wished
to place in Mexico a man "who would personify those qualities of
290neighborliness on which I have placed such emphasis."
FDR's qualities of neighborliness, however, failed to 
include courtesy and a sensitivity to history. In appointing 
Daniels, FDR had neglected, contrary to diplomatic protocol, 
to first ask the Mexican government for its reaction to his 
choice. With a view to history, Mexico, predictably, regarded
288Rosen, Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Brain Trust, 263; 
Cronon, Daniels in Mexico, 9; Overacker, "Campaign Funds," 778.
289Farley, Farley's Story, 97-98.
29DFDR to Clark Howell, May 14, 1934, Wilfred Callcott 
Hardy, The Western Hemisphere: Its Influence on United States
Policies to the End of W o r l d  war II (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1968), 332.
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the appointment of Daniels as an incredible insult, if not
as one more example of myopic Yanqui arrogance. As secretary
of the navy in 1914, Daniels had ordered the U.S. Marines to
invade Vera Cruz, resulting in 126 Mexicans killed and 195 
291wounded.
Daniels presented other attributes that appeared to make
him an inappropriate selection. He spoke nary a word of
Spanish, and his knowledge of Mexico was scarcely encylopedic.
Whereas Mexico was predominantly Catholic and reportedly
flowing With pulque and tequila, Daniels was a devout Southern
292Methodist and a teetotaler.
The Mexican government, nevertheless, assented to Daniels 
appointment. To its credit and with some risk to its credi­
bility with the Mexican public, the government decided not to 
return the insult to the newly-elected United States presi­
dent. It hoped, instead, for continued improvements in 
Mexican-U.S. relations, and it was not disappointed. Daniels' 
sympathy for the goals of the Mexican revolution, his passion­
ate interest in Mexico, and his informal manner and unassuming
personality soon overrode whatever deficiencies he may have
293possessed for the post.
291Cronon, Daniels in Mexico, 15-16.
292Ibid., 13; Morrison, 'Small-d' Democrat, 65-66, 169-170.
293Cronon, Daniels in Mexico, 13; Morrison., Small-d Demo­
crat, 169-170.
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Ralph Morrison, on the other hand, soon proved that he 
would have been a disasterous choice for the post to Mexico 
or to any other nation. To assuage Morrison's pique, Roose­
velt dispatched him as a last-minute delegate to the London 
Economic Conference in the summer of 1933. In naming Morri­
son, as well as the several other delegates, FDR failed to 
consult with Hull. Poignantly ignorant of foreign affairs,
Morrison asked newspapermen at a press conference in London, 
v 2 9 4"Who is Benes?" Conference participants later could
295only describe Morrison charitably as a "boob."
Another protege" of Vice President Garner— Hal H. Sevier—  
fared slightly better. He became the Ambassador to Chile.
A former Texas legislator, Sevier and his wife, who was known 
as the "Mother of the Alamo," were solid Democrats and knew 
Garner well. Although Sevier had served on the Creel Committee 
on Public Information to Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and 
Uruguay during World War I, and thus possessed some experience 
in Latin American affairs, his appointment under FDR was 
clearly political.
Roosevelt hardly knew Sevier. When Garner insisted that 
Sevier receive the Chilean embassy, FDR readily complied.
294Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Depression, 263.
296 Moley, First New Deal, 407-408. See also Dallek, 
Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 51.
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Two years later, in 1935, Sevier resigned his commission
following his second recall by the State Department for
296behavior incongruent with the dignity of his office.
Roosevelt evidently had intended to appoint Spruille
Braden to Chile. Of all the amateurs FDR singled out for
diplomatic assignments, Braden, with whom he was barely acquaiht- 
ed, was perhaps his most enigmatic choice.
Spruille Braden held almost none of the standard quali­
fications for diplomatic appointment. He was neither a pro­
fessional diplomat nor a New Dealer. By his own account, he
was a conservative Republican; he never contributed financially 
to FDR's campaigns; he was an isolationist. By 1938, at the 
time of his appointment as FDR's minister to Columbia, he
regarded the president's domestic New Deal policies as
297"irresponsible." Seldom was one so ill-suited, politically
or professionally, rewarded with a diplomatic post.
Braden commanded influential friends, however. He also 
could have, had he desired, contributed handsomely to any
296State Department Biographic Register, 1935, 294;
Stuart, Department of State, 316; Spruille Braden, Diplomats 
and Demogogues: The Memoirs: of Spruille Braden (New Rochelle,
N.Y. : Arlington House, 1971), 97, 135.
297Braden, Diplomats and Demogogues, 92, 96, 100, 115.
-341-
political campaign.
A wealthy copper magnate, born in the Montana mining
camp of Elk Horn, Braden followed his father into the mining
business after his graduation in 1914 from Yale's Sheffield
Scientific School. Moving rapidly through the world of
corporate finance, he acted as the principal representative
of his father's and Anaconda Copper's interests in Chile until
1922. Residing in New York during the 1920s, he served on
the boards of several corporations, including American Ship
and Commerce, W.A. Harriman Securities, Pennsylvania Coke and
298Coal, Monmouth Rug Mills, and the Capital Theatre Corporation.
Despite his Republican allegiances Braden cast his ballot 
for Al Smith in the 1928 presidential election. Prohibition, 
he stated, had cooled his "Republican ardor." He also saw 
much of his sizeable and easily made fortune swept away in 
the crash of 1929. In 1932 he voted for Roosevelt.
Braden approached several influential figures in the 
Democratic party following FDR's victory. He was, he said, 
"more or less footloose and wondering what to do next."
Two of his friends were members of Roosevelt's cabi-
298 Ibid., 1-6, 23-24, 31, 38, 48-49, 61-80, 86-90;
Joseph Newman, "Diplomatic Dynamite," Collier1 s, 116 (November 
10, 1945), 11, 43-45; "Democracy's Bull," Time, 44 (November 5, 
1945), 42, 45-47.2 99Braden, Diplomats and Demogogues, 86-95.
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net. They suggested that he consider diplomacy.
Braden "liked the idea of" a diplomatic post. Whether 
or not someone had offered him Chile, he anticipated receiving 
that assignment:
Things were completely dead in the 
business world. It might be pleasant 
to go to Chile as Ambassador for a couple 
of years. The Chilean exchange had gone 
off badly, and living there would be 
extraordinarily cheap for Americans.
While there in 1931 we had given a couple 
of extravagant parties and found the cost 
absurdly low. The United States Ambassador 
to Chile, I knew, could maintain his embassy 
very creditably without using up his entire 
salary and bank account.
Along with his friends, Braden believed that his marriage to
a Chilean and his many Chilean mining contacts "especially
qualified" him for the appointment. When his nomination
appeared imminent, he sold most of his Chilean copper
, 301stock.
Chile went to Sevier, however. As with Morrison, FDR 
evidently sought to soothe Braden1s disappointment with 
another appointment. He named him as a United States delgate 
to the Seventh Pan American Conference to be held in Monti- 
video, Uruguay,in December 1933, the only delegate, peharps, 
that Secretary Hull, who chaired the delegation, did not
^^Ibid., 96. Braden's friends are unidentified. 
301Ibid., 97-98.
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select. 302
Two years later Roosevelt again considered Braden for
an embassy. Peru was mentioned. Instead, FDR appointed
Braden to replace Hugh Gibson as chairman of the United
States delegation to the Chaco Peace Conference in Buenos
Aires, Argentina. Stalled in directing U.S. efforts to
mediate a settlement between Bolivia and Paraguay over Chaco,
Gibson had requested that he be relieved so that he could
return to Brazil to supervise a Brazilian-American trade 
303agreement. Braden later complained that his "years"—
actually twenty-eight months— as chairman "cost me the
millions I would have made on the real estate development of
304my Stonehurst property."
Braden finally landed a legation in April 1938. For
reasons best known to FDR, Braden became the Minister to
305Columbia, a post he held until 1942. As a New Deal diplo­
mat, Braden— a large, heavyset, profane, and outspoken enemy 
of Latin American dictators— earned high praise from Henry
302Ibid., 98. See also Beck, "Hull and Latin America," 74.
303Beck, "Hull and Latin America," 286-320.
304Braden, Diplomats and Demogogues, 146.
^^Braden also served as ambassador to Cuba (1941-1945), 
as ambassador to Argentina (194 5), and as an assistant 
secretary of state (1945-1947).
Luce, the owner of Time magazine, and from other corporate
306friends of freedom. Perhaps FDR needed Braden1s presence
to mollify the American right-wing.
A variety of other amateur envoys filled posts in Latin
America. For example, an Indiana novelist and friend of
Claude Bowers, Meredith Nicholson, sixty-seven years old in
1933, found life in the embassies in Paraguay, Venezuela, and
307Nicaragua comfortably retiring. Leo R. Sack, a Washington
correspondent for the Scripps-Howard chain and a Roosevelt
admirer, who contributed $2,500 to FDR’s first campaign,
3 08landed the Costa Rica post in 1933. Fay A. Des Portes, a
three-term member of the South Carolina legislature and a
wealthy businessman, received appointments to Bolivia and 
309Guatemala. A few other amateurs, such’ as Boaz Long, who
had served as deputy administrator of the Puerto Rican Nation­
al Recovery Administration prior to his appointment to
Nicaragua in 1936, had some previous experience in Latin
310American affairs. Most also were loyal Democrats.
"Democracy's Bull," 42, 45-47.
307Indiana: A Guide to the Hoosier State (N.Y.: Oxford
University Press, 1955), 145; Villard, Affairs at State, 184.
30 8National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, LXII (1958), 
220; Kiplinger, Washington Is Like That, 261.
309State Department Biographic Register, 1940, 89.
310 Ibid., 141; Crane, Mr. Carr, 210; Werking, Master 
Architects, 246.
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Professional diplomats appointed to Latin American
nations also reflected a generous cross-section of career
types. Veterans of the pre-Rogers Act era, as well as younger
officers, received assignments to Latin America. Nine of the
fourteen officers who attained their first chief-of-mission
post under FDR served their first ministerial tour in the
311Southern Hemisphere. Five later moved on to posts m
other geographical regions. Of the 42 individual career 
chiefs-of-mission, 21— or 50 percent— held a Latin American 
post at one time or another from 1933 to 19 39.
Professionals monopolized the appointments to the Carib­
bean countries. Strategically located at the entrance to the 
Caribbean Sea, the nations of Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican 
Republic had concerned nearly every administration. When, in 
May 1933, another revolution appeared imminent in Cuba, Roose­
velt dispatched his trusted adviser, Sumner Welles, to Havana 
as his ambassador and trouble-shooter. Compared to any number 
of amateurs FDR might have selected, Welles was a known and 
respected commodity. Eight months later, upon the conclusion
311Does not count Wilbur Carr or Francis White, both of 
whom held high-level State Department positions prior to 
receiving first-time chief-of-mission posts under FDR.
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of a mission of mixed success, Welles returned to Washing- 
312ton.
His successor, Jefferson Caffrey, ranked high as a diplo­
matist in the eyes of his colleagues. A minister to El Sal­
vador and Columbia under Presidents Coolidge and Hoover, 
respectively, Caffrey had twenty-two years of diplomatic 
experience. In July 1933, Roosevelt appointed him assistant
secretary of state with the intention of sending him to Cuba
313upon the completion of Welles' mission.
Earlier Undersecretary Phillips had suggested to the 
President that Caffrey "might appropriately be promoted" to 
the ambassadorship to Brazil. "Such a promotion will be well 
received throughout the entire Service." Phillips rated 
Caffrey as "one of the best men in the Service in the mini­
sterial rank."314
Several works evaluate the Welles mission to Cuba.
Two of the most recent and most critical are Luis E. Aguilar, 
Cuba 193 3: Prologue to Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell Universi­
ty Press, 1972), and Irwin F. Gellman, Roosevelt and Batista: 
Good Neighbor Diplomacy in Cuba, 19 33-1945 (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1973).
313Roosevelt Press Conference, November 8, 19 33, Nixon, 
FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 468.
Phillips to FDR, April 8, 19 33, ibid., 50.
Hull described Caffrey as "one of our outstandingly capable 
representatives." Memoirs, I, 341. See also Spaulding, 
Ambassadors Ordinary and Extraordinary, 261-265.
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From 1937 until 1944, when he became the first career officer 
ever chosen to head the prestigious Paris embassy, Caffrey 
held the Brazilian post.
The recommendation by Phillips to promote Caffrey to 
Brazil was also part of the Undersecretary's efforts to pro­
tect and accommodate the interests of another career officer, 
Hugh Gibson. A highly regarded diplomat, Gibson confronted 
the prospect of an early retirement from the Service in 1933. 
Because of his close friendship with Hoover, Gibson ranked 
high on FDR's purge list. Then the ambassador to Belgium, 
Gibson asked Phillips to engineer his transfer to Istanbul 
in the likely event that he would be ousted from Brussels.
In the meantime, Roosevelt, unable to overcome the objections 
of Hull and Phillips to Gibson's removal from the Service 
altogether, had discussed sending him to Brazil.
Phillips moved directly to fashion Gibson's transfer to 
Turkey. On April 8, in a letter replete with subtle sugges­
tions for maneuvering prospective diplomatic appointments, 
Phillips suggested to FDR that he consider Gibson for Istanbul 
instead of Brazil. "Inasmuch as Mr. [Mayor James] Curley [of 
Boston] is slated for Poland, I suggest that we send Caffrey^ 
whom we discussed for that post, to Brazil in the event that
31SChilds, American Foreign Service, 103, 147-148.
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116Gibson goes to Turkey." In effect, Phillips was treating
Gibson's appointment to Istanbul as a fact.
Another candidate for the Brazilian post also appeared 
on a list that accompanied Phillips' letter to FDR. Based 
upon earlier discussions with the President, Phillips included 
a memorandum listing potential diplomatic appointees along­
side various countries. The undersecretary asked Roosevelt 
if he would write "the word 'approved' after each country or 
indicate such other wishes as you desire." Much too canny 
to commit himself to diplomatic appointments before necessity 
dictated that he do so, Roosevelt made only one notation on 
the memorandum. Under Brazil he wrote: "Weddell— of Va
Pollard's man?"^^
Alexander Weddell was a career diplomat with strong ties
to his native Virginia. John Pollard, an active Deir 
was then governor of Virginia. The families of bott 
shared common backgrounds—  aristocratic Virginia w
ocrat, 
men
jalth, 
, 318clergymen fathers, Democratic political involvements.
Whether the Pollard connection cemented a chief-of-missim
^■^Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 50.
317Ibid., 51 ftn. 1.
318Who Was Who In America, I (Chicago: A.N. Marquis,
1942), 979.
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319post for Weddell is uncertain. He held solid qualifica­
tions for a mission to Latin America. A student of litera­
ture and history, fond of Spain and fluent in Spanish, he 
had acquired a broad background in Latin American affairs 
since entering the diplomatic corps in 1908. On June 3, 193̂ , 
Weddell became the Ambassador to Argentina, not Brazil.
What is certain is that Phillips' efforts to protect 
Gibson met with only partial success. Under Roosevelt's 
orders, Gibson was transferred to Brazil rather than Turkey 
on May 11. However, he was not then dismissed from the 
Foreign Service.
Among the other career chiefs to Latin America worthy of
special mention was Norman Armour. A graduate of Princeton
and Harvard, and two generations removed from the founders
of the Armour Chicago meat-packing fortune, he joined the
Diplomatic Service in 1915 and quickly moved from one responsi-
320ble position to another. Hull rated Armour as "one of the
most capable, yet unpretentious diplomats" in the entire
319Beaulac states that Weddell's appointments to Argen­
tina (1933-1938) and Spain (1939-1942) were the result of 
"political considerations." Career Ambassador, 184.
320State Department Biographic Register, 194 0, 5 6;
James A. Padgett, "Diplomats to Haiti and Their Diplomacy," 
Journal of Negro History, 25 (July 1940), 324; Heinrichs, 
American Ambassador, 19, 97.
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321 . 322Service. His colleagues echoed those sentiments. A
highly successful negotiator, Armour became FDR's most
widely traveled chief-of-mission.323 Besides Haiti, he also
headed the missions in Canada, Chile, and Argentina.
Other career officers received well-deserved, first­
time chief-of-mission promotions to Latin American countries. 
For instance, Douglas Jenkins, at the age of fifty-nine, 
became minister to Bolivia in 19 39. As a diplomatic secre­
tary and consul general in London and Berlin during the 1930s,
he had impressed his immediate superiors. State Department
324officials also had marked him for promotion.
Still other career chiefs-of-mission were less fortunate. 
Sometimes they contributed to their own demise. Sheldon 
Whitehouse, for example, balked at being transferred from 
Columbia to the malaria-infested environs of Panama in 1934.
A veteran of twenty-four years in the diplomatic ranks, 
Whitehouse evidently also had complained about his assignment
321Hull, Memoirs, II, 1377-1378.
322Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy, 101.
323On Armour's negotiating ability, see Phillips to FDR, 
August 3, 1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 343-345.
324R. Walton Moore to FDR, November 21, 1936, ibid.,
III, 498. Leo J. Keena was another. Straus to FDR, ibid.,
II, 465, 467.
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as minister to Columbia. Having spent most of his career in
the more comfortable posts of Europe, he expected better 
32 5treatment. He may have been among that group of officers
about whom Moffat wrote in his diary on February 5, 1934:
"All together, the impression is gaining ground, in quarters
where it ought not to, that our people are childish and all
326together above themselves." In the case of Whitehouse,
Roosevelt responded to his complaints by placing him on the
32 7"waiting list.” Soon thereafter, Whitehouse, then fifty-
one years old, resigned from the Service.
VI
To discern FDR1s precise motivation for any diplomatic 
appointment is difficult, if not impossible. In reflecting 
upon the criteria— geographical balance, personal and philo­
sophical affinity— that presidents normally appear to employ 
in selecting their cabinet officers, Raymond Moley concluded 
in 1937 that the criteria used by FDR were elusive;
So far as I could see, there was 
neither a well-defined purpose nor
^ ^State Department Biographic Register, 19 35 , 277. 
"^^Weil, Pretty Good Club, 82.
■^^FDR to Hull, October 29, 19 34, Nixon, FDR and Foreign 
Affairs, II, 248.
underlying principle in the selection 
of the Roosevelt Cabinet. It was 
shaped by a score of unrelated factors.
And in some cases it almost seemed as 
though happenstance played [as large a 
role as any other]....
Perhaps the historians of the future 
will be able to discover in the Roose­
velt Cabinet some delicate pattern 
overlooked by me. If so, I wish them 
well.328
To a large extent, the same could be said of Roosevelt's 
diplomatic appointments.
The selection of Roosevelt's chiefs-of-mission—  
particularly the amateurs— derived more from politics and 
improvisation than from any system with its connotations of 
method and regularity. Political pressures and priorities, 
informal human interactions, traditions, and unforeseen 
events characterized the landscape of the Roosevelt appointive 
process. Rarely, moreover, did any single factor operate 
exclusively to compel a selection. Although some factors 
clearly dominated others, more often than not a constellation 
of influences combined to secure a prospective candidate an 
appointment.
Partisan political considerations largely dominated 
the appointment of amateur chiefs-of-mission. Although 
chance occurrence sometimes determined who served where, a 
nearly endless list of amateurs— Tony Biddle, Robert Bingham,
■^^Ifoley, After Seven Years, 110-111.
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Claude Bowers, John Cudahy, Josephus Daniels, Joseph Davies, 
George Earle, Bert Fish, Joe Kennedy, Breckinridge Long,
David Morris, Leo Sack, Hal Seiver, Jesse Straus, and 
Laurence Steinhardt, to name but the most prominent— owed 
their appointments to their participation, financial and 
otherwise, in Roosevelt's campaigns.
Their participation in Democratic politics and FDR's 
fortunes bought them access to the nomination process largely 
denied to others. In some appointments— such as those of 
Joe Kennedy and Ruth Bryan Owen— the sponsorship of a power­
ful political ally— such as Raymond Moley— proved vital.
Where partisan political acceptability and powerful connec­
tions coincided, the absence of any expertise or special 
diplomatic qualifications generally formed no barricade to 
appointment.
Other influences also surfaced and prevailed from time- 
to-time. Roosevelt's offer of the Netherlands to seventy- 
seven year old William Rice, his subsequent appointment of 
Grenville Emmet to The Hague and later to Vienna, and his 
willingness to accommodate Josephus Daniels with the Mexican 
mission riveted upon genuine friendship.
Still other appointments were enigmatic, resting upon 
neither politics, loyalty, or friendship. Among many 
seemingly inappropriate and untraditional selections— includ-
-354-
ing the dispatching of an Irish Catholic to England and a
Scotchman to Ireland— Spruille Braden was perhaps the
strangest. He was not particularly loyal to the New Deal,
although he evidently possessed well-placed friends in the
President's cabinet, and he never contributed to FDR's
campaigns. Perhaps Braden's appointment reflected FDR's
329way of placating big business interests. That Roosevelt
simply sought to exile Braden, as is sometimes the motivation 
behind an appointment, is doubtful.
The appointment of Daisy Harriman was also unique. 
Although a loyal Democrat, she was not fond of FDR or his 
New Deal policies. More significantly, she neither sought 
nor campaigned for a diplomatic post. Given the large 
number of active and deserving political contenders for 
appointments, Harriman's unsolicited "windfall" selection to 
Norway was a rariety. Perhaps her appointment merely satis­
fied FDR's quota— self-imposed or otherwise— for a woman 
chief-of-mission.
By comparison, the appointment of career officers to 
chief-of-mission positions followed more established, if 
unwritten, rules and routines. To the extent that choice posts
329Perhaps Shirley N. Rawls, "Spruille Braden: A Poli­
tical Biography," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of New Mexico, 1977), which this writer has not read, sheds 
some light on Braden's appointment.
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were available to career officersf they went to those who 
commanded respect within the old-boy network and who could 
count well-placed colleagues in the State Department as their 
friends. Hugh Wilson's appointments to Berne and to Berlin 
were perhaps the best examples.
Partisan political considerations also entered into the 
appointment equation with regard to career officers. The 
possession of strong ties to the White House— as William 
Phillips, Joseph Grew, and Alexander Weddell might have 
attested— improved a Foreign Service officer's opportuni­
ties for promotion to chief-of-mission status. As often 
as not, however, career officers were the victims, not the 
beneficiaries, of partisan political winds. Where an 
amateur coveted a post held by a professional, the profes­
sional often found himself demoted or transferred to a less 
desireable mission. If a professional were too closely 
identified with a political rival of the President's, as 
Hugh /Gibson was, the result might be ouster from the Service
Ialtogether.
In many respects Roosevelt's manner of choosing United 
States envoys represented no precedent shattering departure 
from tradition. Nearly all presidents have displayed 
suspicion toward Foreign Service officers whose politics 
and loyalties they are uncertain of; have installed indiv­
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iduals loyal to their policies in ambassadorships; have 
succumbed to the pressures of party patronage; have reward­
ed political supporters and friends; and occassionally have 
appointed political malcontents to posts abroad for no other 
reason than to be rid of them.
Where Roosevelt largely differed from his predecessors 
and successors was in the breadth and depth of his willing­
ness to allow circumstance and happenstance to direct the 
selection of envoys. With seeming imperiousness, he dis­
patched amateurs to important posts without thought of 
their aptitude for diplomacy, concocted after-the-fact 
rationales to explain away haphazard and inappropriate 
choices, offered minor administrative positions to some 
appointees before sending them abroad to head prestigious 
embassies, and flippantly suggested to intimates that he 
did not expect some of his selections to last long in their 
posts. In the end, FDR's diplomatic appointments reflected 
his ad hoc, disorganized approach to the affairs of govern­
ment, as well as his scant regard for the Foreign Service 
as an instrument of United States foreign policy.
One of his most exasperating idiosyn­
crasies was his almost invariable 
unwillingness to dictate any memoranda 
of his conversations with foreign 
statesmen or foreign diplomatic 
representatives...as a record to 
inform and guide those who were 
running the Departmentof State.
Sumner Welles1
EPILOGUE: FDR's LEGACY TO PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMACY
Temperamentally ambiguous, consistent only in his in­
consistency, disdainful of career diplomats, yet supremely 
confident of his own diplomatic abilities, FDR never provid­
ed any clear guidance to the experiment in professional 
diplomacy inaugurated with the Rogers Act in 19 24. In the 
years prior to World War II, he displayed little concern 
for the future of the Foreign Service, and he failed to 
nurture it as an instrument of United States foreign policy.
■^Seven Decisions, 215-216.
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With the advent of war, he securely grasped the politi­
cal-military machinery of the United States in his own 
hands and shunted the diplomatic establishment aside, 
isolating it from all but the most esoteric of tasks. 
During the war, he excluded the State Department from any 
systematic role in the planning, determination, and exe-
3cution of wartime policy.
When Roosevelt died the position of professional 
diplomacy in the United States was no more certain than 
when he became President. In some respects, it was more 
uncertain, more insecure. Although no one seriously pro­
posed that the Foreign Service be abolished, the role of professional
^One observer described the isolation of the State 
Department thusly: "The State Department, which should
have been the vital instrument of our most important 
national policy, had been relegated to the status of the 
querulous maiden aunt whose sole function is to do all the 
worrying for the prosperous family over the endless impor­
tunities of the numerous poor relations living on the 
other side of the tracks." Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 
757.
3 David S. McLellan, Dean Acheson: The State Depart­
ment Years (N.Y.; Dodd, Mead, 19 76) , '45. ' See' also 
Acheson, Present at the Creation, 87, 88; John Paton Davies, Jr*' Dragon By The Tail: American, British, Japanese, and
Russian Encounters With China and One Another (N.Y.: W. W.
Norton & Co., 1972), 212; Wilson and McKinzie, "Masks of 
Power," in Makers of American Diplomacy, 489.
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diplomats in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy
4was left ill-defined and confused. The question of whether 
the United States would have a sound professional diplomatic 
arm, capable of serving as a catalyst for American power,
FDR left to his successors to ponder and grapple with anew.
Nearly every administration since the end of World War
II has probed the question of organizing the government for
the purposes of formulating and conducting foreign policy.
At least a dozen major studies or proposals have been advanced,
5most with some official sanction. Many of them have called 
for, among other things, the further "democratization" of 
the foreign affairs community, and for extending recruitment
6to include a greater cross-section of "mainstream" Americans.
Inexorably, too, or so it appears, the responsibility 
for foreign affairs has become increasingly fragmented, 
subject to the endeavors of nonprofessional diplomats. Never 
the dominant authority for foreign policy under FDR, the
4Stein, "Foreign Service Act of 1946," in Public Admin­
istration, 663, 666. See also Davies, Dragon By The Tail,
421; McLellan, Dean Acheson, 44-45; Steiner, The Wriston Report, 
5; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 88.
^Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy,
16. Destler, who produced his study in 1972, cites 13 
major studies in his note 2 to chapter one, 323-324.
6Perhaps the most noteworthy study is the so-called 
Wriston Report, a study commissioned by Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles under Henry M. Wriston, president of Brown 
University, in 1954. See Steiner, The Wriston Report, and 
Wriston, Diplomacy in a Democracy.
State Department watched the actual conduct of diplomacy pass
from its hands in 1940 to White House staffers, the military
services, and other special agencies."^ Today, in the 198 0s,
less than 17 percent of all government employees representing
the interests of the United States abroad are professional
diplomats -under the direction of the State Department. The
remainder work for a host of agencies, including the Defense
Department, which operate independently of formal diplomatic 
8channels. Frustrated and bitter, if not confused and bewil­
dered, America's professional diplomats complain about being
mistrusted, ignored, and placed far from center stage in the
9nation's foreign relations activity.
If FDR cannot be faulted for the lack of status of 
professional diplomats in today's labyrinthine diplomatic 
organization, neither can he be credited with advancing the 
cause of professional diplomacy during his presidency. The 
extraordinary turmoil, uncertainty, and diplomatic paralysis 
wrought by the Great Depression, followed by the profound 
change in the responsibility of the United States in inter­
national relations brought about by World War II, would have 
severely taxed any normal evolution of professional diplomacy 
under any administration. Yet, FDR's prejudice against
7Wilson and McKinzie, "Masks of Power," in Makers of 
American Diplomacy, 475; Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 67.
g Harr, Professional Diplomat, 12, 55-66; Destler, 
Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy, 10-11.
9Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 125.
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career diplomats, combined with his frightfully loose style 
of administration, seriously inhibited, if it did not pre­
clude, a constructive approach to the advance of a sound 
professional diplomatic structure.
In many respects, FDR blindly embraced the "chronic 
distaste" of American democratic opinion for "the image" of 
the professional diplomat. He liked the consuls, whom he 
judged to be toiling in the best tradition of democratic-cap- 
italism in their discharge of commercial tasks. The consuls 
engaged in concrete, productive endeavors. Toward their 
diplomatic brethren, Roosevelt evinced little more than 
scorn. He regarded the professional diplomats as frivolous 
socialites and undemocratic elitists, prone to foreign 
mannerisms and modes of thought, with little to recommend 
them beyond good educations, social breeding and manners.
Roosevelt tended, moreover, to credit the amateur over 
the expert. "He was quite willing to appoint qualified and 
experienced Foreign Service officers as Ambassadors and 
Ministers," Sumner Welles recounted. "But it was very rare 
indeed, that" the President "could be persuaded to bring 
into" discussions "on foreign policy any of those State 
Department specialists who had devoted a lifetime to the 
study of some particular" area "and who could have given him 
the detailed information and authoritative viewpoint that he 
very frequently lacked.
■^Welles, Seven Decisions , 216.
Disdaining the expertise of foreign relations profes­
sionals, FDR came to rely for advice on major diplomatic 
issues on diplomatically inexperienced men in the White House, 
and on a succession of amateur "special emissaries" whom he 
superimposed on his regularly accredited chiefs-of-mission. 
About one of the latter, General Patrick J. Hurley, Roosevelt 
concluded that the United States needed "more men like him." 
Hurley, the President told his son,Elliot, spoke in plain 
language, unlike "the men in the State Department, those career
diplomats...half the time I can't tell whether to believe 
12them or not."
At the heart of any final evaluation of FDR's legacy to 
professional diplomacy is the question of whether "those 
career diplomats" were better diplomatists than the. amateurs. 
The foundersof the Foreign Service advanced the presumption, 
which they shared with other diplomatic theoreticians and 
practitioners, that professionals are better diplomats than 
amateurs by virtue of their training and experience in the
11Loewenheim,Roosevelt and Churchill, 73. Many observers 
and students have remarked upon FDR's use of special represen­
tatives, a practice that while dating to the early years of 
the American republic, FDR is said to have institutionalized. 
For example, see Briggs, Farewell To Foggy Bottom, 295-296; 
Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 227.
*^Michael Schaller, The U.S. Crusade In China, 1938-1945 
(N.Y.; Columbia University Press, 1978), 149. A prominent 
Republican corporation lawyer, and secretary of war under 
Hoover, Hurley was dispatched by FDR to China as a special 
envoy in 1943. Hurley was woefully ignorant of the Far East. 
See Dallek, Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 493.
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13art of diplomacy. It is not an unreasonable presumption. 
However, to fully test it againt FDR's diplomats— to evaluate 
the performance of his career and amateur chiefs-of-mission, 
for instance— requires another undertaking, one that would 
beget additional questions, one that could wind and weave 
along any number of different paths.
By what criteria, for example, should FDR's diplomats
14be judged? By some set of "ideal" characteristics? By their 
handling of the major diplomatic functions— reporting and 
analyzing events, negotiating agreements, representing United 
States interests abroad, and protecting the lives and property 
of American nationals? Alternately, should the diplomats be 
judged by the expectations they may have set for themselves? 
Concurrently, how are the diplomats to be evaluated alongside 
the context within which they had to operate— at home and
13For example, see Villard, Affairs at State, 226; 
Briggs, Farewell To Foggy Bottom, 38, 46.
"^Nicolson, for instance, postulates a set of "immutable 
qualities"— moral and intellectual— that the "ideal diploma­
tist" should possess. He also describes some "diplomatic 
faults"— personal vanity "being the most common and disadvan­
tageous," and the fear of expressing judgments— which suggest 
another avenue for evaluating the performance of amateur and 
professional diplomats. Diplomacy, 55-67. Gibson offers yet 
another approach, at least with regard to amateurs, whom he 
classifies as crusaders, reformers, spenders, and exhibition­
ists. Road To Foreign Policy, 157. Still, Etzold provides 
an incisive comment on the difficulty Americans have faced— • 
given the brevity of their diplomatic experience, rejection 
of European traditions, and the effects of egalitarian reform 
in striking down the once durable standards of education, 
breeding, and manners— in defining what, or who, is a good 
diplomat. Conduct of Foreign Policy, 123.
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15abroad? What kind of training and experience did Foreign
16Service officers receive prior to FDR's presidency? How did 
it prepare them for the events of the 193 0s? How did it 
differ from the experiences FDR's amateur diplomats brought
15The 1930s presented politicians and diplomats world­
wide with enormous challenges. In the words of Ferrell: 
"Statesmen doubted, as they never had before, the advantage 
of political solutions to international problems....The Great 
Depression had, therefore, a catastrophic effect upon the 
maintenance of world peace." American Diplomacy in the 
Depression, 3. As war approached, politicians and diplomats, 
amateurs and professionals alike, seemed paralyzed. Old 
standards of international concord or ethics seemed unwork­
able; certainly, Hitler, the world's principal protagonist, 
abided by none. As Heinrichs states: "Diplomacy in the early 
thirties lacked any clearcut character. International rela­
tions were atomized and featureless. Such faith as existed 
in the old formulas and arrangements drained away. The world 
drifted as the weather changed." "1931-1937," in Ernest R.
May and James C. Thomson, Jr., eds. American-East Asian 
Relations: A Survey (Cambridge; Harvard University Press,
1972), 244. Nowhere, perhaps, was the featureless drifting 
more evident than in the United States. Disillusioned, 
turned inward, self-absorbed, and bound by the traditions of 
a passive and incoherent foreign policy born of geographic 
isolation and messianic ideals, the United States stood un­
willing— though not necessarily complacent— to take immediate 
risks to reduce the threats to peace. While pouring forth 
calls for cooperation against international lawlessness, the 
U.S. drew the line at foreign entanglements. How, thus, to 
asses the performance of American diplomats— amateurs and 
professionals— within the currents of their time poses some 
special moral and intellectual problems. "So far as diplomacy 
served the ideal of accommodating differences between nations," 
Heinrichs stated, "the postwar years of nonentanglement were 
a discouraging time to advertise that service [in the U.S.]." 
"Bureaucracy," 171.
16The best single work on the pre-1930 traditions, mores, 
and thoughts of the career diplomats is Schulzinger, Diplomatic 
Mind. See also De Santis, Diplomacy of Silence, 76, 202, 
wherein he concludes that "the tendency to passivity and intel­
lectual conformity" by career diplomats was exacerbated in the 
1930s by the government's policy of noninvolvement, the cutbacks 
in appropriations, and "the public's view of diplomats as ana­
chronistic survivors from some mythological world" of frivolity.
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to their tasks? Finally, what difference did it all make in 
the development and execution of United States foreign 
relations— then, in the years prior to World War II, and 
later?
That FDR harbored deep prejudices toward the career 
diplomats, prejudices reflected in American democratic 
society at large, is clear. Equally clear is that under 
FDR the question of whether the United States would develop 
a sound diplomatic corps was left unresolved, if not untested. 
Much less certain is what it meant for the conduct of United 
States foreign policy. At best, perhaps, FDR's legacy to 
professional diplomacy will be judged to be of dubious 
distinction.
Appendix 1 
Career Vs. Noncareer Appointments1 
1908-1974
PercentageYear Career Noncareer Career
1908 5 34 13
1912 10 30 25
1916 3 36 8
1920 4 27 13
1924 13 34 28
1928 20 29 41
1932 25 26 49
1933 24 27 47
1934 25 26 49
1935 25 26 48
1936 25 27 48
1937 25 27 47
1938 24 27 47
1939 25 23 52
1940 26 26 50
1944 33 20 62
1948 41 24 63
1952 49 25 66
Career chiefs-of-mission include those who entered 
the service by examination, and those who entered prior to 
1906 with ten or more years experience in grades below mini­
ster. Chiefs-of-mission accredited to more than one country
-366-
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Appendix 1 (continued)
Percentage
Year Career Noncareer Career
1956 49 28 64
1960 63 71 71
1965 78 27 70
1968 71 32 63
1972 80 33 65
1974 88 35 68
are counted but once for each year for the years 1908-1940. 
For the years 1944 to 196 0, chiefs-of-mission with dual 
accreditation are counted twice.
Sources: "Career vs. Non-CareerAppointments, 1906-194 0,"
American Foreign Service Journal, 17 (December,
1940), 678-679 for years 1908 to 1940; William 
Barnes and John H. Morgan, The Foreign Service of 
the United States: Origins, Development and
Functions (Washington, DC: Historical Office,
Department of State, 1961), 364, for the years 
1944 to 1960; material from State Department files 
supplied by Frederick Aandahl, Director, Operatiors 
Staff, Office of the Historian, in letter to author, 
March 2, 1979, for the years 1965 to 1974.
Appendix 2
Chiefs-of-Mis sion By Country 
1933-1939
Country Chief-of-Mis sion Appointment Termination Career/N on- Ca reer
2Afganistan (See Persia)
Albania Post Wheeler 8/26/33 11/1/34 C (1906)
Hugh G. Grant 8/9/35 9/27/39 NC
Argentina Alexander W. Weddell 7/31/33 10/29/38 C (1908)
Norman Armour 5/18/39 6/29/44 C (1915)
Austria George H. Earle,III 7/14/33 3/25/34 NC
George S. Messersmith 4/7/34 7/11/37 C (1914)
Grenville T. Emmet 7/13/37 9/26/37 (d.) NC
Belgium^ David H. Morris 5/18/33 5/5/37 NC
Hugh S. Gibson 7/13/37 5/15/38 C (1908)
Joseph Davies 5/14/38 11/30/39 NC
Bolivia Fay A. des Portes 8/19/33 5/1/36 NC
R. Henry Nor web 4/25/36 6/15/37 C (1916)
Robert G. Caldwell 5/4/37 6/23/39 NC
Douglas Jenkins 6/22/39 10/3/41 C (1908)
Brazil Hugh S. Gibson 5/11/33 12/3/36 C (1908)
Jefferson Caffrey 7/13/37 9/17/44 C (1911)
Appendix 2 (continued)
Country Chief-of-Mission Appointment
Bulgaria Frederick A. Sterling 
Ray Atherton
9/1/33
7/13/37
Canada Warren Delano Robbins 
Norman Armour 
Daniel C. Roper
5/11/33
5/22/36
5/9/39
Chile Hal H. Sevier 
Hoffman Phillip 
Norman Armour 
Claude G. Bowers
8/19/33 
7/22/35 
1/17/3 8 
6/22/39
China Nelson T. Johnson1̂ 12/16/29
Columbia Sheldon Whitehouse 
William Dawson 
Spruille Braden
7/15/33
12/15/34
4/27/38
Costa Rica Leo R. Sack 
Edward Albright 
William H . Hornibrook
8/17/33
4/22/37
7/2/37
Termination Career/N on-C areer
6/30/36 C (1911)
7/5/39 C (1917)
3/28/35 C (1909)
1/15/38 C (1915)
8/20/39 NC
5/4/35 NC
10/31/37 C (1901)
6/10/39 C (1915)
9/2/53 NC
5/14/41 C (1907)
12/8/34 C (1909)
11/16/37 C (1908)
3/12/42 NC
1/10/37 NC
5/25/37 (d.) NC
9/1/41 NC
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Country C h ie f-o f-M iss io n  Appointment
Cuba Sumner Welles 
Jefferson Caffery 
J. Butler Wright
4/24/33
2/23/34
7/13/37
Czechoslovakia Francis White 
J. Butler Wrig ht 
Wilbur J. Carr
6/13/33
3/9/34
7/13/37
Denmark Ruth Bryan Owen 
Alvin M. Owsley 
Ray Atherton
4/13/33
5/28/37
8/7/39
Dominican
Republic
H.F. Arthur Schoenfeld ̂  
R. Henry Norweb
8/1/31
4/22/37
Ecuador William Dawson^ 
Antonio Gonzales 
Boaz Long
5/9/30
12/10/34
3/22/38
Egypt Bert Fish^ 9/6/33
Termination C areer/Non-Career
12/13/33 C (1915)
3/9/37 C (1911)
12/4/39 (d.) C (1909)
11/30/33 C (1915)
6/1/37 C (1909)
3/21/39 C (1892)
6/27/36 NC
5/15/39 NC
4/9/40 C (1917)
4/27/37 C (1910)
2/13/40 C (1916)
2/27/35 C (1908)
3/30/38 NC
5/1/43 NC
2/2 8/41 NC
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Country Chief-of-Mission Appointment Termination Career/Non-Career
El Salvador Frank P. Corrigan 3/14/34 8/2 8/37 NC
Robert Frazer 8/9/37 10/31/42 C (1909)
Estonia® (See Latvia)
Finland Edward Albright 7/2 1/33 4/12/37 NC
H.F. Arthur Schoenfeld 4/22/37 12/17/42 C (1910)
France Jesse Isidor Straus 3/17/33 8/5/36 NC
William C. Bullitt 8/25/36 7/11/40 NC
Germany William E. Dodd 6/13/33 12/29/37 NC
Hugh R. Wilson 1/17/38 11/16/38 C (1911)
Great Britain Robert W. Bingham 3/23/33 11/19/37 NC
Joseph P. Kennedy 1/17/38 10/22/40 NC
Greece Lincoln MacVeagh 6/13/33 4/23/41 NC
Guatemala Matthew Hanna 7/17/33 2/9/36 C (1917)
Fay A. des Portes 4/25/36 5/14/43 NC
Appendix 2 (continued)
Country Chief-of-Mission Appointment
Haiti Norman Armour4 
George A. Gordon 
Ferdinand L. Mayer
7/25/32
6/5/35
7/13/37
Honduras Julius G. Lay4 
Leo T. Keena 
John D. Erwin
12/16/29
2/22/35
7/29/37
Hungray John F. Montgomery 6/13/33
Irish Free State W.W. McDowell 
Alvin M. Owsley 
John Cudahy..
9/13/33 
5/15/35 
- 5/28/37
Italy Breckinridge Long 
William Phillips
4/24/33
8/4/36
Japan Toseoh O.Grew4 2/19/32
Latvia ̂ John Van A. MacMurray® 
Arthur Bliss Lane® 
Frederick. A. Sterling® 
John C. Wiley
8/2 8/33 
1/24/36 
8/9/37 
7/18/38
Termination C areer/Non-Career
3/2 1/35 C (1915)
7/21/37 C (1920)
11/20/40 C (1916)
3/17/35 C (1889)
5/1/37 C (1909)
4/16/47 NC
3/17/41
\
NC
4/9/34 (d.) NC
7/7/37 NC
1/15/40 NC
4/23/36 NC
10/6/41 C (1903)
12/8/41 C (1906)
2/12/36 C (1907)
9/16/37 C (1916)
— C (1911)
6/17/40 C (1915)
Appendix 2 (continued)
Country C h ie f-o f-M iss io n  Appointment
Liberia Lester A. Walton 7/22/35
Lithuania Owen J.C.Norem 8/23/37
Luxembourg* ̂ (See Belgium)
Mexico Josephus Daniels 3/17/33
Netherlands Laurts S. Swenson4 2/2 8/31
Grenville T. Emmet 1/15/34
George A. Gordon 7/30/37
Nicaragua Arthur Bliss Lane 7/31/33
Boaz W. Long 1/24/36
Meredith Nicholson 3/22/38
Norway Hoffman Phillip4 7/22/30
Anthony J. Drexel Biddlejr. 7/25/35 
Florence J. Harriman 5/4/37
Termination Career/Non-Career
2/28/46
6/15/40
11/9/41
3/5/34 
8/2 1/37 
8/15/40
3/14/36
4/1/38
2/27/41
8/3/35 
5/2 1/37 
4/9/40
NC
NC
NC
NC 
NC 
C (1920)
C (1916) 
NC 
NC
C (1901) 
NC 
NC
Appendix 2 (continued)
Country Chief-of- Mission Appointment Termination Career/Non-Career
Siam (Thailand) James Marion Baker 8/30/33 5/2/36 NC
Edwin L. Neville 5/2 8/37 5/1/40 C (1909)
Soviet Union William C. Bullitt 11/21/33 5/16/36 NC
Joseph E. Davies 11/16/36 6/11/3 8 NC
Laurence A. Steinhardt 3/23/39 11/12/41 NC
Spain Claude G. Bowers 4/6/33 2/2/39 NC
Alexander W. Weddell 5/3/39 2/7/42 C (1908)
Sweden Laurence A. Steinhardt 5/11/33 6/26/37 NC
Fred M. Dearing 4/22/37 6/17/38 C (1904)
Frederick A. Sterling 6/16/38 7/14/41 C (1911)
Switzerland Hugh R. Wilson^ 2/26/27 7/8/37 C (1911)
Leland Harrison 7/13/37 10/14/47 C (1907)
Turkey Robert P. Skinner 6/13/33 1/16/36 C (1897)
John Van A. MacMurray 1/24/36 11/28/41 C (1907)
Union of South Ralph J. Totten^ 6/20/30 4/12/37 C (1908)
Africa Leo J. Keena 7/31/37 8/13/42 C (1909)
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Country Chief-of-Mission Appointment Termination Career/Non-Career
Panama Antonio C. Gonzales 8/2 8/33 1/9/35 NC
George T. Summerlin 12/10/34 7/7/35 C (1909)
Frank P. Corrigan 8/9/37 6/14/39 NC
William Dawson 3/23/39 4/2 1/41 C (1908)
Paraguay Meredith Nicholson 8/19/33 2/3/35 NC
Findley B. Howard 8/20/35 1/16/41 NC
Persia (Iran)** William H. Hornibrook 12/12/33 3/16/36 NC
Louis G. Dreyus, Jr. 7/7/39 12/12/43 C (1910)
Peru Fred M. Dearing^ 1/31/30 6/3/37 C (1904)
Laurence A. Steinhardt 4/22/37 4/10/39 NC
Poland John Cudahy 6/13/33 4/23/37 NC
Anthony J. Drexel Biddlejr. 5/4/37 9/5/39 NC
Portugal Robert G. Caldwell 6/13/33 5/28/37 NC
Herbert Clairborne Pell 5/27/37 2/3/41 NC
Rumania Alvin M. Owsley 6/13/33 6/15/35 NC
Leland Harrison 5/15/35 9/3/37 C (1907)
Franklin M. Gunther 7/31/37 12/12/41 C (1908)
Appendix 2 (continued)
Country Chief-of-Mission Appointment Termination Career/Non-Career
Uruguary J. Butler Wright4 9/29/30 7/10/34 C (1909)
Julius G. Lay 12/14/34 8/3 1/37 C (1889)
William Dawson 8/31/37 6/6/39 C (1908)
Edwin C. Wilson 6/22/39 3/5/41 C (1920)
Venezuela George T. Summerlin4 9/11/29 1/15/35 C (1909)
Meredith Nicholson 1/22/35 4/14/38 NC
Antonio C. Gonzales 3/22/38 2/8/39 NC
Frank P. Corrigan 1/20/39 9/5/47 NC
Yugoslavia Charles S. Wilson 8/3/33 7/28/37 C (1901)
Arthur Bliss Lane 8/9/37 4/14/41 C (1916)
•̂If the chief-of-mission is a career officer, the date he entered the Foreign Service is in 
parenthesis. For definition of career chief-of-mission, see (*) to Appendix 1.
^Ministers to Afganistan were also accredited to Persia. They resided at Teheran.
^Ministers to Belgium were also accredited to Luxembourg. They resided at Brussels. 
^Chiefs-of-mission appointed by President Herbert Hoover and initially recommissioned to the 
same post by FDR.
5 Accredited also to Saudi Arabia. Resided at Cairo.
^Ministers to Estonia were also accredited to Latvia. They resided at Riga.
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 ̂Ministers to Latvia were also accredited to Estonia. They resided at Riga.
^Also accredited to Lithuania. Resided at Riga.
^Commissioned, but did not proceed to post.
* ̂Ministers accredited to Luxembourg were also accredited to Belgium. They resided at Brussels.
* ̂Ministers to Persia were also accredited to Afganistan. They resided at Teheran.
Sources: State Department Biographic Register,, 1932-1940 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1932-1940); United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1973 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1973).
Appendix 3
Name
Norman Armour ^
Ray Atherton ®
Jefferson Caffery 4
W ilbur J. Carr 6 
W illiam  Dawson4
Fred M . Dearing 4
Characteristics of Career C h ie fs -o f-M iss ion  
1933-1939
Countries 
As C -o f-M
H a iti
Canada
Chile
Argentina
Bulgaria
Denmark
Cuba
Brazil
Czechoslovakia
Ecuador
Columbia
Uruguary
Panama
Peru
Sweden
Year of 
Birth
1887
1883
1886
1870
1885
1879
Entered F .S /
1915 (18)
1917 (16)
1911 (22) 
1892 (45)
1908 (25) 
1904 (26)
Education ^
Princeton
Harvard
Catholic U . 
Georgetown U.
U . Minnesota
U . Missouri
Appendix 3 (continued)
Name
Countries 
As C -o f-M
Year of 
Birth Entered F .S . Education
r
Louis G . Dreyus, Jr. Persia
i
1889 1910 (23) Yale
£
Robert Frazer El Salvador 1878 1909 (24) M . I .T .
Hugh S . Gibson ^ Brazil
Belgium 1883 1908 (26) L'Ecole des
George A. Gordon ® H a iti
Netherlands 1885 1920 (13)
Sciences Poli- 
tiques
Harvard
Joseph C . Grew 4 Japan 1880 1906 (27) Harvard
Franklin M . Gunther^ Rumania 1855 1908 (22) Harvard
Matthew Hanna 4 Guatemala 1873 1917 (16) W est Point
Leland Harrison 4 Rumania
Switzerland 1883 1907 (24) Harvard
6Douglas Jenkins Bolivia 1880 1908 (25) --
Nelson T . Johnson 4 China 1887 1907 (26) George Wash ­
C
Leo T . Keena Honduras
Union of South Africa 1878 1909 (24)
ington U. 
U . M ichigan
Appendix 3 (continued)
Name
Countries 
As C -o f-M
Year of 
Birth Entered F .S . Education
6Arthur Bliss Lane Nicaragua
Latvia
Yugoslavia 1894 1916 (17) Yale
Julius G . Lay4 HondurasUruguary 1872 1889 (44) High School
John Van A. MacMurrayS Latvia
Turkey 1881 1907 (26) Princeton
Ferdinand L . Mayer® H a iti 1888 1916 (17) Princeton
George S. Messersmith6 Austria 1883 1914 (19) Delaware
Edwin L. N eville® Siam 1884 1909 (24)
College 
U. Michigan
R. Henry Norweb ® Bolvia
Dominican Republic 1894 1916 (17) Harvard
Hoffman Phillip  4 Norway
Chile 1872 1901 (32) Cambridge U
W illiam  Phillips ® Ita ly 1878 1903 (29) Harvard
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Name
Countries 
As C -o f-M
Year of 
Birth Entered F .S . Education
Warren Delano Robbins^ Canada 1885 1909 (24) Harvard
H .F . Arthur Schoenfeld 4 Dominican Republic 
Finland 1889 1910 (21) George Wash ­
ington U.
Robert P. Skinner Turkey 1866 1897 (36) High School
4
Frederick A. Sterling Bulgaria
Latvia
Sweden 1876 1911 (2 2 ) Harvard
George T . Summerlin4 Venezuela
Panama 1872 1909 (24) W est Point
Ralph J. Totten4 Union of South Africa 1880 1908 (25) Business School
Alexander W . W eddell^ Argentina
Spain 1876 1908 (20) George Wash­ington U.
Sumner W elles 5 Cuba 1892 1915 (15) Harvard
Post W heeler 4 Albania 1869 1906 (27) Princeton
Francis W hite 6 Czechoslovakia 1892 1915 (18) Yale
Appendix 3 (continued)
Name
Countries 
As C -o f-M
Year of 
Birth Entered F .S . Education
4
Sheldon Whitehouse Columbia 1883 1909 (24) Yale
John C . W iley  6 Latvia 1893 1915 (18) Georgetown U
Charles S. W ilson ^ Yugoslavia 1873 1901 (32) Harvard
Edwin C . W ilson ® Uruguary 1893 1920 (13) U . M ichigan
Hugh R. W ilson^ Switzerland
Germany 1886 1911 (22) Yale
J. Butler W right ^ Uruguary
Czechoslovakia
Cuba 1877 1909 (24) Princeton
1 Indicates countries commissioned to as a ch ief-of-m ission under FDR.
2Number in parenthesis refers to years of diplomatic experience prior to appointment as ch ief-o f-m ission  
under FDR.
3 Refers, ip most cases, to place of undergraduate education. Several officers attended two or more 
un ivers ities , and several received advance degrees. Nelson T. Johnson and George S. Messersmith 
attended the universities noted but did not graduate. The primary purpose of this column is to 
indicate whether the officer attended a public or private institution of higher education.
^Indicates that officer was a ch ief-of-m ission under President Hoover a t time of FDR's inauguration and 
was retained in a sim ilar capacity by FDR, though not necessarily in the same country.
Appendix 3 (continued)
5MacMurray and Robbins were serving in the State Department at time of FDR's inauguration. Phillips  
and W elles were temporarily resigned from the Foreign Service. All four had prior experience as ch ie fs - 
of-m ission.
^Indicates officers who received firs t appointment as a chief-of-m ission under FDR. Two of them— Carr 
and W hite— held high positions w ithin the State Department prior to their appointments.
Sources: State Department Biographic Register, 1932-1940 (Washington, D .C .;  Government Printing 
O ffice , 1932-1940); United States Chiefs of M ission , 1778-1973 (Washington, D .C .:  
Government Printing O ffice , 1973).
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Appendix 4
Name
Edward Albright
James M . Baker
Anthony J. Drexel 
Biddle, Jr.
Robert W . Bingham 
Claude G. Bowers
Spruille Braden 
W illiam  C . B ullitt
Robert G . Caldw ell
Characteristics of Non-Career C h ie fs-o f M ission  
1933-1939
Countries 
As C -o f-M
Finland 
Costa Rica
Siam
Year of 2 
Birth
1873(66)
1861(72)
Residence
Tenn.
S .C .
Education Occupation
Cumberland U. ' Publisher 
Wofford College Librarian
Norway
Poland
Great Britain
Spain
Chile
Columbia
U .S .S .R .
France
Portugal
Bolivia
1897(38) Pa.
1871(62) Ky.
1878(59) N .Y .
1894(44) N .Y .
1891(42) Pa.
1882(54) Tex.
High School Business
U . Louisville Publisher
High School
Yale
Yale
Princeton
Journalist;Historian
Business
Business, travel
Professor
Name
Frank P. Corrigan
John Cudahy
Josephus Daniels  
Joseph E. Davies
Fay A. des Portes
W illiam  E.Dodd 
George H . Earle, I I I  
G renville T . Emmet
John D . Erwin
Appendix 4 (continued)
Countries
As C -o f-M
El Salvador
Panama
Venezuela
Poland
Irish  Free State 
Mexico
U .S .S .R .
Belgium
Bolivia
Guatemala
Germany
Austria..
Netherlands
Austria
Honduras'
Year of 
Birth
1881(53)
1887(46)
1862(71)
1876(60)
1890(43)
1869(64)
1890(43)
1877(57)
1883(54)
Residence
Oh.
W is .
N .C .
D .C .
S .C .
111.
Pa.
N .Y .
Tenn.
Education
Western 
Reserve U .
Occupation
M .D .
Harvard Business
U.North Carolina^ Publisher
U . Wisconsin Lawyer
N.C. Agri.College Business;Politician  
U. Leipzig Professor
Harvard
Harvard
High School
Business; Politician
Lawyer
Journalist
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Appendix 4 (continued)
Name 
Bert Fish 
Antonio Gonzales
Hugh G . Grant 
Florence Harriman 
W illiam  H . Hornibrook
Findley B. Howard
Joseph P. Kennedy 
Boaz Long
Breckinridge Long 
Lincoln MacVeagh
Countries
As C -o f-M
Egypt
Panama
Ecuador
Venezuela
Albania
Norway
Persia 
Costa Rica
Paraguay
Great Britain
Nicaragua
Eduador
Ita ly
Greece
Year of 
Birth
1875(58)
1888(45)
1888(47)
1870(67)
1884(49)
1885(50)
1888(49)
1876(57)
1881(52)
1890(43)
Residence Education
Fla.
N .Y .
Ala.
D .C .
Utah
Nebr.
N .Y .
N .M .
M o.
Conn.
John B. Stetson U.
George
Washington U. 
Harvard 
Private Tutors
U . Michigan 
U . Nebraska
Harvard
Occupation 
Lawyer; Judge
Lawyer
Journalist; Professor 
Socialite
Publisher
Law yer;U .S . 
Customs Agent
Business
S tM ic h a e l College3 Business
Princeton
Harvard
Lawyer; Politician  
Publisher; Business
Appendix 4 (continued)
Name
Countries 
As C -o f-M
Year of 
Birth Residence Education Occupation
W .W , M cDow ell Irish Free State 1867(66) M ont. Union C ity  College Mining;Ranching
John F. Montgomery Hungary 1878(55) C a l. Business School Business
David H . Morris Belgium 1872(61) N .Y . Harvard Lawyer
M eredith Nicholson Paraguay 
Venezuela 
Nicaragua 1866(67) Ind. Private Tutors Journalist; Novelist
Owen J .C . Norem Lithuania 1902(35) M ont. St. O laf Lutheran Pastor
Ruth Bryan Owen Denmark 1885(48) F la . U . Nebraska Lecturer; Politician
Alvin M . Owsley Rumania
Irish  Free State
Denmark 1888(45) Tex.
N. Texas State 
Teachers C . Lawyer
Herbert Clairborne Pell Portugal 1884(56) R .I . Harvard Politician
D aniel C . Roper Canada 1867(72) D .C . Duke U . Lawyer:
Leo R. Sack Costa Rica 1889(44) Pa. U . M issouri Journalist
Appendix 4 (continued)
Name
H al H . Sevier
Countries
As C -o f-M
Chile
Year of 
Birth
1978(55)
Residence
Tex.
Education
High School
Occupation
Publisher
Jesse I .  Straus France
Laurence A. Steinhardt Sweden
Peru
U .S .S .R .
Laurts S . Swenson
Lester A. Walton
Netherlands
Liberia
1872(61)
1892(41)
1865(68)
1882(53)
N .Y .
N .Y .
M inn.
N .Y .
Harvard
Columbia 
Luther College 
High School
Business
Lawyer
Banker
Journalist
i
OJ
0000I
1 Indicates countries commissioned to as ch ief-of-m ission under FDR.
Number in parenthesis refers to the .age of the ch ief-of-m ission at the time of his or her appointment under 
FDR.
O
Did not graduate.
Sources*. State Department Biographic Register, 1932-1940 (Washington, D .C .:  Government Printing 
O ffice , 1932-1940); United States Chiefs of M iss ion , 1778-1973 (Washington, D .C . ;
Government Printing O ffice , 1973).
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Appendix 5
Countries W ith Embassies and Legations 
By Geographical Region 
1933-1939
Western Europe Scandanavia
Central and 
Eastern Europe
Africa and 
The East Latin America
Belgium 1 Denmark Albania China Argentina
Canada Finland Austria Egypt Bolivia
France Norway Bulgaria Japan Brazil
Germany Sweden Czechoslovakia Liberia Chile
Great Britain Greece Persia 3 Columbia
Irish  Free State . Hungary Siam Costa Rica
Ita ly Latvia 2 Turkey Cuba
Netherlands Lithuania Union of South Dominican Republic
Portugal Poland Africa Ecuador
Spain
Switzerland
Rumania 
Soviet Union 
Yugoslavia •
El Salvador
Guatemala
H aiti
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguary
Peru
Uruguary
Venezuela
Appendix 5 (continued)
■^Ministers to Belgium were also accredited to Luxembourg. They resided at Brussels.
^M inisters to Latvia were also accredited to Estonia. They resided at Riga.
3The M in is ter to Persia in 1935 was also accredited to Afganistan for that year on ly. He 
resided at Teheran.
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Appendix 6
C h ie f-o f-M iss ion  Appointments by Geographical Region 
1933-1939
Percentage
Region Posts 1 Appointments Career Non-Career Career
Western Europe 11 26 9 17 35
Scandanavia 4 11 5 6 45
Central and Eastern
Europe 12 27 15 12 55
Latin America 20 56 32 24 57
Africa and the East 8 12 ,8 4 67
Totals 55 132 69 63
*Afganistan-Persia, Belgium-Luxembourg, and Estonia-Lativia are counted as one post each. 
The M inisters to these posts held dual accreditation.
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